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PREFACE
This volume contains the findings
from a series of case studies that comprised

The case studies themselves are useful
summaries and analyses of transfer issues in

the primary work in this project A major
purpose of this project was to evaluate

the context of a specific project Each of
them can stand on its own as a piece of

transfer issues in relation to specific examples
where these issues were raised. We examined
Bureau of Reclamation projects in eight
states (see next page). Transfers involving a
change of use of water either had occurred
in each of the projects or had been seriously
proposed.

research and analysis. Special attention was
given to the Central Valley Project in
California because of its size and its
importance.
Ultimately, however, the case

The case studies are the product of
work by a number of people. Bruce Driver
was the author of the Central Valley Project
case study. Richard Wahl prepared the case
studies of projects in Arizona and New
Mexico. Teresa Rice was the primary author
for the three case studies in Utah and the
two in Colorado. Steve Bushong prepared
the Casper-Alcova case study.
Larry
MacDonnell authored the Newlands and
Rapid Valley case studies.
Research

studies were intended only as a means to get

at the end which was to analyze general
federal law and policy affecting transferability
of Bureau-supplied water. The results of this
effort are contained in volume one.
Research

supported

by

the

U.S.

Geological Survey,
Department of the
Interior, under USGS award number 14-080001-G1736. The views and conclusions in

this document are those of the authors and
not be interpreted as necessarily

should

representing the official policies, either
expressed or implied, of the U.S. Government

assistance by Rhonda Egan and Emily Keimig,

University of Colorado School of Law (Class
of 1992) and Peter Waack (Class of 1991) is

acknowledged with thanks.
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ARIZONA CASE STUDIES

ARIZONA CASE STUDIES1
This

When one hears of water transfers in

activity

has

meant

that

in

Arizona, one probably first thinks of the

Arizona, the federal government has been a

purchases of rural lands by cities in order to

participant

gain rights to their groundwater supplies for

surface water rights.

future urban growth. According to the state's
groundwater code7 cities within designated

is complicated by several factors.

"active management areas" must demonstrate

a 100-year assured supply of water before
land is subdivided. This has set off something
of a bidding war between cities and has
resulted in a good deal of controversy-pitting

urban areas and counties against rural ones
and areas within active management areas

in

the

market

for

transfer

of

However, this market

(1)

Much

of the surface water use in Arizona from

federal projects is from the Colorado River.
The Secretary of the Interior has particular
authority over contracting for water from the
Colorado River (more authority than in
Reclamation projects elsewhere). Therefore
federal rules and procedures may have more
importance, compared with state law, than in

against those that are not. Many of these
purchases of privately owned groundwater

other areas of the west

have a potential connection to the federal
Bureau of Reclamation.
The purchasers

Colorado River water would take place are
not clear. (2) The Central Arizona Project
is relatively recent, with the result that not all
of the water is under contract Although all

expect to be able to utilize surplus capacity in
the federal conveyance canal of the Central
Arizona Project in order to convey their
groundwater when it is needed.

federal

rules

under

which

However,

transfers

the

of

of the water was allocated to specific parties
by the Secretary of the Interior, some
contracts

Although

most

of

the

publicity

concerning water transfers in Arizona has
focused on groundwater purchases, there is
also a growing interest in transfer of surface
water supplies from federal projects.
This
interest is motivated by several factors: the
senior surface water rights of some federal
contractors (particularly those preceding the

authorization of the Central Arizona Project),

federal contractor seniority for access to the
Central
Arizona
Project's
conveyance
facilities, and the potential to utilize existing
surface supplies to satisfy certain federal
obligations. In particular, purchase of water
from federal contractors has been utilized in

past Indian water settlements and is being
looked at as one source in future settlements.
Purchase of surface water is also being
considered by Phoenix area cities as a
potential source of replacement water for
Cliff Dam, a federal storage facility that was
halted by Congress in 1988.

have been declined and other
contracts have not been signed.
This has

meant that a great deal of. attention is
focused on the reallocation of the declined
water

and on what will happen to the
allocated, but uncontracted water, rather than
on transfer of water already under contract.
(3) Arizona statutes provide a procedure for

a "severance and transfer" of surface water
rights, but one provision in this statute
requires that such transfers be approved by
all water districts in the same basin. This is
in stark contrast to the transfer laws of most
western states where a state agency is
responsible for protecting third-party interests
in water. This provision has the potential to
halt, or to greatly complicate, transfer of
surface rights falling under state water law.
At a minimum, a transfer would require

agreement on the part of a large number of
water users. Whether transfers of Colorado

River entitlements (including allocations of
CAP water) fall under this requirement is
uncertain - perhaps not, particularly given

that the rights were not obtained under state
law. (4) Certain other special provisions also
affect the transfer of surface water rights on
some federal projects.
For example, the
particular structure of the water rights within
the . Salt
River
Project
clouds
the
transferability of such water. In the course of
the following discussion we will return to a

more detailed examination of these various
factors, but first we provide some background
on the nature of federal facilities and
authorities within Arizona.
Background

The various compacts and pieces of

legislation relating to use of Colorado River
water and the court decisions based on them
are known as the "Law of the River." The
Colorado River Compact of 1922 states that
75 million acre-feet of water must be
delivered every 10 years by the Upper Basin
to Lee Ferry, the dividing point between the
Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, resulting
in an average of 7.5 million acre-feet per
year. The Upper Basin itself is allocated 7.5
million acre-feet, but, because annual flows of
the Colorado River average only around 14
million acre-feet, the obligation to deliver

California and Arizona were each entitled to
50 percent of any surplus flows.
For many years, Arizona had no
practical means to divert much of its share,

except for some diversions to low-lying lands

along the Colorado River in the Yuma Valley
before the river enters Mexico. Even in the
early 1980s, the state was utilizing only about
13 million acre-feet per year from the river.
In 1968, Arizona was able to secure passage
of the Colorado River Basin Project Act (82
Stat. 885; 43 U.S.C. 1501), authorizing
construction of the Central Arizona Project
(CAP) to divert water from the Colorado
River to the state's population centers

surrounding the cities of Phoenix and Tucson
in the south central part of the state.
Arizona's success in securing authorization of
the Central Arizona Project did not come
cheaply, however; in the process, it had to
give priority to Lower Basin diversions to
California in times of low flow. This means

that as demands on the river increase in the

Upper Basin (Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah),
Arizona will have to bear the brunt of
reduced Lower Basin diversions in times of
shortage in order to meet the U.S. obligation
for water deliveries to Mexico.

water to Lee Ferry may in effect reduce
Upper Basin entitlements to less than 7.5

million acre-feet
This has not been a
problem to date because Upper Basin
depletions have not exceeded 4 million acrefeet The Mexican Water Treaty of 1944
allocated 1.5 million acre-feet of water per
year, to Mexico, further adding to the
demands on Colorado River water.

An allocation among the Lower Basin
states was specified by the Boulder Canyon

Any diversion

of water

from

the

Colorado River (including those within the
Central Arizona Project) require a contract

with the Secretary of the Interior.
One
implication is that the Secretary's authority
over allocation of Colorado River water is
nearly absolute • perhaps limited only by the
contracts he has signed for water use.
In
actual practice, the Secretary has often made

Act of 1928 and the Supreme Court's 1963

an attempt to work with state agencies (in
Arizona, primarily with the state Department
of Water Resources) in the allocation of

decision in Arizona v. California:

water.

4.4 million
acre-feet of Colorado River water to
California, 2.8 million acre-feet to Arizona,
and 0.3
million acre-feet
to
Nevada.

The Bureau of Reclamation also
works closely with the Central Arizona Water
Conservancy District in operation of the
Central Arizona Project
But certain
questions remain.
Do federal rather than

state

definitions

of

appurtenancy

and

beneficial use apply to all CAP and other
Colorado River contracts? Will the federal

government bear primary responsibility for
determining historical consumptive use of any
Colorado River contracts that are transferred?
One answer may be that there is a degree of

Arizona, along the Colorado River.
The
original plans were to irrigate another 45,000
acres on the adjacent Yuma Mesa to the east
However, the acreage of this project was
scaled down considerably to the 3,305-acre
Yuma
Auxiliary
Project,
which
began

delivering water in 1922.

gradation of federal authority, with the exact

nature to be determined by future federal and

The

Gila

Project

(see

Figure

2)

state actions. The answer may also depend in
part into which class of contracts a particular
transfer falls. At any rate, for purposes of
presenting some case studies and for
discussing the legal and contractual questions
surrounding them, three distinct categories

irrigates some 95,000 acres lying along
Arizona's Gila River to the east of Yuma, as
well as lands to the northeast and south of
the city. In the late 1800s, settlers along the
Gila River diverted water from that river to
irrigate their crops. However, after floods

suggest

themselves:
(1)
transfers of
contractual rights to pre-CAP Colorado River

washed out the diversion works, they turned

water, (2) transfers of contractual rights to
CAP water deliveries, and (3) transfer of
other surface water rights from federal
facilities; i.e., non-Colorado River water

salinity in the wells became a problem. The
Gila Project was designed to save the area by
importing surface flows from the Colorado

supplies, such as those of the Salt River
Project

in 1943. Deliveries to the Wellton-Mohawk
Irrigation District (east of Yuma along the

to pumping groundwater.

By the 1930s,

River, with the first water deliveries arriving

Gila River) began in 1952.
Transfers of contractual rights to pre-CAP

Colorado River water
In Arizona, there are a number of
water users in the western and southwestern

part of the state that have contracts with the
Secretary of the Interior. Many of these take
water from the Lower Colorado River either
directly or through a project The Federal
projects in this area include the Yuma
Project, the Yuma Auxiliary Project, and the
Gila Project
The Yuma Project (see Figure 1)
receives water from the All-American Canal
to irrigate lands in both California (the
Reservation Division of the Project) and
Arizona (the Valley Division). The project
was authorized in 1904 and began delivering
water in 1907. Water is carried by a siphon
from California under the Colorado River to
irrigate about 54,000 acres in the Valley
Division, lying generally southwest of Yuma

In addition to these two projects, the
Secretary has contracts for Colorado River
water with other entities that are not part of
any local Bureau of Reclamation Project (see
Table 1 and Figure 3). The Bureau lists
these contracts under the Boulder Canyon

Project, of which Hoover Dam is the
principal facility.
Below Lake Havasu at
Parker Dam (the point where CAP water is
pumped) are the Ehrenberg Water Company
(at Ehrenberg), the city of Yuma, and the
Cibola Valley Irrigation and Drainage District
(at Cibola).
Above Parker Dam, the
Secretary has contracts with the following
Arizona entities: Bullhead City, Kingman, the
Lake Havasu Irrigation and Drainage District
(at Lake Havasu City), the Mohave Water
Conservation District (near Bullhead City),
and the Mohave Valley Irrigation and
Drainage District (near Needles, California).

Table i.

Colorado River Contracts in Arizona

Projected

Population

Current

Contract
(acre-feet)

(other than CAP)

State's

Recommendation
(acre-feet)

Contractor

bv 2040

Mohave Water
Con* Diet*

8,880

1,800

1,800

0%

Bullhead
City

74,610

8,200

15,210

85%

Mohave
Valley IDD

14,300*

23,000

23,000

0%

1,640

2,000

2,000

8,780

993

1,420

43%

73,170

14,801

19,180

30%

Consolidated
Water Col.

3,590

680

800

18%

Parker

6,890

630

1,660

163%

Ehrenberg

2,110

500

500

0%

Golden
Shores

Increase

0% •

Havasu

Water Co.
Lake Havasu

City

Source:

Arizona Dept.

of Water Resources
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Transfers related to the Yuma Desalting
Plant

Purchases by the United States related
to the settlement ofIndian water claims

Historically, one of the factors motivating

A more recent market transfer of

federal acquisition of water in this area (or
acquisition of irrigation land that would
otherwise utilize water) was the concern over
meeting treaty obligations to Mexico. The
Mexican Treaty of 1942 obligated the U.S. to
provide 1.5 million acre-feet annually to
Mexico.
In 1973, minute 242 of the
International
Boundary
and
Water
Commission obligated the U.S. to assure that
this water has no greater concentration of
total dissolved solids than 115 ppm (plus or
minus 30 ppm) more than the total dissolved
solids in the water arriving at Imperial Dam.
The goal was to provide water quality
comparable to that of the flows being

water in Arizona is the purchase by the
United States of an entitlement to 50,000

diverted

to the

agricultural

areas on

the

northern side of the border through the
AIl-American Canal.

acre-feet of water to be used in partially
meeting the requirements of the Ak Chin
Water Rights Settlement Act. The United
States purchased Colorado River water
entitlements from the districts of the Yuma
Mesa Division of the Gila Project
The Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian
Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988
authorized the Secretary to acquire 22,000
acre-feet of water (consumptive use) from
pre-CAP Colorado River contractors. The
Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District agreed to
provide the federal government this quantity

authorized in the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation

of water.
This is to be obtained by the
purchase of 2,000 acres of land and certain
other measures. The estimated consumptive
use per acre in this area is about 3 acre-feet
per acre, so retiring 2,000 acres would yield
about 6,000 acre-feet
The rest of the
amount is evidently to be achieved by a
reduction in deliveries in other portions of
the district and reduced application rates of
water. One of the principal attractions of the

District in the Gila Project, and this measure
was implemented.2 The purpose of acquiring

transaction to the district is that the
legislation provided them with an exemption

these lands was to leave more fresh water in
the Colorado River, thereby reducing the

from acreage limitation* In fact, subsequent
offers to the district to buy additional water
(see discussion of Cliff Dam replacement

To
implement
the
U.S.
salinity
obligations to Mexico, Congress passed the
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act in
1974.
Among other measures, the act
authorized the Secretary to remove 10,000
acres from the 75,000 acres originally

burden on the Yuma desalting plant which
treats agricultural drainage water from the
project to a quality suitable to re-enter the

Colorado River below the Wellton-Mohawk
District The acquisition of these lands was,
in effect, a purchase of water entitlements by
the federal government (for additional
discussion of the salinity control issues and
other perspective water trades related to it,
see Wahl, 1989, pp. 253-269).

Of course, in
this case the purchased entitlement was not
to be transferred to another location, but to
be left in the river.

water) have been refused by the district

Proposed

transfers

relating

to

the

replacement of Cliff Dam

There is a recent set of alternative
proposals that would transfer about 30,000
acre-feet of water from agricultural areas in
Arizona to central Arizona cities by utilizing
CAP conveyance facilities.
Some of the
alternatives involve the transfer of water from
pre-CAP Colorado River contractors to CAP

contractors.

In December 1987, Congress

voted to delete the proposed Cliff Dam from

the future construction schedule of the CAP.
The elimination of Cliff Dam had been
sought
by
environmental
groups
(the
"Coalition to Stop Cliff Dam") because the
dam would have flooded a bald eagle nesting

area, as well as having other adverse impacts.
In exchange, the Secretary of the Interior was
authorized to purchase up to 30,000 acrefeet of water rights (and any associated lands)
for a replacement water supply (Energy and

Water Department Appropriation Act of
1988). The purchase would be paid for by
Arizona cities.
These cities had already
agreed to make advance payments into a fund
for constructing Cliff Dam, and, after the
decision not to fund Cliff Dam, the cities

agreed to keep these contributions in escrow

while sources of replacement water were
examined.

By December 1988, the Bureau of
Reclamation had identified several alternatives
for the replacement water. These alternatives
were presented to the interested parties so

that their reaction could guide the Bureau's

future study and implementation plans. Since
most of the potential sources would yield less

that the full 30,000 acre-feet of replacement
water, the plan could involve implementing
some combination of the alternatives. The
various sources of replacement water are
indicated in Figure 4.

water. This water would be diverted at the
CAP pumping plant on Lake Havasu. After

accounting for conveyance losses and reduced
supplies during shortage years, an average of

about 16,872 feet would be deliverable to the

Phoenix area over the 1997 to 2050 period.
The delivery schedule would have some
restrictions imposed by the current operating
procedures of the Central Arizona Water
Conservation District Only 11% of annual
diversions could be delivered to the Phoenix
area in any one month, limiting the use of
this water to supply peak demands.
The Bureau of Reclamation estimates
that it would cost $1,100 to $3,500 per acre
to purchase the lands, equivalent to about
$45 to $145 per acre-foot per year for the
deliverable water, once investigation and

other costs are added.3
In addition,
operation, maintenance, and replacement
costs for delivering the water would be about
$60 per acre-foot The cities receiving the
water would also be required to pay the
capital cost component for CAP municipal

and industrial supplies, which is $12 per acrefoot for 1997 and rising on an established

schedule to $40 per acre-foot by 2025. In
total, the estimated cost to Arizona cities
would be about $117 to $217 per acre-foot in
1997 and rising by another $28 per acre-foot
by 2025.

Under this proposal, the U.S. would
become owner of the Cibola Valley Irrigation

Potential transfer from the Cibola
Valley Irrigation District. One of the districts
that
expressed
immediate
interest
in
transferring water for the Cliff Dam
replacement supply was the Cibola Valley
Irrigation District The district, comprised of
some 4,840 acres, is located along the
Colorado River below Lake Havasu.
The

District lands. There has been discussion of
transferring management of these lands to the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to supplement
wildlife habitat along the Colorado River. In
fact, one of the motivations for the fanners
offering to sell their lands is the amount of
damage their crops sustain from birds passing
through the area.
If the land were

district

indicated that a majority of its
landowners were willing to sell their lands.

maintained for wildlife purposes, a certain

Assuming the entire district did so, this would
provide an estimated 18,600 acre-feet of

acre) would be retained
vegetation for wildlife.

amount of water (probably 0.5 acre-feet per

for

maintaining

for Purchasing

Figure 4.
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Potential transfer from the Mohave

back to the Colorado River by constructing
a pipeline from the district to the river. A
second possibility would be to exchange the

Vallev Irrigation District The Mohave Valley
Irrigation District lies along the Colorado
River north of Lake Havasu. The Mohave
Valley district expressed interest in selling up
to 4,000 acres of agricultural lands, which

pumped groundwater with other Yuma Valley

water users for a portion of their Colorado
River water entitlement In either case, this
would allow the Bureau to divert water

would
reduce
both
their
agricultural
entitlement and their municipal and industrial
diversions
from
the
Colorado
River.
Purchase of 3,800 acres would yield an
estimated 11,400 acre-feet (which when
combined with 18,600 acre-feet of water from
the Cibola Valley Irrigation District would
yield the full 30,000 acre-feet of Cliff Dam
replacement water).
After subtracting for
conveyance losses and reductions during years
of shortage, an annual average supply of
10360 acre-feet could be expected at the

upstream at the CAP'S Lake Havasu pumping
plant and to deliver about 11,250 acre-feet to
the Phoenix area.
The Bureau estimates that land costs
would average $2,500 per acre in the
Hillander "C district, equivalent to $70 per
acre-foot for water deliverable to Phoenix.
The annual costs for pumping and wellfield

operation are estimated at $20 per acre-foot
Tne capital costs of constructing a collector

Phoenix metropolitan area delivered through

system are unknown.

the CAP aqueduct The district's expression
of interest in December 1988 did not involve

have to be added the CAP O&M costs of

To these costs would

$60 per acre-foot and the capital cost
component for municipal
and industrial water.
Therefore, the total
annual costs would exceed $162 per acre-foot

commitments of individual landowners to sell
water.

The Bureau estimates that land costs
in the Mohave Valley area would average
$4,000 to $5,000 per acre, equivalent to $134
to $167 per acre-foot of water deliverable to
the Phoenix area. Costs for CAP operation
and maintenance and capital costs would
bring the total 1997 costs of this water up to

Potential transfer from the Harquahala
Vallev Irrigation District Another potential
source
identified
by
the
Bureau
of
Reclamation for Cliff Dam replacement water
is the Harquahala Valley Irrigation District.

$206 to $239 per acre-foot
By 2025,
increases in CAP charges would raise these
rates by $28 per acre-foot

This district, comprised of some 33,000 acres,
does not lie along the Colorado River, but
southwest of Phoenix in Maricopa County in

in 1997 and $190 per acre-foot in 2025.

central Arizona. The district holds a contract

Potential transfer from the Hillander

for CAP agricultural water. An estimated
25,000 acres are available for resale. The
Bureau estimates that only 10,000 acres would
be needed to yield 30,000 acre-feet of Cliff

"C Irrigation District
The Hillander "C
Irrigation District lies near the Colorado
River and just north of the Mexican Border
(see Figure 4).
The district utilizes both
groundwater and water diverted from the
Colorado River. There are two possible ways

Dam replacement water. After taking into
account CAP conveyance losses and projected
shortage years, an average of 27,475 acre-

of obtaining an additional 11,400 acre-feet of
water from the Hillander district if a

feet would be deliverable to the Phoenix area

over the 1997 to 2050 period.

sufficient number of farmers were willing to
sell their irrigated lands. One would be to
divert that amount of pumped groundwater

The district has an allocation of 7.69%
of the CAP'S irrigation deliveries.
After
8

assuring that groundwater was of satisfactory
quality,
the
proposal
would
involve
rehabilitation of existing wells and installation
of at least one new well Therefore, there
are two potential ways of providing the water

to the Phoenix metropolitan area.
One
would be to deliver water from the wells to

other Harquahala Valley Irrigation District
lands in exchange for a corresponding amount
of their CAP allocation. Another would be

priority or for CAP agricultural water.
Where land and water were offered together,
the cities insisted that the U.S. be responsible
for the land costs. The cities also requested
that the Harquahala purchase be removed
from consideration since they were separately
considering purchase of the groundwater from
that district, with the idea of letting the
federal government utilize the district's CAP
allocation for the Fort McDowell Indian

to construct a collector and pipeline system to
convey the water to the CAP aqueduct

water settlement (or some other Indian water

The following estimates the cost of
the Grst of these alternatives.
The cities
would be required to pay the incremental
component of the CAP charges (above that
already being paid by the Harquahala district
for agricultural use). This increment would
be $2 per acre-foot in 1997, rising to $38 per
acre-foot in 2025. Land costs are estimated
at $2,500 to $3,000 per acre, equivalent to
about $83 to $100 per acre-foot annually.
Preliminary estimates of the annualized cost
of constructing the well-field are $59 per
acre-foot and the annual operating costs are
estimated at $60 per acre-foot The costs of

The
subsequently

a

conveyance

system

are

yet

to

be

determined. The cities would also have to
compensate the remaining farmers in the

district for adverse impacts on their
groundwater extraction. Therefore, the cost
to the cities would exceed $204 to $221 per
acre-foot annually for 1997 and another $28
per acre-foot by 2025.
Offer price from the Phoenix-area
cities. In November 1989 the cities that had
contributed up-front funds to finance Cliff
Dam specified the prices they would offer for

replacement water

$1200 per acre-foot for

Colorado River water with a pre-1968 priority
(prior to CAP) or for CAP water with an
M&I priority (see discussion of priorities of
different classes of CAP water below, under
section on the CAP), and $650 per acre-foot
for Colorado River water with a 1968 or later

settlement in the Phoenix area).

Bureau
of
Reclamation
sent letters to the various

Colorado River contractors in Arizona, but
none expressed interest in selling water at the
prices specified by the cities. The cities will
have to decide Lf they want to enter into
negotiations with some of these entities, or

merely take back the funds that they have
escrowed for Cliff Dam replacement water.
Comment on land purchases.

It is

notable that all of the Cliff Dam replacement
water

alternatives were presented by the
Bureau of Reclamation in terms of purchases
of land, not just water supplies. This raises

the question whether the land purchases are
necessary, whether it is appropriate for the
federal government to be the owner of the

land; and whether the land, absent the
irrigation water supply, would have value for
grazing or other purposes. If the answer to
the latter question is yes, then the landowners
may be willing to sell their water supplies for
something less than the total land value. In
the Cibola Valley case, there has been some
discussion of making the lands available for
wildlife uses.
However, there does not
appear to be any particular rationale for
federal ownership of the lands in the other
cases.

The

Bureau

has

examined

these

examples in terms of land sales in part
because the Cliff Dam replacement legislation
authorizes land purchases. The Bureau also

feels it is on safer legal ground because of

demands against urban demands and Indian
water claims against non-Indian demands.
This allocation involved more than seventy

questions whether the water must be regarded
as appurtenant to the land In this case it is
not
clear
whether
state
or
federal
requirements apply and what appurtenancy
requirements, if any, may be applicable. Such

municipal and industrial entities, twenty
irrigation districts, and twelve Indian tribes.
The Central Arizona Water Conservation
District (CAWCD) was created in 1971 by
the Arizona legislature as an umbrella agency
charged with coordinating with the Bureau of
Reclamation and operating the completed
project
The Bureau executed a master
repayment contract with CAWCD prior to
the start of project construction in 1972. In
turn, CAWCD is responsible for executing
subcontracts with the various individual water
entities (the Bureau of Reclamation will also

a lack of clarification of water rights
procedures can delay and complicate water
transfers, as well as raising the costs of the
transaction.
The Central Arizona Project

The principal components of the
Central Arizona Project are shown in Figure
5.
Colorado River water is pumped
approximately 1,200 feet up from Lake
Havasu behind Parker Dam into the Granite
Reef Aqueduct
This structure has, since
1985, carried water about 190 miles to an
area just northeast of Phoenix near the
confluence of the Salt and Verde rivers. The
second section of the aqueduct, the Salt-Gila
Aqueduct, is designed to transport water an
additional 58 miles to agricultural areas near
the Gila River in Pinal County.
It began
providing deliveries in 1987.

be a party to the subcontracts).

Although the Secretary of the Interior
has final authority for allocating CAP water,
various Secretaries have relied heavily on the

state of Arizona to make recommendations
on the allocation for non-Indian water users.
State recommendations were based on
projected water needs throughout Arizona
and included uses for power development,
recreation, and municipal and domestic needs
of cities. Municipal and industrial demands
were projected by multiplying projections of
future population by estimated per capita
water use, with deductions for renewable
water supplies available to each entity. The
projections assumed substantial reductions in
per capita water use to be achieved through
water conservation initiatives.

The final portion of the aqueduct, the

Tucson Aqueduct, will lift water an additional

1,700 feet and extend another 60 miles to
Tucson
and
the
San
Xavier
Indian
Reservation south of Tucson.
Initial
deliveries through the Tucson Aqueduct are
slated for 1991. The conveyance of water
from the Colorado River is planned to
operate in conjunction with existing and
newly constructed reservoirs on tributaries of
the Colorado arising within Arizona, such as
the New Waddell Dam on the Agua Fria
River and the Modified Roosevelt Dam on
the Salt River (see figure 5).4

The

irrigation

allocations

recommended by Arizona did

not

assign

specific quantities of water, but instead
established pro rata shares of the CAP
supplies remaining after the municipal and
industrial demands were satisfied.
The

The initial allocation of CAP water
among the various water-using entities in

agricultural allocations were based on the

amount of historically irrigated acreage in
each district during the ten years prior to the

Arizona was a long and controversial process
extending over a period of six years - a
process that involved balancing agricultural

CAP authorization, with deductions for land
irrigated with renewable water supplies and
10

UTAH

Figure 5.
Source:

Central Arizona Project

Based on U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Project Data, p. 302. Washington, D.C., 1981.
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for expected future urbanization in each area
(see table 2).
In essence, the allocations
established a lower priority for non-Indian
irrigation water in recognition of the fact that

Transfers between agricultural users and
between municipal and industrial users

the total CAP supplies from the Colorado

transactions that could occur with CAP water

Probably

the

least

complicated

River were subject to substantial variability

are transfers within either the agricultural

(refer to table 3).

category

or

the

municipal

and

industrial

category, rather than between the two.
Federal charges for agricultural water must
cover operation and maintenance costs and
an appropriate share of capital. When the
CAP was authorized in 1968, the total
agricultural water rate was expected to be
about $16 per acre-foot By 1986 the rate
had increased to $57 per acre-foot (a capital

The Secretary of the Interior took
primary responsibility for allocating water
among Indian tribes in Arizona (consistent
with his trust responsibility for Indian tribes)
and for determining the relative priorities of

Indian, municipal and industrial, and (nonIndian) agricultural water. In March 1982,
Secretary of Interior James Watt selected a
"final" allocation of CAP water.
Watt's

cost of $2 per acre-foot plus operation and
maintenance costs of $55 per acre-foot). This
price may make the water unattractive to

allocation placed 510,000 acre-feet of the
M&I water on a first priority with 258,300

some agricultural producers, even though they

acre-feet of highest priority Indian water (see

have already contracted for water (under the
terms of the CAP contracts, irrigation districts
pay only for the amount of water they use

the last column of table 3). The remaining
Indian entitlement (51,500 acre-feet) would
retain a second priority.
The additional

each year). For many irrigation districts, local
groundwater may remain a less expensive
alternative for a number of years (Bush and
Martin, 1986). Although contractors could
opt simply not to take delivery, they might

130,000 acre-feet of M&I water requested by
Arizona would have a third priority, leaving
non-Indian irrigation water with a fourth
priority.

also lease agricultural entitlements to other

Possibilities for voluntary transfers of
CAP water

agricultural water users. Possible purchasers
would include other producers with a
competitive advantage or those who grow

There are several different categories

perennial or high-value crops ~ for example,

of CAP water that

owners of citrus groves or pecan trees.
Additional CAP agricultural entitlements
would be of at least limited value to some
agricultural water users because entitlements

could potentially be

involved in voluntary market transfers, such as
non-Indian agricultural supplies, non-Indian

municipal and industrial supplies, and Indian
supplies. A number of federal contractual
and legal provisions currently limit the

are determined on a pro rata basis of
available CAP agricultural supplies.
Of
course, purchasers of CAP agricultural
supplies would need to recognize that the
purchased supplies would also be subject to
reductions during years of low flow.

transferability of the water in each category.

But, as discussed in the next subsection, the
Bureau of Reclamation appears to have the
discretion to modify most, if not all, of these.
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Table

2.

Central Arizona Project Vater Allocations - Quantities
Secretary

Kleppe's Indian
allocation vith
1977-79 state

Vater entity

H&I entities

Apache Junction
Avondale
Casa Grande
Chandler
Chaparral City Vater Co.
Clearvater Co.
Coolidge
Consolidated Vater Co.
Cottonvood Vater Co.
Crescent Valley Vater Co.
Desert Sage Vater Co.

Eloy
Florence
Floving Veils I.D.
Gilbert
Glendale
Globe
Goodyear
Green Valley Vater Co.
Litchfield Park Ser. Co.
McMicken I.D.

Mesa

Miami-Claypool
Nogales

Pain Springs Vater Co.
Paradise Valley Vater Co.
Payson
Peoria
Phoenix
Prescott

Rio Rico
Scottsdale
Sun City

Teope
Tucson

Turner Ranches

Other Mil Entities
Pover Plant Cooling
Mining
Recreation

State land/Phoenix Park
Total Mil

recoofflenda t i ons *
(acre-feet)
4,300
2,000
10,500
2,600

6,978
2,849
2,000

12,600
2,500
1,200
6,000
2,700
1,000
0
0
12,700
2,900
740

3,932
1,789

2,697

5,933
2,171
1,641

4,354
7,235
14,083
3,480
2,374
1,900
5,580

2,600

5,900
2,500
15,600
2,400

9,513

3,800

0

2,700
0
102,000
3,500
160
17,600
23,900
3,400
97,800

•

20,129
1,829
3,949
2,919
3,231
4,995
15,000
113,882
7,127

2,683
19,702
15,835

37,750

4,315
151,064
3,932
22,990
43,218
60,784
989
39,090

509,496

638,823

1,900
11,200
100,000

0
2,456*

Current
status of

contracting6

(acre-feet)
6,000
4,099
8,884
3,668

3,900
690
2,600

3,400

Secretary
Van's
allocation

Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Pending
Pending
Pending
Signed
Signed
Signed

Signed
Signed

Pending
Signed
Signed
Signed

Signed
Signed
Oeclined
Pending
Signed
Signed
Pending
Signed

Signed
Pending
Pending
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed

Signed

Pending
•

Pending
Pending

(continued)
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2.

(continued)
Secretary

Vater entity

Indian tribes

Kleppe's Indian
allocation vith
1977-79 state

recommendations*
(acre-feet)

Secretary
Vatt's

allocation

Salt River Indian Coo.
San Carlos Apache
Tonto Apache
Yavapai

58,300
1,200
4,300
173,100
8,000
27,000
10,800
500
13,300
12,700
128
500

Total Indian

257,000

309,828

(percent)

(percent)

Pasqua Yaqui

Irrigation entities

Arcadia Vater Co*
Avra Valley Assoc.
Central Arizona I.D.
Chandler Heights 1.0.
Cotaro Morana I.D.
Farmers Investment Co.
Harquahala Valley I.D.
Hohokam I.D.
La Croix

Maricopa-Stanfield I.D.
Mar ley, JCemper Jr.
Marley, Reaper Sr.
McMickcn I.D.

MCMVCDfl
Nev Magna I.D.
Queen Crttk I.D.
Rood, V.E.
Roosevelt I.D.
Roosevelt Vater CD.
Salt River Project
San Carlos I.D.
San Tan I.D.
Tonapah I.D.
U.S. Forest Service
Total irrigation

0.14

3.68
19.50
0.22
2.97
1.79
8.39
6.97
0.05
22.10
0.05
0.01
8.65
3.12
4.88
4.82
0.05
0.13

5.64

0.00
4.51
0.09
2.24
0.00
100.00

13

contracting6

(acre-feet)

58,300
0
4,300
173,100
0
8,000
0
0
13,300
0
0
0

Ak Chin Indian Community
Camp Verde
Fort McDowell Indian Coo.
Gila River Indian Cob.
Papago-Chuichu
Papago-San Xavier
Papago-Schuk Toak

Current
status of

0.13
3.69
18.01
0.28
2.14
1.39
7.67
6.36

0.04

20.48
0.04
0.00

7.28
4.66

4.34

4.83

0.04
2.61
5.98
2.97
4.09
0.77

1.98
0.22
100.00

Signed
Signed
Signed
Pending

Signed

Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed
Signed

•

Pending
Declined
Signed
Signed
Pending
Pending
Signed
Signed
Declined
Signed
Declined
NA
Declined
Pending
Signed
Signed
Pending7
Declined
Signed

Declined
Pending
Signed
Signed
Declined

(continued)

Table

2

(continued)

Sources:
Secretary Kleppe's Indian allocation is front "Central Arizona
Project, Ariz.; Allocation of Project Water for Indian Irrigation Use," U.S.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, Federal Register
vol. 41, no. 202 (October 18, 1976), pp. 45883-89.
Secretary Watt's
allocation is from "Central Arizona Project, Arizona; Water Allocations and
Water Service Contracting!
Record of Decision," U.S. Department of the
Interior, 1983, Federal Register vol. 48, no. 58 (March 24, 1983), pp.

12446-52.

Other data is from Bureau of Reclamation records as of June 1986.

*M&I and irrigation allocations are for target year 2034.

Indian

allocation is through year 2005, after which Indians receive 202 of
irrigation or 10X of H&I supplies, whichever is most advantageous.

incorporates quantities from Secretary Andrus' 1980 Indian allocation

and quantities from Arizona's 1982 recommendations.
Secretary Watt's
allocation crlls for 100,000 acre-feet of vater for the Gila tribe to be
obtained froz treated effluent from Arizona cities. All allocations shown,
including Indian allocation, are for target year 2034.

eAs of July 1986.

4Indudes 35 entities with less than 2,000 acre-feet.

have signed contracts, 2 are pending, and 1 has declined.

Of these, 22

*0f 9 mines with allocations, 2 have declined and 7 are pending.
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Table

3*

Central Arizona Project Vater Allocations - Priorities

(in acre-feet)

-

Secretary Kleppe's
Indian
allocation (1976)
with 1977/79
state

recommendation

Priority

H&I

1

Indian

Total of
priority 1

510,000

51t000a

state

recommendation

561,000

Secretary
Watt's

Arizona
recommendation
(1902)

allocation
(1982)

(final)

510,000

640,000

510,000

283,800

158t300b

158t3OOb

793,800

798f3OOb

668t300b

(10Z of N&I)

Agriculture

2

Secretary

Andtus' Indian
allocation (1980)
with 1977/79

Ind - 26,000

Ind - 51.000

Agriculture

Agriculture

Ind - 51f000

Ind - 206,000

3

Mil -

130,000

Agriculture

4

Note:
"Ind" denotes Indian; "Mil" refers to non-Indian Municipal and industrial use;
"Agriculture* refers to non-Indian agricultural use.

Source; Andrus Indian allocation is from "Central Arizona Project; Allocations of Project
Water to Indian Tribes," U.S. Department of the Interior, Federal Register vol. 45, no. 239
(December 10, 1980), pp. 81265-73. Sources for otl**r data are the same as for table 2.

Allocation after 2005 is 10Z of Hfcl supplies or 20% of irrigation supplies, whichever is

greater.

The allocation based on H&I supplies is used here as more representative of a firm supply

because of the higher priority accorded to H&I supplies.

bExeludes 100,000 AF of water for the Cila tribe to be obtained from treated effluent from
Arizona cities.

Within the municipal and industrial
category, the growth of urban demands for
CAP water may differ from the projections
made before the initial CAP allocations. If
so, cities may find it advantageous to trade
their existing CAP water supplies among
themselves in order to balance demands with
available supplies. Such transfers of existing
contractual entitlements could be made either
on a short-term or long-term basis.
The
charge for CAP supplies by CAWCD to M&I
water entities was $55 per acre-foot for
operation and maintenance in 1986, plus $5
per acre-foot for capital. The capital charge
will increase on a preestablished schedule to

Project water scheduled for
delivery in any year under this
subcontract may be used by
the subcontractor or resold or
exchanged
by
the

$40

the

to pay under this subcontract,

charges for CAP agricultural water, M&I
entities must pay the capital charges for their

the excess amount shall be
paid
forthwith
by
the

water, whether or not they take delivery.
Therefore, cities not needing all of the water
they contracted for may be willing to sell or

subcontractor to the contractor
for application against the

lease water to other cities with greater water

obligation
States.

per acre-foot by 2024.

Unlike

subcontractor
appropriate

contractor [CAWCD]. If said
water is resold or exchanged
by the subcontractor for an
amount in excess of that which
the subcontractor is obligated

contractor's

of CAP supplies - $60 per acre-foot in 1986
to

to

agreements

approved by the contracting
officer
[the
Bureau
of
Reclamation]
and
the

demands. Those cities that need to purchase
additional supplies would find the total cost
and $95 per acre-foot in 2024 -

pursuant

to

repayment
the United

While this provision clearly acknowledges that
transfers may occur, it severely restricts thefinancial attractiveness to the selling party.

be

considerably less than the prices being paid
for privately developed water ($200-$300 per

No additional income can be immediately

forthcoming from the transaction to be used
for, say, financing district conveyance systems,
installing conservation measures, reducing the
district's charges to its members, or making
payments to farmers to retire marginal lands
from production. Of course, there would be
a limited financial incentive in that additional
income from the transfer would accelerate
payout of the subcontractor's obligation and
therefore move nearer the date after which
the subcontractor would no longer have to
assess CAP capital charges against its
members. Furthermore, if the transfer were
of sufficiently long duration, there could be
increased income to the selling or leasing
party after the federal obligation was repaid.
But in both cases, there is a significantly

acre-foot). Of course, water from the federal

project would be subject to mandatory
reductions in times of low flow on the
Colorado

River because of California's
priority among Lower Colorado River Basin
water users.

At present, there are certain federal
contractual provisions relating to transfers of

CAP irrigation or M&I water that would
severely limit such transactions.
Notable
among these are restrictions on the increased
income that could be realized by any water
entity leasing or selling water. Section 4.3(e)
of the CAP water service subcontract with
each agricultural water district and M&I
entity states that

reduced financial incentive for transfers.

16

A
second
contractual
provision
contained in the master repayment contract
with
CAWCD
and
echoed
in
each

the expected CAP agricultural water rates

have increased significantly since the project
was authorized, and (2) CAP water is often

subcontract restricts the service area where
water can be transferred:

Neither
the
(CAWCD)

more expensive than groundwater. The CAP

authorizing
legislation
recognized
that
agricultural water use in the Central Arizona
Project would eventually give way to

Contractor
nor
any
shall sell or

increased urban use.
However, urban
purchasers of agricultural water would likely
be willing to pay a reduced amount for CAP
agricultural water because of the possibly
lower priority attached to CAP water
converted from irrigation use. Purchases of
higher priority water from other municipal
and industrial entities would be more valuable
in this regard.

subcontractor
otherwise dispose of or permit
the sale or other disposition of

any project water, including
return flows, for use outside
the Contractor's service area.
Although this clause limits transfers of water
within the three-county service area of the
CAP, this would not be a serious restriction
in most cases since the greatest demands for
water would also be located there. If there

The water service subcontracts with
each irrigation entity clearly recognize that
water could be transferred from agricultural
to urban uses, as evidenced by the following
provisions (Section 43(i)):

were a transfer possibility in Arizona outside

of these three counties, then the Bureau
could possibly amend
this contractual
provision provided other CAP water users
agreed.
Section 301 (a) of the Colorado
River Basin Storage Act contains only a more
general restriction on the service area for
water deliveries of the Central Arizona
Project:
"the water deficient areas of
Arizona and western New Mexico through
direct diversion or exchange of water."

Subject to the prior approval
of the Contracting Officer and
the Contractor, which approval
shall not be unreasonably

withheld, agricultural water
made available hereunder for
eligible
lands
may
be
converted to M&I purposes if
and to the extent that such
water is no longer required by
the subcontractor for irrigation
purposes
and
shall
be
converted in all cases where
eligible lands receiving project
agricultural water have been
converted
to
M&I
use;
provided
that
the
water
converted from irrigation to
M&I purposes as a result of

Transfers between agricultural users

and municipal and industrial users
Another category of transfers that
might arise if the Bureau shows its willingness
to amend its contracts is transfers from

irrigation to municipal and industrial use. It
would generally be expected that cities, as
they grow, would be able to sufficiently
compensate agricultural users to make water
sales attractive, such as in the recent
purchases of non-CAP water in the state. As
noted above, some agricultural contractors
might be willing to sell some of their

conversion of eligible lands to

M&I uses shall be used only
for M&I purposes within the
service area of the entity

agricultural entitlements for two reasons: (1)

responsible
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for

serving

the

Such

Clauses of this type are not uncommon in

conversion of water use for
eligible lands shall be at the

large municipal water supply districts and are

converted

lands.

designed to encourage all water-using entities
with potential future demands to participate

rate of one acre-foot per acre
minus the average annual
surface water supply for said
acre which was available [from

in the initial allocation of the financial burden
of the project
Otherwise, a city could
understate its expected demands and then
later purchase additional water, possibly at a
lower total cost

sources other than the CAP]
for use during the 1958-1976

period as determined by the

In addition to the restrictions already
discussed, there are certain other provisions
embodied in the CAP water allocations and
contracts that in their current form would
complicate transfers from agricultural to
urban use.
For example, even though
agricultural use of CAP water is expected to
average about 2 acre-feet per acre, the
contract language cited above may place a
limit of 1 acre-foot per acre on transfers from
agricultural to municipal and industrial use.5
In effect, the M&I purchaser of water in a
market transaction would have to
value the water about twice as much as the
agricultural seller just on this basis alone (the
higher federal charge for M&I water and the
possibly
lower
priority
for
converted
agricultural water would also affect the price

Contracting
Officer.
Conversion of water from
agricultural to M&I purposes
shall take effect only upon
execution or amendment of an
appropriate subcontract among
the
United
States,
the
Contractor, and the M&I user.
This clause appears to consider two types of
transfers of irrigation water to M&I use: (1)

changes
of use
resulting
from
land
conversions and (2) other transfers. Under
the first category, up to 1 acre-foot per acre
of water would be converted to domestic uses
when land was converted to urban use. This
type of transfer requires that the water be
reserved for use in the same service area.

Other water transfers appear to be allowable
under the provision that water can be
transferred if it "is no longer required by the
subcontractor for irrigation purposes."
It
appears that transfers in this category may
also be limited by the contract language to 1
acre-foot per acre of eligible land, but the
area of use may not be limited to the service
area of the irrigation subcontractor.

paid).
The CAP water allocation also
stipulates that subsequent increases in M&I
use (such as through land conversion) not
increase the total amount of first-priority
water shared with Indian tribes:

For the limited purpose of
establishing the relative Indian
and
non-Indian
M&I
percentages of the shared
priority,
non-Indian
M&I
allocations beyond 510,000
acre-feet, including conversions
from agriculture to M&I, will
not be permitted to be
included in the calculations of
the non-Indian portion of the

Of course, M&I purchasers of CAP
irrigation supplies would have to pay rates

that reflected the interest charges in
Reclamation law, rather than agricultural
rates. The CAP water service subcontracts
an
additional
requirement
on
place
agricultural to urban transfers, namely,
"payment of an amount equal to the acrefoot charges previously paid by other
subcontractors .~ plus interest1*
a lump sum payment is

words,

In other
required.

18

shared priority.

(This is not
to say that future Secretarial
allocations for M&I use, or

under this interpretation of the provision in
the subcontracts, a transfer from agricultural
to municipal and industrial use would dilute

agricultural conversions
to
M&I use might not take the

the priority of the M&I water supplies of all
other M&I entities. Because of this anomaly,
it could be expected that urban entities
generally would oppose any one city's
purchase of additional CAP water from

total non-Indian allocations to
a figure greater than 510,000,

but that 510,000 acre-feet is
an
absolute
limit
when

irrigation users.

calculating the shared priority
between Indian and M&I use
in times of shortage.) (U.S.
Department of the Interior,
Office of the Secretary, 1980).*

The

as follows. Under the current allocation of
water, 640,000 acre-feet are assigned to M&I

Another possibility for restructuring
the allocation of water converted from
irrigation use to municipal and industrial use
would be to place the converted water in a
new category, lower in priority than all M&I
water, but ahead, of agricultural use.
Alternatively, such purchases could retain
their agricultural priority, which is subject to
proportional reduction in times of shortage.
In either case, cities wanting additional

to M&I use were to occur, there would then
be a total of 690,000 acre-feet of project
water with an M&I priority. Therefore, the
same M&I entity with 100,000 acre-feet of
water would now have only 74,000 acre-feet
of first-priority water (510/690 x 100,000 acrefeet) - a reduction of 6,000 acre-feet This
6,000 acre-feet would be, in effect, shifted to
third-priority water, which would increase in
acre-feet

quantities of first-priority water would have

to purchase it from other cities, with the total
pool
of
first-priority water
remaining

Therefore,

unchanged.

deliveries to each M&I entity in shortage

years would be reduced.

in

class, but that would be less serious than a
dilution of their first-priority water. Under
this interpretation, cities desiring an increased
quantity of first-priority water would have to
purchase some portion of the first-priority
water allocated to other municipalities.

use. Of this amount 510,000 acre-feet have
first priority and the remaining 130,000 acrefeet are assigned third priority (see
table 3).
Therefore, an entity with an
existing M&I allocation of 100,000 acre-feet
has approximately 80,000 acre-feet of firstpriority M&I water (that is, 510/640 x
100,000 acre-feet) and 20,000 acre-feet of
third-priority M&I water.
If a voluntary
transfer of 50,000 acre-feet of irrigation water

26,000

Reclamation,

to municipal and industrial use could be
placed in the lower priority for M&I water
(the third-priority category in the last column
in table 3), leaving the allocations in the first
priority untouched. This interpretation would
be consistent with the allocation decisions as
published in the Federal Register. Of course,
such an interpretation would still mean some
dilution
of
the
priorities
of
other
municipalities' water in this lower priority

provisions in a consistent manner, illustrated

to

of

conjunction with the CAP water contractors,
should consider reconstructing its contracts
such that this dilution does not occur. For
example, water transferred from agricultural

In contrast, the CAP subcontracts (all written
after 1982) state that project water converted
from agricultural to M&I use shall be
delivered with the same priority as other
project M&I water. This provision appears
to conflict with the allocation language cited
above, although it is possible to read the two

quantity

Bureau

In other words,
19

Other federal projects
Colorado River)

in Arizona

contracted with the Bureau of Reclamation to
construct Bartlett Dam on the Verde River,
in addition to making repairs on the spillways
at the four storage reservoirs previously
constructed on the Salt River.
A final
storage facility - the Horseshoe Dam on the
Verde River — was completed in 1946. The
project also relies on some 250 wells within

(non-

One of the earliest Reclamation
projects is the Salt River Project (SRP) in
Arizona. The project lies generally at the
confluence of the Salt and Verde Rivers near

Phoenix, Arizona (see Figure 6). Irrigation in
the Salt River Valley began as early as 1867,
but the farmers faced tremendous variations
in streamflow, including flash floods.
In
subsequent years, a number of diversion dams

its service area to augment available surface
water supplies.
One need only to fly over Phoenix to
visualize the approximate boundaries of the
project-the Arizona Canal on the north, the
Consolidated and Eastern Canals on the east,
and the western Canal on the south delineate

and canals were constructed by private water
companies, but these faced problems also. In
order to be able to construct some storage
reservoirs upstream and to contract with the
Bureau of Reclamation, the local canal

the approximate boundaries on three sides of
the district Within those areas, there is a
preponderance of older, larger trees and
abundant shrubbery, which places it in
contrast to the areas outside the boundaries,
where there is greater use of desert
landscaping. In part, this is due to the fact
that the district lands were settled first, but it
is also because urban landowners within the
district have the option of continuing to
receive surface water supplies through a
series of ditches for flood irrigating their

companies formed the Salt River Valley
Water Users' Association in 1903. The Salt
River Project was authorized by the Secretary
of the Interior in 1903 under the authority of

the
1902
Reclamation
Act,
which
contemplated irrigation development only.
Today, Phoenix and several of its surrounding
suburban cities have grown within the
boundaries of the district-they have land both
within and outside the SRP.
The original project consisted of
Theodore Roosevelt Dam (on the Salt River),
the Granite Reef Diversion Dam (below the

lawns.

The landowner accomplishes this by
utilizing his assigned ditch turnout (one is
located on each quarter section) and having

confluence of the Salt and Verde Rivers), and
associated canals (see Figure 6). This system
was delivering water by 1903 and was
completed by 1911.
Operation and
maintenance responsibilities for these facilities
were turned over to the district in 1917 (title
to the facilities remains with the United

diked borders around his lawn to contain the
water. The cost for this water is relatively

inexpensive. This practice might appear as
both an anachronism, a remnant of the
irrigation practices of the district, and an
extravagant, use of cheap water in a desert

environment However, one should keep in
mind two factors. (1) This cheaper surface
supply is untreated water and therefore would
be expected to carry a much lower water

States), and to this day the district has been

the operating entity for the project

charge than treated water.7 (2) The surface

The Salt River Valley Water User's
Association
subsequently
built
several
additional storage facilities on the Salt River
between 1923 and 1930 ~ Horse Mesa,
Stewart Mountain, and Mormon Rat Dams

water rights in Salt River Project are, in an

underlying sense, owned by the landowners
within the district, rather than the district
Therefore, a central question related to

efficient water use is whether, in this arid

(refer to Figure 6). In 1935, the Association
20
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environment, these individuals might want to
sell a portion of their water rights, forgoing

(5) The bylaws of the district, which may

require the permission of all of the district's
landowners to transfer water outside the
district (6) The voting rules in the district
Voting rights are assigned by acreage, which
means that agricultural interests dominate the
board. Through these means it appears that
SRP has gone to great lengths to maintain
water rights as appurtenant to the district's
lands.

some of their water uses.

A second observation relates to the

same question.
Along with urbanization
within the SRP boundaries, a significant

amount of water has shifted from irrigation
use to municipal and industrial use (see Table

4).8

This change in use has also resulted in

a lower consumptive water use for the Salt
River Project's surface water supplies.
However, with some exceptions, the district
and its members have shown little interest in
leasing possible surplus supplies to entities

Neither the appurtenancy of water
rights to district lands nor the fact that the
Salt River Project is an irrigation project
appear to have imposed significant restrictions
on the transfer of water from agricultural to

outside the district, nor have they shown any

urban use within the district.
Beginning in the
1950s, in light of
urbanization within the SRP boundaries, SRP

interest in engaging in programs by which
other entities might pay for conservation
within the district in exchange for the
conserved water.
In fact, the district has
maintained that there would be several legal
obstacles to such out-of-district leasing.
Indeed, as discussed below, the particular
nature of the water rights held within the

entered into agreements with local urban

entities to supply Salt River Project water for
domestic and other urban uses. Under the
terms of these contracts, which were
approved by the Secretary of the Interior,
individual landowners within the district have

district would present obstacles to out-ofdistrict sales, although the attitude against
out-of-district

obstacle to
restrictions.

sales

such

may

be

leasing

as

as

much

any

the option of assigning the responsibility for
delivery of their surface water rights to the

an

city in which they reside (the landowner
retains the actual water right). (In approving

legal

these agreements, the Bureau of Reclamation
did not impose any higher repayment
requirements
for
water
converting
to
municipal and industrial use.) After such an
assignment is made, the city assumes the
responsibility for collecting the water charges
for SRP. Indeed, one of the motivations for
these agreements was that SRP was having

In brief, there appear to be several
factors that might contribute to the difficulty

of out-of-district transfers.

(1) The fact that

landowners within the district own the
district's water rights. (2) The Kent Decree,
which

made the district's pre-1910 water
rights appurtenant to the land (3) The fact
that the Kent Decree was established by a
territorial court (prior to statehood), rather

difficulty

than state court, making it uncertain as to
what process would be required to alter
aspects

of the

decree.

(4)

collecting

its

assessments

on

urbanized land.
Land deeds within the
urbanized areas contain a section indicating

whether the assignment has been made.

The state's
Even though the cities receive only
the right to deliver SRP water to the same
lands, rather than the actual water right, they
have exercised some discretion in utilization

"severance and transfer" provision, which
requires the permission of all water districts
in a basin before water rights can be severed
from the land.

of the water.
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For example, in at least two

Table 4
Conversion of Agriculcural Acreage and Water to Urban Uses

Salt River Project, Arizona
Urban

Project

Agricul.

Year

Acreage

Acreage

Acreage

1950

1955
1956
1957

240,999
240,904
240,661
240,388
240,261
239,908
239,645
239,289

207,779
205,727
201,259
197,798
195,435
192,825
190,597

1958
1959

238,787
238,582

185,920
181,136

33,220
35,177
39,402
42,590
44,826
47,083
49,048
50,935
52,867
57,446

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

238,342
238,191
238,082

176,712
173,839
171.262
169,834
167,922
167,120
165.276
164.495

1951
1952

1953
1954

1965
1966
1967

1968
1969

238,252
238,252
238,252
238,252
238,252
238,252
238,262

188,354

61,630
64,352
66,820
68,418
70,330

Agricul. Urban
86.2
85.4
83
82

13.8
14.6

81
80

18
19:6

79

20,
21,
22
24.1

78
77.9

75.9
74.1

73.0
71.9

71.3
70.5
70.1
69.4

16.4
17

25.9
27.0
28,
28.

68.4

29,
29,
30,
31.0
31.8
31.6

66.4
64.4

125,741
124,452
121,761
118,951
114,392
109,223

80,128
84,706
90,136
95,333
112.523
113,812
116,505
119,269
123,828
128,998

62.2
60.0
52.8

44.4

162.514

162.874

71,132
72,976
73.757
75,738
75,388

1970
1971

238,264

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

238,264
238,264
238,264
238,264
238,266
238,220
238,220
238,221

1980
1981
1982

238,221
238,221
238,172

105,771
102,105
98,546

1983
1984

95,292
89,268
81,911
74,746

142,880

1985
1986

238,172
238,171
238,170
238,170

132,450
136,116
139,626
148,903
156,259
163,424

1987
1988

238,170
238,266

71,245
69,271

166,925
168.995

238,264

1950-19881

158.136
153.558
148,128

142,931

69:0
68.2

52.2
51.1
49.9
48.0
45.8

Agricul.2

Urban3

935.006
925,772
905,666
890,091
879,458
867.712
857,686
847,593
836,640
815,112

79,728
84.425
94.565
102.216
107.582
112.999
117.715

795,204

147,912
154,445
160,368
164,203

782.276
770,679

764.253
755.649
752,040
743,742
740,228

122.244

126.881
137,870

168,792
170,717
175,142
177,017

731,313

181,771

732,933

180,931

33.6
35.6

711,612
691,011

203,294

37.8
40.0
47.2
47.8
48.9
50.1
52.0

666.576

216,326

192,307

643.190

228,799

565.834
560.034
547,924

270,055
273,149
279,612
286,246
297.187
309,595

54.2

535,280
514,764
491,504

55
57
58

475,970
459,472
443,457

317,880
326,678

40.0

60.0

428,814

37.5
34.4

62
65

31.4

68

401.706
368.600
336,357

29.9
29.1

70
70.9

320,602
311,720

342,912
357,367
375,022
392,218
400,620

42.9
41.4

Sources: Various SRP reports from 1977 and 1988.

335,102

405.588

2 Assumes 4.5 acre-feet per acre, which is the 1980 agricultural use race.
3 Assumes 2.4 acre-feet per acre, which is che 1980 urban use race.
Conpiled by Gary Woodazd, University of Arizona.
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Indian water settlements
- the Salt
River/Pima Maricopa settlement and an offer
in the Fort McDowell settlement, Phoenix
area cities made contributions of water, part
of which might be regarded as water attached
to lands within the
Salt River Project
However, SRP has
required that any contributed water be
delivered to Indians lands within their

the plant). The Arizona courts have ruled
that these cities may lease or otherwise utilize
the outflow from the plant, as long as they
do so before it reenters a natural water
course. There are currently two applications
pending for use of treated effluent from the
plant: one by the Buckeye Irrigation District
some 6 miles downstream (and outside the
Salt River Project boundaries), and another
by the Arizona Public Service Company for
the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant In fact,
reuse of water from the treatment plant may
prove an important vehicle, if no other is
worked out, to allow for greater use of
surplus SRP water resulting from lower
consumptive use.

Association boundaries. In these agreements,
the cities can in some sense be considered as
acting on behalf of their landowners: the
water rights of SRP landowners are at some
risk if the Indian water claims were
adjudicated in court Settlements offer an
opportunity for an outcome over which the
participants
exercise
greater
control.
Presumably, if the cities took some action
with their delivery of water to which
landowners

objected,

they could

halt

Utilization of excess conveyance capacity in
the CAP aqueduct

the
Several

cities' actions.

of

the

water

transfers

discussed in this paper would propose

to

Interestingly enough, there are at least
two agreements involving the Salt River
Project that are out-of-district transfers. In

utilize the CAP for conveyance of the
transferred water. Most of these transfers
involve terminating a consumptive use on the

the early 1920s, the Roosevelt Water
Conservation District (RWCD), southeast of
Phoenix and outside the SRP boundary, was
interested in obtaining additional surface
water supplies.
Under the agreement,
RWCD paid for the lining of about 9 miles

Colorado River and increasing the intake of
water at the CAP pumping facilities to deliver
the water to central Arizona. Such transfers
include the purchase of water from the Gila
Project for the Ak Chin settlement and

purchase of water from the Wellton-Mohawk
Irrigation District for the Salt River/Pima
Maricopa Indian settlement, as well as several
of the alternatives for locating Cliff Dam
replacement water from the Cibola Valley
Irrigation District and the Mohave Valley

of the Eastern Canal and agreed to pay for
the maintenance of the canal lining.
In
exchange, RWCD receives the salvage water,
which was estimated to be about 5% of SRP
water.
Some entities have, however,

Irrigation District

threatened to challenge this agreement when
the initial contract expires, believing that it
does not have a firm legal basis.

In
addition
some
nonfederal
purchasers of water clearly expect to utilize
CAP conveyance facilities.

Second, there appear to be some
agreements regarding use of the extra return

Purchose by Scottsdalc

flows resulting from the lower consumptive
use of water under urban use. The effluent
from a number of Phoenix areas cities is
treated at the 91st Avenue treatment plant
(the SRP itself does not have ownership in

In 1984 the city of Scottsdale
purchased the Arizona Ranch and Metal
Company (the Planet Ranch property),
23

to be available over the long term. Under
the Arizona Groundwater Management Act,

located in western Arizona near the Colorado
River (see Figure 5).
The ranch has
approximately 8300 acres of land irrigated
with an existing proven right to approximately
8,000 acre-feet of surface water from the Bill
Williams River, a tributary of the Colorado
(see Figure 5).
Under the provisions of
Arizona water law, Scottsdale plans to
increase that proven right to approximately
13,000 acre-feet by establishing a firm record
of beneficial use over a five-to seven-year
period. Then it plans to transfer use of the
water from the ranch to the city in order to
meet growing municipal and industrial water
demands during those future yean when low
flows on the Colorado River force a
reduction in diversions by the Central Arizona
Project This will necessitate the construction
of pipeline and storage faculties to transport
water from the ranch to the CAP's Granite
Reef Aqueduct
Scottsdale will also need
permission from the Bureau of Reclamation
and CAWCD to utilize surplus capacity in
the aqueduct If Scottsdale intends to use
the water during periods of low flow on the
river, the surplus conveyance capacity should
probably be available. However, Scottsdale
has not received formal approval from
CAWCD or the Bureau of Reclamation. The
fact that the city paid some $123 million for
the ranch indicates it does not expect
significant obstacles to the approval. (For

the lands have a grandfathered right to pump
approximately 3 acre-feet of water per acre.

The city plans to relocate the wells for the
groundwater in an area near the Salt-Gila
Aqueduct and then to pump groundwater into

the aqueduct for delivery to the city of
Tucson in exchange for equal amounts of
Tucson's CAP water. This plan would also
need the approval of the Bureau of
Reclamation and CAWCD.
Unlike the
Scottsdale purchase, this proposal does not
require utilization of additional conveyance
capacity in the CAP aqueduct - it would

actually free up additional capacity between
Phoenix and the point where the groundwater
is placed in the aqueduct (For additional
detail, see Saliba and Bush, 1987, pp. 103104; or Wahl, 1989, p. 239).

In

purchases

any

raise

event

these

questions

as

transfers

to

how

and

the

surplus capacity in the CAP will be allocated.
CAWCD has already begun thinking about,
these questions.
The board has passed a
resolution indicating the following basic
priority scheme-existing CAP contractual
commitments, Indian water settlements that
Congress authorizes, and other supplies. The
CAWCD is considering what means might be

utilized to allocate the surplus. These include

additional details concerning this purchase,
see Saliba and Bush, 1987, or Wahl, 1989, pp.

(1) first-come, first-served, (2) proportional to
request, and (3) highest bidder.

238-39).
Conclusions and recommendations

Purchase by Mesa

There is considerable interest in water
transfers in Arizona, both for surface and
groundwater supplies. Although there have
been a number of purchases of lands to

In 1985 the dry of Mesa purchased

approximately 11,000 acres of farmland with
the intent to eventually transfer the

acquire groundwater rights, purchases of
surface supplies has been more limited principally the purchase of the Planet Ranch
property on the Bill Williams River and the

associated groundwater rights to itself. Mesa

purchased the land within two CAP irrigation
districts located between the Phoenix and

Tucson metropolitan areas in a region where
groundwater overdraft has not been severe

acquisition of water from contractors on the
Lower Colorado River for Indian water

and where groundwater supplies are expected
24

settlements.

The federal government has

water would logically take place after this
contracting process is complete, since an
original contract for CAP water could
generally be expected to be cheaper than
repurchasing
water
from
an
existing

been a major participant in these latter
acquisitions.
This makes Arizona unusual
when compared with other western states, in
that the federal government has become a
participant in the market
Negotiated
settlements of Indian water treaties are

contractor.

However,
existing
CAP
contractors are beginning to ask questions

usually concluded through legislation. This
legislation provides the opportunity to make
special rules regarding those particular
settlements, but they do not necessarily clarify
the procedures that would apply to more
routine transfers.

regarding how leasing or sale of contract
water might take place, and the proposal to
utilize the CAP allocation of the Harquahala
Irrigation District in an Indian water
settlement is perhaps the first concrete
example. Although the Harquahala exchange
may be accomplished by means of legislation,
it will confront some of the same issues as

(1) The Bureau of Reclamation could
do more to clarify the rules for transfers on
several fronts—both for transfers of CAP

transfers of CAP for other purposes:
(1)
under the terms currently being discussed, a
"fair value" would be paid for the water-an
amount which could be above the allocated
contract cost, and (2) if the water is

water and for transfers of other Colorado

River water. Indeed, some of the personnel
that could be expected to deal with water
transfer issues in the Arizona Project's Office,
the Bureau's Phoenix office that manages the
Central Arizona Project, had not received the
Bureau's own internal guidelines on water
transfers from the regional office (although
they were familiar with the Department's
December 1988 principles on voluntary water
transfers).
But, even beyond the level of
detail of the Bureau's guidelines, there
appears to be a particular need to clarify the
rules applying to transfers in Arizona because
of several factors: (1) the uncertainty over
the extent to which federal rather than state
law applies, given the Secretary of the
Interior's authorities of Colorado River Water
and Colorado River contracts, (2) the
complexity of the rules applying to Colorado
River water ~ the law of the River", and (3)
the newness of the CAP contracts.

converted to M&I use, it must be determined
how the priorities of other M&I contractors
will be affected.

Informally,
some
Bureau
of
personnel
indicated
their
Reclamation
willingness to modify the current provision in
CAP contracts which practically removes any
economic
incentive
for
transfers
(any
increased income from transfers must be
returned to the CAWCD for use against its
repayment obligation) if parties interested in
a transfer brought a proposal to the Bureau.
However, the Bureau's intent in this regard
has not been made clear to all contractors,
even those familiar with the Department's
principles
regarding
water
transfers.
Furthermore, those we spoke to in CAWCD,
the entity that will actually manage the
project, seemed less familiar with the
Department's principles involving water
transfers, less sure whether these provisions
signaled the Bureau's willingness to modify

CAP contracts.
Not only are the
CAP contracts relatively new, but not all of
the CAP water is under contract Currently,
most of the debates taking place over CAP

the

water have to do with how the uncontracted

virtually prohibit the selling districts from
receiving any increased income, and less
inclined to see economic incentives as

water will be utilized (to what parties it will

be re-offered for contract). Transfers of CAP
25

restrictions

in

current

contracts

that

important in promoting water transfers and

purchased water supplies is probably some
years off, it is clearly not too early to begin
considering these questions since a number of
entities
are
considering
utilizing
CAP
conveyance for purchases they have already

efficient water use.

Purchasing parties are also interested
in the precise way in which priority would be

established for CAP water converted from
agricultural use to municipal and industrial
use. The current understanding appears to

made.

be that such converted water would enlarge
the current pool of municipal and industrial
water-thereby diluting its priority.
Most

want to consider in this regard is the
transferability of canal capacity — Le., once

Bureau staff we contacted believe that the
cities in the Phoenix area would not favor
establishing a new priority for converted

demands

Another concept that CAWCD may

an assignment of surplus capacity is made,
may vary, and a party desiring
additional conveying should be allowed to pay

a contractor with a conveyance entitlement
not to utilize all or a portion of that capacity

water-between the existing M&I and Indian
priorities and above the agricultural priority.
However, the limited number of cities we
contacted in this study would support such a
concept-even those that are expected to
benefit from conversions. They appear to
desire the greater certainty that would attach
to leaving the existing quantities of high
priority water in place. It would probably be
a good idea for the cities and the Bureau to
undertake the necessary contract amendments
in the near future in order to establish what
would probably be a more rational policy.. If
they wait until a number of conversions have
already taken place, then there would
naturally be resistance to lowering the priority
of those conversions on the part of the
entities to which they applied.

for a specified period of time.
Other Colorado River water. Other
Colorado River contracts have an earlier
priority date than CAP water, making them
more attractive than CAP water. However,
there are a number of questions relating to
transfer of such water that could be clarified
by the Bureau of Reclamation, possibly in

conjunction with the Arizona Department of
Water Resources.
(1)

What entity is responsible for

determining consumptive use
River water is transferred?

(2)

if

Colorado

Do the appurtenancy restrictions

of Arizona law apply to transfer of Colorado
There is also uncertainty over how the
conversion provision of the CAP contracts
would
be
interpreted.
The current
expectation is that it would apply only to land
that is actually converted to urban use.

River water
Secretary?

under

contract

with

the

(3) What entity will be responsible
for determining other aspects of beneficial
use? For example, under what conditions

However, under one interpretation, it could
also apply to land not converting to urban
use in order to obtain additional M&I water.

would a contractor be allowed to lease or sell

that part of his contractual entitlement which
has never been put to beneficial use?

CAP conveyance. A related question
is under what rules surplus conveyance
capacity in the CAP might be available for
transporting leased and purchased water.

restrictions that might apply to certain
contracts limiting either the transferability

Although

(e.g. the convertibility of agricultural water to

development

and

transport

(4)

of
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Are there any other specific

land. The approval process for severance and
transfer requires the approval of all of the
water districts in the same basin.

municipal and industrial use) or income gains
from the transfer.
The
conjunction

Bureau of Reclamation, in
with the Regional Solicitor's

No right to the use of water

Office, is proposing to clarity some aspects
of the Department's management of the

on or from any watershed or
drainage area which supplies

Colorado River through developing a set of

or contributes water for the

guidelines. This idea originated because of
the increasingly heavy demands on the River.
Use of water by the CAP is increasing,

irrigation of lands within an
irrigation district, agricultural
improvement district or water
users association shall be
severed or transferred without
the consent of the governing
body of such irrigation district,
agricultural
improvement
district
or
water
users
association.

thereby reducing the "slack" in Lower Basin
supplies.
In 1990, for the first time, the
Bureau will not be able to fulfill the extra

demands of Lower Basin users such as the
Metropolitan Water District, over and above

their initial allocations.
In addition, the
Bureau is rinding that an increasing number
of Lower Basin entities are interested in
more fully utilizing their return flows. This
has the potential to reduce return flows to
the river. Since existing contracts are written
in terms of diversions, this raises the question
of whether the Bureau might have to limit
the increased consumptive use of return flows
through contractual or other means.

The

statute

requires

that

any

proposed

transfer be submitted to the governing bodies
of such districts for approval, and written

approval must be submitted to the state. If
the districts do not act within 45 days of
receipt of transfer applications, they are
considered to have approved it
This procedure differs sharply from

In conjunction with the Department's
efforts to develop guidelines applying to
Colorado River water use, the Department

that in other states, where a state agency

could respond to the above questions and

accepts protests from potentially affected
water rights holders, but makes the final

otherwise clarity the rules that will apply to
transfers of Colorado River contract water.

determination as to whether any prior water
rights are injured. This Arizona provision

does not, of course, rule out transfers of
2.

Arizona statutes could be revised

surface water rights, but the apparent veto
power granted to water districts appears to
unnecessarily complicate the water transfer

to facilitate efficient water transfers.
Two
aspects of Arizona law are particularly
relevant either directly or indirectly to
transfer of surface water supplies from federal

process.

projects or utilization of federal conveyance

facilities: (1) the appurtenancy provisions and

Arizona's groundwater code. Much
of the market activity in Arizona-purchases

(2) the Arizona groundwater code.

of both surface and groundwater rights-are

As noted above, there is an unusual provision

spurred by the requirement that urban
developments possess an assured 100 years'
supply of water. There are two aspects of

in Arizona law relating to the "severance and
transfer" of water rights from a parcel of

inefficient

Arizona's

appurtenancy

provisions.

this law that appear to be particularly
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from

an

economic

standpoint.

First,
because
groundwater
is
heavily
regulated only within four active management
areas, water purchases have been focused on
areas outside of these areas, where there is
little regulation.
This defeats one of the

amount

competing values of surface and groundwater
supplies.

goals of the legislation - to assure the
orderly development of the groundwater
resource.
Furthermore, it has probably
accelerated purchases by cities far in advance
of the time when they would normally have
been made by prudent water utility planners.
This structure has also had the unfortunate
side effect of pitting urban interests against
rural interests.
All of these effects could
have been ameliorated by placing similar
requirements over all areas of the state, and
the same reasons are compelling to take such
action now.

What an economically efficient system
would do is either create a system of property
rights in groundwater basins so that the
entities controlling them would value them
correctly, or a centralized entity would

regulate the rates of extraction based upon an
analysis which would attempt to maximize the
present worth of the resource. This analysis
would have to take into account the values of
available surface water supplies and the
potential for groundwater recharge.
The central point in this discussion is
that the Arizona groundwater code has
created an artificially high demand for surface

A second aspect of the Arizona code
is that its goals of arresting groundwater

mining
are
economically
inefficient-in
economic terms they frustrate the economic
goal of utilizing the cheaper resources first

and
groundwater
management areas.

outside
the
active
A more economically
rational use of groundwater would lower the
total cost of obtaining water.

and the more expensive later at a rate that
would maximize the present worth of the
benefits from the resource. Pursuing such an
economic strategy should not necessarily
mean mining the groundwater to exhaustion

3. The Salt River Project The above
discussion of the Salt River Project illustrates
the complicated provisions that surround the

because, as the resource became more scarce
and as pumping became more expensive,
groundwater would rise in value. The price
rise would itself serve to ration the resource
and enforce conservation. Under the current
situation, which artificially slows pumping
rates, Arizona citizens must pay the higher
cost of obtaining more costly supplies (such
as importing surface and groundwater from
rural areas) or enforcing conservation before

it

is

economically

necessary.

From

If entities were allowed to decide

whether they wanted to replace these
amounts or not, then they could judge the

ownership and use of this water.
These
complications are abetted by the authority in

an attempt to retain district control over
water rights of landowners within the project
Because these rights are some of the earliest
and least expensive rights, however, one could
imagine that the members of the district

could eventually benefit from the lease or
sale of some of its water.
Additional
motivation for such a transfer will occur as

an

the increased urbanization of the area within

economic standpoint, sustained yield is not
necessarily the economically desirable goal.

the district's boundaries reduces consumptive

use. It is difficult to say what means will be
found to ultimately make some of this water
available to other parties, especially given the

Under the current system, if an entity
is forced to mine some groundwater above
the safe yield level during years of reduced
surface supplies, then it must replace this

resistance of the authority to out-of-district
transfers.
The above discussion illustrates
some potential means, although they are
28

limited—(1) reutilization of water at the 91st
avenue treatment plant; (2) conservation
projects, such as the existing agreement with
the Roosevelt Water Conservation District;
and (3) contribution of water to Indian water
settlements.
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ENDNOTES

1.

The case studies in this chapter were completed in the spring of 1990.

2.

The Secretary was also authorized to purchase additional lands at a later date if the district
consents, but this authority has not been utilized

3. Land acquisition and investigation costs in this and other Cliff Dam replacement alternatives
are annualized at 9% over a 50-year period. Per-acre foot values are based on amount of
water delivered to the Phoenix area.
4. As noted above, Cliff Dam on the Verde River was originally planned to be part of the
system, but in December 1987, Congress voted to delete it from the Central Arizona Project.

5. The CAP contract calls for deducting the previous agricultural surface water supplies from
other sources, which would be zero in most cases. The remaining agricultural water not
transferred (approximately 1 acre-foot per acre) would presumably reenter the pool of available
CAP irrigation water and be reallocated to all agricultural users based on the percentages
established in the CAP allocation (shown in table 2).

6. Since this portion of the notice is not inconsistent with subsequent Federal Register notices,
this provision remains in effect.

7. The cost of treated urban supplies water evidently does not vary significantly between those
located inside the SRP and those located outside. A survey done during preparation of the
Environmental Impact Statement on allocation of CAP water indicated no preference for
locating inside the SRP boundaries on the part of companies planning to locate in the Phoenix
area. Subsequent analyses of land values both inside and outside SRP did not identify the
availability of SRP water as a determining factor.

8. Interestingly, the Bureau of Reclamation still considers the project an irrigation project,
describing it as capable of supplying 238,220 acres with a full irrigation supply and another
24,715 acres with a supplemental (partial) supply. As table 4 shows, the actual number of
irrigated acres has been far less.
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BOULDER CANYON PROJECT: REALLOCATION OF
WATER TO THE CITY OF HENDERSON

BOULDER CANYON PROJECT:
REALLOCATION OF WATER TO THE CITY OF HENDERSON
Reallocation

of

Water

to

the

City

of

feet for milling and metallurgical use and
8,690 acre-feet for municipal use.

what

Subsequent to the end of World War
II, the U.S. sold the plant facilities in 1949 to

Henderson, Nevada

In

understanding

under '

conditions the Bureau of Reclamation will

allow transfers of water, it is also of interest
to examine cases in which proposed transfers
were
either
substantially
modified
or

rights permits to the state. In 1953, the state
sold the facilities and water rights to a

disallowed. A proposed transfer in southern
Nevada
between
Basic
Management,

consortium of private mining and chemical
companies, in which Basic Management, Inc.

Incorporated

(BMI) was a holding company created to
manage the water rights and water delivery
facilities for the industrial complex.

the state of Nevada and transferred the water

(BMI)
and
the
city
of
Henderson represents such a case. Although

the proposed resale (or subcontracting) of
water by BMI to Henderson was disallowed,
principally because BMI had not established
beneficial use of the water, the Bureau did
allow a "reassignment" of previously unused
water from BMI to Henderson.
This was
accomplished by (1) reducing the contractual
entitlement of BMI, (2) executing an
"assignment and transfer of entitlement to

Following the Arizona v. California
ruling in 1963 that water from the Colorado
River could only be delivered under contract
with

1942

the

Defense

Secretary

of

the

Interior

(the

that all Colorado River water be delivered

under contract by the Secretary of the
Interior), BMI entered into a 1969 contract
with the Bureau of Reclamation for delivery
of water under the state permits.
The
purpose and place of use of the industrial

delivery" from BMI to Henderson, and (3)
executing a new Bureau contract with
Henderson.
In

the

Boulder Canyon Act of 1928 also requires

water were specified in the contract:

Plant

Corporation (DPC), a federally chartered
organization for the purpose of building and

"..32^87 acre feet of water

expanding facilities to produce war materials,

per

constructed the town of Henderson, Nevada,
about 13 miles southeast of Las Vegas and
nearby faculties for the production of
magnesium (see Figure BC-1). In order to
secure a water supply, included in the
facilities were an intake structure at Lake
Mead on the Colorado River, as well as

thereof as may be required for
beneficial consumptive use for

pumping stations and a 16-mile pipeline.

accordance with state law, DPC applied for a
permit to divert water through the pipeline.
In 1948 the state of Nevada issued water

Basic Complex or portions
thereof, in the service area
described in Certificate No.
3118 as that certificate is

rights

identified in Article 2(5)...."

annum,

or

so

much

industrial

purposes
by
members of the Basic Group
and such of their successors,
tenants, and assignees as may
be in lawful possession of the

In

permits
to
the
Defense
Plant
Corporation for the diversion of Colorado

The contract is for permanent use. The 1969
contract also allowed BMI to deliver water

River water in the amounts of 32,587 acre-
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Figure BC-1.
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under its existing contract for 5,603 acre-feet,
with the city of Henderson, with such

Henderson or the purveying of unused water

acre-foot for the quantities diverted, plus an

to other entities in southern Nevada.
However, it did allow a reassignment of the
water to take place. This was accomplished

administrative charge to defray the expenses

by (1) reducing the contractual entitlement of

of the Colorado River Commission of Nevada
(currently set at $.05 per acre-foot). Under
the overall contract, the maximum industrial
use by BMI was 18,000 acre-feet in 1969.

BMI, (2) executing an "assignment and
transfer of entitlement to delivery" from BMI

contract expiring in 1990.

BMI pays $.50 per

to

Henderson,

and

(3) executing

Bureau contract with Henderson.

a

new

The new

and revised contracts were reviewed by the
Colorado River Commission of Nevada (the
entity that oversees the allocation of Nevada's
300,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water),

However, over the past 11 years, the average
annual use has been only 7,662 acre-feet

Because of its proximity to Las Vegas,
Henderson has been growing in recent years
and has projected a need for additional water

which found

that there were

no adverse

impacts

third

supplies.

Accordingly, BMI executed a new
contract with the City of Henderson for water
- a minimum of 6,000 acre-feet in 1991 and

agreements were

The
May

increasing to a minimum of 12,895 acre-feet

deliveries to Henderson, consisting of 6,449

in 1997. This additional water was to come
from
BMTs
unused
BMTs
industrial

acre-feet

on

parties.

executed

in

final
1990.

More specifically, the amendments to BMI
1969 contract transferred 15,878 acre-feet of
of

the

M&I

water

previously

dedicated to municipal use and provided for

entitlement In October 1989, BMI requested
an amendment to its Bureau of Reclamation
contract to allow the new arrangement with

subcontracting for that purpose to Henderson,
and 9,429 acre-feet of BMTs industrial

Henderson, which increased the amount of
municipal deliveries, as well as extending the

BMI permanently relinquished any control
over the assigned water, as they sought under

delivery

their original proposal.

date

beyond

1990.

BMI

entitlement

also

requested an amendment to its contract to
allow it to market water for municipal and

The Bureau's rationale for its decision
is as follows.

The Bureau interpreted the
purpose of the Department's policy to
facilitate water transfers to increase the

industrial purposes anywhere in Clark County,
Nevada.

economic productivity of water and, in
particular, to provide an incentive to transfer

The Bureau of Reclamation raised
several concerns about these actions and
proposals.
Should BMI be allowed to
transfer and sell water for a proGt that it had
never placed in beneficial use?
In other
words, was there a right to transfer? And by
doing so, should BMI be allowed to become
a major water wholesaler in southern Nevada,

water already under contract and in use.
However, the Bureau did not feel that
allowing an entity to sell water never put to
use was consistent with the goals of the
Department's
principles.
The Bureau

regarded that BMI had ample time since the
initiation of its 1969 contract (as had previous
permittees since the initiation of diversions in

again for water it had never put to use? Yet
the Bureau sought to be responsive to the
Department's water transfer principles.

1942) to place its full entitlement to
beneficial use. However, because BMI had
not done so, there was no transferable

The Bureau chose to resolve the issue
in the following manner. First, it disallowed

the

contract

for

additional

water

In effectuating the assignment,

interest in the unused water (objections to
the original transfer proposal on this basis

with
34

delivery pipeline, it can have considerable
influence over the new financial terms when
contracts for the reassigned water expire.

were also raised by the City of North Las
Vegas
during
the
Colorado
River
Commission's public review process).
The
Bureau regarded it as within its authority to
simply require BMI to relinquish its unused

contract

entitlement
Nevertheless, the
Bureau worked with the parties to reach an

agreement to effectuate an "assignment and

transfer

delivery

of1

Colorado River water" from BMI
Henderson.
One of the benefits

of

entitlement

to

to
to

Henderson of this form of the agreement,
compared to the alternative of a new

contract, is that it preserved the 1942 priority
date for the water based on the original state
permits.

Under the agreements, Henderson
pays about $6 per acre-foot to the Bureau for
the water. The amount paid by the city to
BMI for the assignment and delivery through
the BMI pipeline is $110 per acre-foot,
increasing by $10 per acre-foot for every two
years until the year 2000.
There is an
additional escalator clause indexed to water
rates in Dark County. These price terms are
subject to renegotiation in 2015. Reportedly,
these financial terms are the same as those in
the original, disallowed sales agreement1
Depending
upon
what
future
transactions take place, the distinction
between
BMTs
original
request
for
subcontracting and the approved reassignment
may be more of form than of substance. For
example, if BMI is allowed to reassign all of
the remaining unused water under its contract
and to negotiate its own financial terms for

doing so, then its financial returns may be
nearly the same as if it had been allowed to
subcontract the unused water. Under the
reassignment procedure, however,
BMI
appears to lose some control over subsequent
use of the water and payments for it after the
term of the new Reclamation contract with
the transferee. In the case of the Henderson
assignment, though, given that BMI owns the
35

ENDNOTES

1.

Water Strategist

1991.

"Interior's Policy of Voluntary Water Transactions: The Two-Year

Record." VoL 4, No. 4 (January 1991), pp. 1, 2, 11, 13. Stratecon, Inc. (Claremont, CA).
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is played out in many forums, including the
extensive ttBay/Deltaw hearings, proposals for
federal legislation and challenges to the
manner in which expiring CVP water service
contracts are renewed, and is bolstered by the
evolution of California's public trust doctrine.9

Introduction and Summary
This is a report on transfers of water

supplied by the Central Valley Project1
The Central Valley Project ("CVP" or

"the project") is the largest multi-purpose

project constructed by the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation. It consists of 20 reservoirs with

Second, people keep moving to
California's coastal areas, increasing the

the capacity to store about 11,000,000 acrefeet and 500 miles of major aqueducts to

growth in demand for water for municipal
and industrial (m&i) purposes.
Generally,
coastal cities can pay multiples of r the
marginal dollar value of water to irrigators
for the use of their water.

convey

project

water

to

contractors.3

Installed project electric generating capacity
is about 1800 megawatts.3 By 1989 the CVP
had executed water service contracts with 309
water supply districts, farmers, municipalities,
wildlife refuges and wetlands.4 Under these
contracts, the bureau is obligated to supply
about 7.1 million acre-feet (MAF) per annum

Third, municipal demand for water is
growing within the Valley. Agricultural water
supply districts in some areas are faced with

urbanization within their boundaries. On the

east side of the Valley, where most of the
urbanization has occurred to date, municipal

out of the 8.2 MAF that is available annually,
except during times of drought.5
Water
delivered for agricultural purposes provided a
partial or full supply to 2.1 million acres in
1978.6 This is nearly one-third of all lands
served by the entire reclamation program in
the West7

demand

for

water

has

been

slaked

by

groundwater.
On the west side, however,
growing towns within commuting distance of
San Francisco are looking to surface water
supply already applied to the land by

irrigation and other water supply districts.10

Water allocation in California in 1991
is characterized by a number of factors that
create pressure for reailocation of water
provided by the CVP.
Indeed, these
pressures place the project under siege. First,
water development undertaken by private
parties, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
and, more recently, the CVP and the

Fourth, the western side of the San
Joaquin Valley is increasingly plagued by the
effect of salty and sometimes toxic agricultural
drainage on wildlife and cropland productivity.
A leading drainage reduction strategy is water
conservation encouraged by the ability of

water

supply

districts

to

transfer

the

California State Water Project (SWP) is now
understood by many to have done great

entitlement to use conserved water.11

damage to fish and wildlife resources. For
example, San Joaquin River salmon runs have

Fifth, conditions have changed among
CVP
contractors
since
initial
water
allocations, with the result that some
contractors have ended up with relatively
abundant supplies of water whereas others

declined by 90% over the past 40 years and
95% of northern California's wetlands have

disappeared."
As a result, increasingly
urbanized Californians want more water used

are water-short12

to revive and sustain natural systems.
Pressure to use more water for this purpose
38

Finally,
the present drought in
California is cutting into the state's water
"reserve margin", increasing the need for all
Californians to use water more efficiently,

including through water conservation
transfers.13

The report concludes that the market
for water that is "surplus" to the needs of
CVP irrigators, particularly "conserved" water,

is underdeveloped.14
It is underdeveloped
primarily because CVP contractors and
growers
have
insufficient
incentive
to
conserve and transfer conserved water.

and

Each one of these factors exerts
pressure for reallocation of water provided by
the CVP for irrigation, whether it be for
environmental purposes, to meet municipal

The problem of insufficient incentives
to develop and transfer conserved water is
not, primarily, a result of disincentives in
reclamation or California law or even policy

demand, to minimize contributions to the
drainage problem,
to
reflect changing
agricultural patterns within the Valley or
simply to stretch available resources to meet
the need.

enunciated by the U.S. Department of the
Interior. Rather, the disincentives exist for a
mix
of
other
reasons,
including
political/institutional and "cultural" resistance,
"third-party" effects, lack of technical capacity

Water
may
be
reallocated
administratively by the bureau or voluntarily,
through transfers of entitlements to use water

among
bureau
contractors
and,
most
importantly, bureau policy at the regional

level that discourages water conservation and

provided by the CVP. This report focuses on
the second means: Transfers. It does so by
reviewing the legal and institutional context in
which
transfers
of
CVP
water
are

long-term

transfers

generally.

A

special

problem exists for transfers to environmental

uses. This is at once a problem of California
law, which has not yet found ample means to
allow water to be used for instream uses, and
an absence of funds to buy water for
wetlands.

implemented, with the purpose of considering
whether changes in the law and bureau policy
would be appropriate to facilitate these

transfers. It begins, in Chapter I, with a brief
In
Chapter
VII,
the
report
recommends that the region move quickly to
finalize
its
policy regarding long-term
transfers, with an emphasis on removing
impediments to the transfer of conserved

description of the CVP. Chapter II describes
transfer activity within the CVP to date.
Chapter in is a review of federal project-

specific and general reclamation law affecting
transfers of CVP water.
Chapter IV
summarizes California state law bearing on
CVP
transfers.
Chapter
V
reviews

water.

administrative policies implemented by the

Chapter t Toe Central Valley Project*
Brief Description

Department of the Interior, bureau and the
bureau's Mid-Pacific regional office as they
affect CVP. transfers.
Chapter VI is a

A

The CVP was initially authorized to
rectify four principal conditions in the Central
Valley: (1) Most of the need for water for
irrigation was in the San Joaquin Valley
whereas most of the water arises in the
Sacramento Valley; (2) Almost all of the
water falls as precipitation during winter
months, when farmers have little need for it,
and then flowed unimpeded and unused (by

discussion of "institutional considerations",
such as non-market values and attitudes that'
affect transfers. Chapter VII is a conclusion
to the report as well as recommendations for
changes in policy to facilitate transfers of

CVP water that would be broadly in the

public interest
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Joaquin Valley.

man) to the ocean; (3) Growers in parts of
the Valley south of the Delta were mining
locally available groundwater; and (4) Parts of
the Valley were subjected to chronic and

The San Luis Unit, partially

jointly owned and operated by the bureau
and the SWP, includes the San Luis reservoir,

used to store primarily winter flows from the
Delta for later use by the Westlands Water
District and farmers and other users within
the San Felipe Unit south of San Jose.

sometimes severe seasonal floods.13
Figure 1 is a map of the CVP. It
indicates the enormous and, among bureau
projects, unique reach of the CVP. However,

The

Friant

Division,

hydraulically

independent of the rest of the project, serves
to impound the headwaters of the San

notwithstanding the far-flung nature of the
project and the fact that its facilities have
been authorized, in pieces, for varying
purposes under a long string of legislation,
the region attempts to operate it as one,
integrated project16 In doing so, the bureau
is following the intent of Congress.

Joaquin River, in Millerton Lake behind
Friant Dam, and to transport them to
irrigation contractors in the southern and
eastern portions of the San Joaquin Valley.
Buchanan and Hidden Dam, just to the north
of Millerton Lake, were constructed and are

Pacific

operated by the Corps, but are integrated
into CVP operations. Finally, the East Side

offices (Redding, Willows, Fresno, Tracy, and

division consists of the New Melones Dam,
constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers

The CVP is operated by the Mid-

region
of
the
bureau,
with
headquarters in Sacramento and five field

("Corps") but operated by the bureau.

Folsom). The project is divided into several
divisions and units. For a detailed discussion
of these divisions as well as other factual
project data, see Appendix 1 to this case
study. In the north are found the Shasta,
Trinity and Sacramento divisions. Shasta and

Operating the CVP as an integrated
project involves releasing water from

the
northern reservoirs, in particular Shasta,
Trinity and Folsom, after flood control season

Trinity include two principal reservoirs used
to store water for irrigation and other uses
both north and south of the Delta.
The
Sacramento division includes the Red Bluff
dam which diverts water from the Sacramento
River to a system of canals for distribution to
agricultural
water districts.
East
of
Sacramento is the American River division,
comprised primarily of Folsom Dam and Lake
and the Sly Park unit, now under the

is over (March or April) for use south as well
as north of the Delta. Water from northern
reservoirs takes about five days to reach the
Delta from which it is lifted at Tracy for
conveyance by the Delta-Mendota Canal to
agricultural contractors on the west side of
the San Joaquin Valley. The Delta-Mendota
Canal is also used to transport water to San
Luis reservoir.

operation

At about the same time of year, water
is released from Friant Dam for transport by

of

the

H

Dorado

Irrigation

District

the Friant-Kem and Madera canals to a

Principal features of the Delta division
are the Delta-Cross channel which transports

group of agricultural contractors. The right
to use water now used by Friant Unit
contractors formerly was held by farmers
along the west side of the Valley. They are
now served by the Delta Division with water

water

across the Delta and the Tracy
Pumping plant, which lifts water from the

Delta into the Delta-Mendota CanaL The
canal conveys water from the Delta for use
by farmers along the west side of the San

transported from northern California. Indeed,
the Friant Unit would be unable to divert
40
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water were it not for water from northern
California transported for use on the west
side of the San Joaquin Valley.

Ad hoc transfers between CVP
contractors are routine, occur on an informal
basis and are approved by the bureau as a

means of reallocating water to meet annually
varying needs.20 Most of these transfers are
within a field division, even within one service
area within a field division.21 The vast bulk

Operation of the project is complex,
with hundreds of water contractors of various
kinds,
each
with
different
contract
entitlements for different uses and with rates
for water that vary widely as a function of

of these ad hoc transfers are from one
contractor to another and are carried out,
with the permission of a field officer, without
amendment of contracts.22

when their contracts were executed.
In
addition, the region operates the project
within a fishbowl, subject as it is to pressure

from irrigators, environmentalists, cities, other
agencies of the federal government and state
government
The region believes that

Two groups of contractors in the
Sacramento River Valley have created pools
as a means of facilitating annual transfers.23

operation

of
the
project
would
be
complicated further were transfers of water to
become commonplace.17

The purpose of these pools is to provide
water banks in which contractors may deposit

Chapter It Transfer Activity Involving Water
Provided by the CVP

have been in existence for many years, they

"surplus" water for withdrawal by pool
members facing a deficit While the pools

operate on an annual basis: Water may not
be deposited in the bank one year and
withdrawn in another. The pools are the

Transfer activity
involving water
provided by the CVP falls into two categories:
(A) transfers among CVP contractors and (B)
transfers between CVP and State Water
Project contractors.11

exclusive

means

by

which

members

may

transfer water among each other. In addition,
membership in the pools restricts pool
members from transferring water to and
receiving water from a non-pool member.

Transfers among CVP contractors

Another pool arrangement of sorts is
found among Friant Unit contractors. In wet
years water
from
Millerton
Lake
is
transferred
to
those
districts
with
underground storage capacity. In dry years
this water is pumped and returned to those
districts with inadequate groundwater supply.
In other words, transfers are used to permit

According to a study by Gray, over 3
million acre feet of water moved between
CVP contractors by means of transfers during
the period 1981-1988."
Most transfers of
water among CVP contractors are shortterm, lasting no more than one year. Almost
all of the water moving by short-term
transfers was from one irrigation use to
another.

conjunctive
use
through
banking
of
temporarily excess surface water supplies.24
This arrangement has been in place for many
years, but the bureau reserves the right to

Short-term transfers

approve or disapprove it on an annual basis.29

Short-term transfers are of two kinds:
Long-term transfers

(a) those carried out on an ad hoc basis and
(b) those implemented through a pool or

Construction of the locally financed
Cross Valley Canal was completed in 1975.

water bank.
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A second transfer proposal entailing
the movement of water between CVP and
SWP contractors involves the Arvin-Edison
District and the Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California (MWD). Under this
proposal, during wet years the DWR would
deliver up to 135,000 acre-feet of the MWD's
entitlement to SWP water to Arvin-Edison.
Arvin-Edison would use this water for aquifer
recharge or for irrigation. During dry years,
and in exchange for the SWP water, ArvinEdison would make up to 128,000 acre-feet
of CVP water available to the MWD. A
petition for the approval of this transfer is
pending before the SWRCB.32

The canal facilitates an exchange of water
between the Arvin-Edison Water Storage
District and a group of entities that have
long-term contracts with the bureau for water
released from Shasta Dam and Reservoir
known as the Cross Valley Exchange
Contractors.26
Pursuant to the exchange,
Arvin-Edison, a long-term Friant Unit
contractor, permits the Exchange Contractors
to use up to 128,000 acre-feet per year of
Arvin-Edison's Friant Unit water. In return,
the Arvin-Edison District takes an equivalent

amount of water released from Shasta Dam
and delivered to Arvin-Edison by means of
the California Aqueduct and Cross-Valley
CanaL
The effect of this exchange is to
make up to an additional 128,000 acre-feet of
water available to the east side of the

These transfers show that considerable

water does move between CVP contractors
and, in limited circumstances, between CVP
contractors and SWP contractors. However,
most of the water is transferred for no more
than one year and from one agricultural
contractor to another. Little water has been
transferred from agricultural to m&i uses or
to environmental uses.33 The major proposed
transfer of water from the CVP to the MWD
is an exchange where essentially no water is
ultimately lost to agriculture.

southern San Joaquin Valley.37
The bureau has also approved a
permanent transfer of water used for
irrigation by the lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation
District to the City of Lindsay for m&i use.28
There appear to have been no other such
transfers from irrigation uses to m&i uses
within the project
Transfers

between

CVP

and

SWP
Chapter IDt
Reclamation Law Affecting
Transfers of CVP Water

contractors

In 1989 the State Water Resources
Control Board ("SWRCB")29 approved a
transfer of 50,000 acre-feet from the Kern
County Water Agency ("KCWA"), a SWP
contractor, to the Westlands Water District,
a CVP contractor. The transfer was made
possible by the fact that KCWA unexpectedly
found itself with a surplus of water that
Westlands could use. Wetlands paid $20 per
acre foot for the water plus transportation
charges of about $12 per acre foot30
Westlands will also repay KCWA with CVP
water. If the water is repaid in dry years,
KCWA will pay Westlands between $5 and
$15 per acre-foot31

This chapter is an analysis of the
effect of federal reclamation law on the
transferabflity of water provided by the CVP.

The chapter is divided into four parts. Part
A delineates the roles of federal and state
law in transfers of project water.
Part B
analyzes whether statutes authorizing the
CVP contain restrictions on CVP transfers.
Part C is a review of general reclamation law
to ascertain its effect on such transfers. Part
D is a brief section on the effect of
reclamation law on the transfer of CVP
entitlements by the San Joaquin Valley
"exchange contractors", a group of CVP
contractors who have a different relationship
42

with

the

United States

than other CVP

In the water transfer context the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, citing California, stated that "'the
conspicuous absence of transfer procedures

contractors.

Part A: The Role of Federal Law in
Transfer Policy

[in reclamation law], taken in conjunction
with the clear general deference to state
water law, impels the conclusion that
Congress intended transfers to be subject to

While it is the federal government
that built and owns CVP storage and
conveyance facilities, California law has at
least as much to say about transfers of CVP
water as does federal law.

state water law.*"36

These cases may create the impression
that transfers of CVP water are subject
exclusively to California law. This would not
be a correct impression. First, while it is true
that the absence of explicit provisions in
reclamation law governing "transfers" has

The basis for the role that California
law plays in CVP water transfers is found in
section 8 of the Reclamation Act Section 8
provides:

opened

the door for California law to
regulate transfers of CVP water, there are
provisions in the legislation authorizing the
CVP and in general reclamation law that

Nothing in this Act shall be
construed
as
affecting or
intended to affect or to in any

way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating

leave room for a significant role for federal
law in these transfers.
For example,
provisions of federal law controlling place of
use of CVP water and the purposes for which
the water may be used as well as contract
provisions can and do limit the transferability
of CVP water.

to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation, or any
vested

right

acquired

thereunder, and the Secretary
of the Interior, in carrying out
the provisions of this Act, shall
proceed in conformity with
such laws~Provide& that the
right to use of water acquired
under provisions of this Act
shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial
use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the. limit of the
right34

As a result, it is necessary to review

both
project
authorization,
general
reclamation law and contract provisions to
ascertain whether they circumscribe the
application of California law in a manner that
could affect the transferability of CVP water.

Finally, federal law other than
reclamation law may impinge on transfers
even where inconsistent with state law.
governing transfers.
For example, the

Interpreting this section, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in California v. United States
("California"^ that the Secretary of the
Interior must follow state law regarding

requirements of the National Environmental

Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, Clean
Water Act and other federal environmental
legislation may limit transfers that otherwise
would be lawful under both reclamation law
and state law. This report does not address
this body of federal law, but notes that it

Bureau projects "in all respects not directly

inconsistent with" congressional directives.39
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Insofar as it bears on the question of
transferability of water provided by the
project, the statute (as amended to include
authorization to construct distribution systems
by the Act of October 17, 1940) reads as

cannot be ignored in the consideration of
CVP transfers.

PaitB: CVP Authorizing Legislation

follows:

There are no provisions in the statutes
authorizing the CVP and units thereof that
explicitly address transfers of water provided
by the project However, some CVP statutes
do contain specifications of the purposes for
which and, in some cases, the places in which

...the entire (CVP) is hereby
reauthorized and declared to
be

for
the
purposes
of
improving
navigation,
regulating the flow of the San

CVP water may be used.

Congress
first
authorized
and
appropriated funds for the construction of the
CVP in three statutes enacted in 1935 and
1936.37
None of these early authorization
and

Joaquin River and Sacramento
River,
controlling
floods,
providing for storage and for
the delivery of the stored
waters
thereof,
for
construction
under
the
provisions of the Federal
reclamation laws of such

appropriation

distribution

Initially authorized facilities

enactments

establish

any

congressional policy to guide the government
in its construction of the CVP. The facilities
authorized in these statutes were those
contained in documents prepared by the
Department of War. The Department relied
on the Corps which, in turn, relied on
components of the CVP contained in
California plans for the project

systems

as

the

Secretary of the Interior
deems necessary in connection

with

lands

stored

for which

waters

are

said

to

be
delivered, for the reclamation
of arid and semi-arid lands of

Indian reservations, and other
beneficial uses, and for the
generation and sale of electric
as
a
means
of
financially aiding and assisting
such undertakings and in order
to permit the full utilization of
the works constructed to
accomplish
the
aforesaid

It took the Act of August 26,1937 for
Congress to establish statutory policy for the
project This statute reauthorized the project

energy

(for construction by the Secretary of the
Interior), as it had been described in plans
submitted by the Secretary of War to the
Rivers and Harbors Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives. This document

purposes...And

Provided

further. That the said dam and

describes project facilities that are the
backbone of the project, principally the
Shasta Dam, Delta-Cross Channel, Tracy
Pumping Plant, Contra Costa Canal, DeltaMendota Canal, Friant Dam, Madera Canal

reservoirs shall be used, first,

and Friant-Kera Canal38 Thus, the Act of
August 26, 1937 is the initial expression of
congressional policy applying to these

and, third, for power.39

for
river
regulation,
improvement of navigation,
and flood control; second for
irrigation and domestic uses;

The inclusion of water supply for "other
beneficial uses" as an authorized project

facilities.
44.

purpose makes clear that CVP water
delivered through those facilities authorized
by the Act of August 26, 1937 may be used

statute is unambiguous. Second, water, even
from the initially authorized facilities, from
the project is already used outside the

for any beneficial use, including domestic,
municipal and industrial, and fish and wildlife

Valley.42

Third, the bureau's preliminary

decision to approve the transfer of CVP

water to the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California for use outside of the
Valley, as part of the Arvin-Edison/MWD
transfer discussed in Chapter n,is an
indication that the bureau does not read the
act as confining water provided under its

uses.

Any doubt as to the availability of
water provided by the CVP for use for fish
and wildlife purposes was dispelled by the Act
of August 27, 1954, which specifically

authorized the use of waters provided by the
project "for fish and wildlife purposes subject
to such priorities as are applicable under [the
1937 CVP legislation.]"40 Moreover, a 1954
opinion by the Solicitor of the Interior
indicated that fish and wildlife had been an
authorized purpose since 1937 and that the
express reference in the 1954 act was simply
a "more definitive specification."41

provisions to use in the Valley. This opinion
is entitled to considerable weight43
Third, assuming, for argument's sake,

that a court might be impelled to review the

legislative history of the 1937 act to ascertain
congressional intent regarding the place of
use of project water, it would not find clearly

stated intent to limit project waters to use
within the central Valley.
The legislative
history of the 1937 legislation consists of, at
best, secondary sources, such as reports of
Executive Branch agencies on the project.
No House or Senate reports on the act were
published.44 There appears to have been no
debate on the question of where project
water may be used. Agency statements do
show an intent to develop the project to
produce benefits for the Central Valley. But
these statements do not expressly limit these
benefits to the Valley. Nor do they expressly
limit the use of project water to the Valley.

Thus, water provided by the CVP
from the "backbone" facilities authorized in
1937 may be used for any beneficial use. It
follows that authorized purpose of use is not
an impediment to transfers of CVP water
provided that a transferee will put the water

to a "beneficial use."
The 1937 legislation says nothing
about the place of use of water developed by
the authorized facilities. This has led some
to opine that there are no restrictions on the
place of use of water provided by the
facilities authorized in the statute. Others

Congressional intent as to the place of
use of CVP water provided from initially
authorized facilities is, at best, ambiguous. As
such,
under
California.
California
law
regarding the place of use of CVP water is
controlling, not reclamation law. To ascertain
whether CVP water may be used outside the
Central Valley, one would look first to the
state water rights permits held by the United
States for the water provided by these
facilities. These permits prescribe places of
use that do not include certain areas outside
the Central Valley, in particular, Los Angeles

argue that the legislative history of the
legislation evinces an intent to restrict the use
of CVP water to the Central Valley.
The better opinion is that the use of
water from facilities authorized in the 1937
legislation is not restricted to the Valley.
First, the statute is unambiguous: There is no
place of use restriction. Thus, there is no
need for a court to refer to legislative history,
whatever it may say. Indeed, courts typically
do not refer to legislative history where a
45

and San Diego. As a result, before water so
provided may be used there, applicable water
rights permits would have to be amended.

such laws giving priority to the
counties and areas of origin
for present and future needs.47

The remainder of the CVP has been
constructed
pursuant
to
individual
authorizations. The following sections analyze
whether
legislation
authorizing
these
additional facilities contains impediments to

The question is whether this directive might
restrict transfers. In that California law in
1991 not only protects basins of origin but

transfers rooted in limitations in purpose or
place of use.

the Secretary from approving transfers.

also encourages transfers of water, it would
appear that this provision does not prevent

Another provision of the Act of
October 14, 1949 may have an indirect effect
on the transferability of water from one of
the facilities of the Folsom Unit, namely
Folsom Dam and Reservoir. The act directs

Folsom and Sly Park units

By

an

act

of October

14,

1949,

Congress authorized construction of the
Folsom and Sly Park units of the CVP,
located in the American River Basin
northeast of Sacramento.41 Section 1 of the
act states that the CVP, as authorized by the

the Corps of Engineers to construct Folsom
Dam and Reservoir, but directs the Bureau
of Reclamation to operate and maintain the
facility. However, the act also requires that
the dam "shall be operated for flood control

Act of August 26,
1937, is
"hereby
reauthorized to include the American River

in accordance with criteria established by the
Secretary of the Army as provided for in

development as hereinafter described, which
development is declared to be for the same
purposes as described in (the Act of August
26,1937).1146 Thus, there are no limits on the

section 7 of the Flood Control Act of 1944
(cites omitted)."48
In theory operation of
Folsom Dam for flood control could impinge
on transfers dependent on the availability of

types of uses to which water developed by
the Folsom and Sly Park units may be
transferred.

storage.

Finally, the Act of October 14, 1949
contains an "integration" provision:

Three other provisions of the Act of

October 14, 1949 bear on the transferability
of water from these units. First, section 2
contains the following provision:

The Secretary of the Interior
is directed to cause the
operation of said works to be
coordinated and integrated
with the operation of existing
and future features of the
Central Valley project in such
manner as will effectuate the
fullest and most economic
utilization of the land and

Nothing contained in this Act
shall
be
construed
by
implication or otherwise as an
allocation of water and in the
studies for the purposes of
developing plans for disposal

of water as herein authorized
the Secretary of the Interior
shall make recommendations

water resources of the central
valley project for the widest
possible public benefit49

for the use of water in accord
with
State
water
laws,
including but not limited to
46

While this provision does not authorize the
Secretary to ignore the explicit terms of the
Act of October 14, 1949, it does appear to
give him the discretion to review transfers of
water from the two units involved for

within the Tehama and Butte
Counties..-33

An amendment to this statute in 1967
authorized the Secretary to "provide sufficient

consistency with the objective of using the
land and water resources of the project "for
the widest possible public benefit" In that

extra capacity and elevation in the TehamaColusa Canal to enable future water service
to Yolo, Solano, Lake and Napa Counties for
irrigation and other purposes...."51 A further
amendment in 1980 extended the service area

many transfers would have the effect of
spreading the benefits'of the project, this
provision is supportive of transfers.

described in the first paragraph of the
passage cited above to include "...those
portions
of Yolo County within
the
boundaries of the Colusa County, Dunnigan
and Yolo-Zamora water districts...."32

Sacramento River Canals

In

1950 Congress authorized the

Tehama-Colusa Conduit (or Canal)
These provisions of law indicate that
water may be provided for any beneficial use.
However, the legislation appears to constrain
the use of water provided by the facilities to

...so as to permit the most

effective irrigation of
irrigable lands lying in

the
the

vicinity of said canal and
supply water for industrial,
domestic, and other beneficial
uses for these lands in
Tehama, Glenn and Colusa
Counties or such alternate
canals and pumping plants as
the
Commissioner
of
reclamation and the Secretary
of the Interior may deem
necessary to accomplish the

Tehama, Colusa, Glenn, Yolo, Solano, Lake
and Napa counties. This limitation does not
appear to mean that water which contractors
in these counties are entitled to use cannot
be used outside of these counties. It appears
to mean only that water delivered by the
Canals cannot be used outside of the sevencounty area. As a result, a transfer to a use
outside of these counties would have to be
effectuated without use of these facilities.

One way to effectuate such a transfer is to
leave the water in the Sacramento River
rather than diverting it to the Canals.

aforesaid purposes.
The features herein authorized
shall also include an irrigation
canal...beginning
at
the
Sacramento River near Vina,
California,
and
extending
through Tehama and Butte

The Sacramento Division of the CVP,
containing the facilities whose authorization is
discussed herein, also contains the Black
Butte Dam and Lake.
This facility,
constructed and operated by the Army Corps

Counties to a point near
Durham, California, so as to
permit the most effective
irrigation of the lands lying in

of Engineers but, in part, integrated into the
CVP°, provides water for the Orland Project
(not part of the CVP) and to the facilities of
the Sacramento canals.*1 Black Butte was

the vicinity of said canal and

authorized by the Act of August 26, 1937

supply water for industrial,
domestic, and other beneficial
uses for these lands lying

and, as such, transfers of water it impounds
are not limited as to purpose or place of

use.*
47

inconsistent with these provisos would not be

Trinity River Division

The

Trinity

River

permitted.

Division

was

San Luis Unit

authorized in 1955

The San Luis Canal was authorized by
an act of June 3, 1960. Section 1 states that

For the principal purpose of
increasing the supply of water

the unit is authorized

available for irrigation and
other beneficial uses in the

For the principal purpose of
furnishing
water
for
the
irrigation of approximately five

Central Valley of California....*
Thus, water developed and provided by the
division may be transferred to any beneficial
use, but that use need be within the Central

hundred thousand acres of
land in Merced, Fresno, and
Kings Counties, California,
hereinafter referred to as the

Valley.
The legislation authorizing the division
also includes an integration requirement
similar to that included in legislation

Federal San Luis unit service
area, and as incidents thereto
of
furnishing
water
for

authorizing the Folsom and Sly Park Units:

municipal and domestic use

and providing recreation and

fish and wildlife benefits....59

Subject to the provisions of
this Act, the operation of the
Trinity River division shall be
integrated and coordinated,
from both a financial and an
operational standpoint, with

Section 6 directs the Secretary to construct
the unit in such a manner as to "make
possible the future provision of Central
Valley
project
service...to
lands
and

the operation of other features
of the central Valley project,
as presently authorized and as

Santa Cruz, and Monterey Counties..-."*

municipalities in Santa Clara, San Benito,

These provisions establish that water
delivered through the canal may be used for
a broad range of purposes, although, when
used for non-irrigation purposes, it need be
used as an "incident" to irrigation use.

may be in the future be
authorized by Act of Congress,
in such manner as will
effectuate the fullest, most
beneficial, and most economic

utilization
resources

of

the

water

hereby

made

The
provisions
also
create
a
presumption that water provided through unit
facilities is limited to use in the area
described in section 1 and, later, when other
facilities
are
constructed,
to
counties
described in section 6."
However, water

available.37
This passage is followed by a series of
provisos designed to assure flows in the
Trinity River sufficient to protect fish
populations. A final proviso requires that
not less than 50,000 acre-feet per annum be
released from Trinity Reservoir and made
available
to
Humboldt
County
and

downstream

water

users.51

provided by the San Luis Unit originates in

facilities authorized under the 1937 statute,
which, as indicated, contains no place of use
limitation. As a result, if a transfer of water
now delivered for use by facilities of the San

Transfers
48

Luis Unit can be effectuated without use of

Conservation and development of fish and
wildlife resources and enhancement of
recreation opportunities in connection with
the division "shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Water Project

these facilities, say by moving the water to
another place of use by means of the DeltaMendota Canal or the SWP's California

Aqueduct, it appears that any place of use

limitation contain in the
legislation can be avoided.

San Luis

Unit

Recreation Act"64

New Melones Project

The

New

Melones

This act, among other

things, provides for the integration of fish and
wildlife and recreation opportunities into
reclamation projects.0
project

No place of use is specified in the
authorizing legislation.
The division is
authorized to be "an addition to, and an
integral part of, the Central Valley Project."66

was

originally authorized by section 10 of the
Flood Control Act of 1944 in which Congress
simply approved construction of projects on
the Stanislaus River and other rivers
according to the recommendations of the
Chief of Engineers in Rood Control
Document 2, 78th Congress. However, by
the Act of October 23, 1962, Congress
modified the project in accordance with a
later report of the Chief of Engineers and
provided
that,
upon
completion
of
construction, the project would become an
integral part of the CVP.
Congress also

It appears, then, that there are no
limitations in the legislation
authorizing the San Felipe Division that
would restrict transfers of water within or to
a use outside of the Division.
meaningful

Summary
This
part
shows
that
project
authorizing legislation places few restrictions
on the transferability of water provided by

provided that the project would be operated
by the Secretary of the Interior according to
reclamation law, except that the flood control

the CVP. The restrictions that do appear in
the legislation fall into three categories:

portion of the project would be operated in
accordance with rules prescribed by the

1. Water that is intended by

Secretary of the Army.'52
San Felipe Division
The San Felipe Division, in operation
since 1987, transports water from San Luis
Reservoir for irrigation and municipal use in
the Santa Clara Valley. The Division was
authorized

*

Congress to be used only for
irrigation use. There is only
one example of such a
restriction in the CVP: Water
provided by the San Luis Unit
may be used for purposes
other than irrigation, but only
as an "incident thereto."
2. Water that is allocated for
fish
flows
(Trinity
River
Division) or the transferability
of which may be affected by
the requirement that certain
facilities (Folsom Dam, New
Melones,
Black
Butte,

For the purposes of providing
irrigation and municipal and
industrial
water
supplies,
conserving and developing fish
and

wildlife
resources,
enhancing outdoor recreation
opportunities and other related

Buchanan and Hidden Dam)

purposes-..0
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six sub-parts: (1) Transferable interests; (2)
Purpose and place of use; (3) Appurtenancy,
(4) Beneficial use; (5) the Reclamation
Reform Act; and (6) Miscellaneous.

be

operated by the Army
Corps of Engineers or the
bureau
primarily
or
significantly to meet flood

control purposes.
Transferable interest

3. Water the use of which is
restricted to the Central Valley
(Trinity River Division) or
some
other
local
area

Do CVP contractors or individual
growers
receiving
water
from
these
contractors have a legal interest in CVP

(Sacramento River Canals, San
Luis Unit) As explained in

water that they may transfer to other users?

Part 1, place of use restrictions
in the legislation authorizing
both the Sacramento River

Analysis of the nature of the interest
in CVP water held by CVP contractors and
growers begins with the holding of the U.S.

Canals and the San Luis Unit
may be avoided simply by not
using
these
facilities
to
implement a transfer that

Supreme Court in Nevada v. United States
("Nevada"^. In this case the bureau sought
to reduce the entitlement of growers to water

would be inconsistent with the

provide additional water to the Pyramid Lake

legislation.

Paiute Tribe.
The bureau argued that it
could administratively reallocate water within
the project from irrigation use to protection
of Pyramid Lake because it held the water
rights for the project The Court rejected the
bureau's contention, reasoning that

from

Finally, operation of CVP facilities for fish
protection or flood control could affect the
seasonal
availability of water
that
is
transferred.

Part C* General Reclamation Law

the

Newlands

Project

in

order

to

"Once...lands were acquired by
Settlers in the project, the
(federal)
government's
ownership in the water rights

The phrase "general reclamation law"
refers to the uncodified mass of law
beginning with the Reclamation Act of 1902
and including statutes, case law and Solicitor's
opinions that address reclamation issues that
are not project-specific. As used in this part,

was

at

most

nominal;

the

beneficial interest in the rights
confirmed to the Government

reclamation law also includes the terms and
conditions of contracts executed under the
authority of reclamation law, but does not
include Departmental and regional policy.
Agency policy is reviewed in Chapter V.

resided in the owners of the
land...|T)he law of the relevant
State
and
the
contracts
entered into by the landowners
and the United States make
this point very dear."**

There is no general reclamation law
that explicitly addresses transfers of water.
But, as in the case of CVP authorizing

Thus, it is the users that hold the most
important legal interest in water supplied by
the bureau, hot the bureau.

legislation, there is general reclamation law
that may affect these transfers. For analysis
purposes this part analyzes these provisions in

Does the holding in Nevada apply to
the CVP? In the Newlands Project, contracts
50

for the supply of water by the United States
provide landowners with a "permanent water
right" in an amount that may be beneficially

CVP water might be able to transfer this
water at wilL

applied to a specified tract of land69 Neither
nor contractors hold such rights
pursuant to contracts executed for the supply
of water from the CVP. Thus, it has been
argued that, in the CVP, neither contractors
nor growers have the beneficial or equitable
interest in the water that was found to exist
in the Newlands Project

Such
a
conclusion
would
be
erroneous.
The property right to water
provided by the CVP under Nevada has been
restricted both by Congress and by the terms
and
conditions
under which
growers'
organizations receive water from the CVP.

growers

Since 1926 the bureau has been
directed to contract with organizations
("contractors") representing growers rather

This contention places more reliance
on the issuance of contract water rights to
the users than did the Supreme Court in

than with growers themselves.73

Since 1939,

the bureau and contractors have had a choice
as
to
the
nature of the contractual

Nevada. The primary basis for the Court's
holding that the United States could not
administratively reallocate water within the
Newlands Project over the objections of the

relationship between them. They may enter
into a repayment contract, under which a
contractor agrees to pay off the share of

project costs allocated to irrigation over a 4050 year contract period.74 Or they may enter
into a utility-type water service contract under
which the parties agree that the contractor
pay an appropriate share of project costs

growers was Nevada law, which the Court,
citing California. Ickes v. Fox and Nebraska v.

Wyoming™, found binding on the bureau.
That law requires that, for the perfection of
a water right for agricultural purposes, the
water must be beneficially used by application
to the land.71
Thus, the beneficial or
equitable interest in the water resides with
growers.
As a result, if California law
contains a similar requirement, the actual
users of CVP water appear to have the same
beneficial or equitable interest that Newlands
growers were held to have. As elucidated
below in Chapter IV, California law contains
a similar provision. Thus, irrigation uses of
CVP water hold the "equitable" title to water
provided by the CVP.72

allocated to irrigation over a 40 year contract

period.73
Most CVP contracts are water service

contracts. Pursuant to section 9(e) of the
Reclamation Project Act, CVP water service
contracts are for 40 years.
Many CVP
contracts are in their final years. As a result,
the transferable, equitable interest in CVP
water supply, as shaped by contracts, is of
short duration for many contracts unless the
contracts come with a right of renewal
Under the Act of July 2, 1956,
irrigation contractors do have a limited right
of renewal.™
In relevant part, the act
provides in section (1) that the Secretary of

Under California law holders of the
equitable right to use water possess a
"property right" to use the water deriving
from their application of the water to a
beneficial use.
And under traditional
principles of western water law, a property
right in water may be sold or otherwise
alienated by the holder of that right Thus,
one might conclude that growers receiving

the Interior shall include in any long-term
water service contract, if the contractor so

requests, provision for renewal.77 Section (4)
defines the scope of the right to renewal by
directing the Secretary to
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provide

that

the

interest
on
contractors
that
may
be
transferred to a use outside of a contractor's
area or to a non-agricultural use inside such
area beyond the expiration of any 40 year

contractor

shall, during the term of the
contract and of any renewal
thereof
and
subject
to
fulfillment of all obligations
thereunder, have a first right
(to which the rights of the
holders of any other type of
irrigation water contract shall
be subordinate) to a stated
share or quantity of the
project's available water supply

water service contract
This result for
transfers should not be surprising because the
purpose of the act was to provide for
continuity in farming operations and not for

the development of transferable property
rights in water beyond the expiration of

current contracts.9

for beneficial use on the
irrigable lands within the
boundaries of, or owned by,
the party and

While early CVP contracts typically
limit water to irrigation uses, most later
contracts permit the use of water for
irrigation and m&i uses. The Act of June 21,
1963 establishes a right of renewal for m&i
water service contract water.90 It directs the
Secretary to provide a right of renewal to

a permanent

right to such share or quantity
upon completion of payment
of the amount assigned for
ultimate return by the party

subject

to

payment

of

m&i water service contractors, to which right

an

the rights of m&i repayment contractors are

appropriate share of such
costs, if any, as may thereafter
be incurred by the United
States in its operation and
maintenance of the project
works.71

subordinate, to a share of a project's water
supply available for municipal, domestic or
industrial uses.
As a result, the right of
renewal to the supply of m&i water from the
CVP is not restricted bv the 1963 act to m&i
uses within a contractor's service area.

Thus, pending completion of payment of that
share of project costs ultimately assigned to a
contractor,

a

contractor

has

a

right

As importantly, the bureau may and
does, through contracts, regulate the use of
water it provides to the growers.81
These
contracts contain many terms and conditions
that define and circumscribe the equitable
interest that growers, through their districtcontractors, hold in CVP water.82 As they

of

renewal only as against holders of other types
of irrigation contracts, assumedly holders of
irrigation repayment contracts. And, whether
such a first right or a permanent right (after
a contractor's repayment is complete), the
right is always limited to a share or quantity
of project supply for beneficial use on the
irrigable lands within the boundaries or
owned bv the contractor.

bear on the transferability of this interest,

some of these contract provisions are:
1. Place of use.

Under this

term a contractor is prohibited

from disposing of any water

Obviously, the act provides for an

delivered under the contract

incomplete right of renewal^especially as it
affects transfers. That the right extends only
to application of water on lands within a
contractor's boundaries or owned by the
contractor strongly suggests that it confers no

outside of district boundaries
absent the permission of the

bureau's

Some
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contracting officer.
contracts make no

provision for changes in the
place of use whatsoever.

contract amendment is needed to obviate the
effect of a contract term on transferability,
there will likely be water rate-related

2.

older CVP contracts restrict

Reclamation Reform Act consequences. As
discussed in sub-part 5, these may discourage

use of water to irrigation uses
(and sometimes groundwater
replenishment)
absent
permission of the contracting

transfers.
By and large, however, the
negative disincentive of the RRA is minimal
within the CVP, provided that the region
does not impose rate increases that exceed

officer.

the minimum required by the RRA.

3. Return flows. The bureau
reserves the right to control
and use for other purposes
any return flow outside a
district's boundaries.

The fact that growers' equitable
interests in CVP water have been whittled
down by contract terms and conditions does
not mean that these interests are for nought
For example, the existence of an equitable

Purpose of use.

Some

interest should inform a court's review of
whether the bureau's refusal to permit a
transfer or to amend a contract to enable one
is "arbitrary and capricious" under the

4. Shortages. The U.S. is not
liable
for
shortages
and
reserves the right to apportion
shortages
among
all
contractors taking water from
a particular CVP facility.

contract0 That is, a contractor might argue
that, absent compelling circumstances, the
bureau
should
permit
the
district
to
implement a transfer to a use outside of the
district's boundaries as consistent with an
equitable interest in the water.

5. Assignments.

Typically, no
assignment of any interest in
the contract is permitted
absent the approval of the

Changes in the purpose or place of use

contracting officer.
Part 1 of this chapter established that
the transferability of most water provided by
the CVP is not limited by project authorizing

6. Repayment
Contractors
may receive no water if they
fall behind in their payment

legislation either as to purpose or to place of
use. No other limitations based in purpose
or place of use are found elsewhere in

for water.

reclamation law.

7. Transfers" (for one year)
are typically allowed under
CVP
contracts,
with
the
permission of a contracting
officer.

At least three general reclamation
statutes address changes in the purpose of
water provided by bureau projects. In 1906
the Secretary was given the authority to enter
into contracts to provide water to town sites
developed in connection with irrigation
projects "and other towns or cities on or in
the immediate vicinity of irrigation projects,
which shall have a water right from the same
source as that of said project..."84 In the

These terms restrict the interest that growers
and contractors hold in CVP water. With
the concurrence of the bureau, their negative
effect

on

transfers

can

be

overcome.

However, the bureau may exact the toll of a
rate increase for its concurrence. Where a
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1920 or 1939 Acts when considering the
transfer of water from irrigation to another
use when that other use is already authorized.

Miscellaneous Water Supply Act of 1920, the
Secretary was given the authority to enter
into contracts to supply water from any
"project irrigation system" for purposes other
than irrigation upon three conditions:

It is less clear whether general
reclamation law provides authority to the
Secretary to approve a transfer that would
involve the movement of water out of a
congressionally restricted service area. One
argument that such authority exists is
premised on the Miscellaneous Water Supply

1. Such a contract has been
approved by the appropriate

water users' associations;
2.

There

is

no

other

Act of 1920. If the phrase "project irrigation
system" in the 1920 legislation means "project
service area"-the phrase is undefined in the

"practicable" source of water
supply for the other purpose;
and

statute-then it follows that Congress meant

to authorize transfers outside of that area.
Bolstering this argument is the fact that, in
1920, there were virtually no non-irrigation
demands for water outside of project service

3. The supply of water for the
other
purpose
is
not
"detrimental"

to

the

water

service for the project0

areas. Hence, Congress must have meant to
have authorized transfers of irrigation water
to uses outside of project service areas.
However, this is a slender, inferential reed on
which to base such a transfer.

Finally, the Reclamation Project Act of 1939
is authorizes the Secretary to enter into
contracts to supply water for municipal or
miscellaneous purposes, provided that to do
so would not "impair the efficiency of the

The language in the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939, in effect authorizing
transfers as long as the efficiency of a project
for irrigation is not impaired, is not expressly
limited to situations where the transfer is to
a use within a congressionally authorized
service area.
As such, it may constitute
authority for transfers to uses outside of such
service areas. However, there is dictum in a
Solicitor's Opinion to the contrary:

project for irrigation purposes."86
Must the Secretary find that a
transfer from irrigation use to m&i use is
consistent with one of these statutes before
he approve such a transfer when, as in the
CVP, m&i use is already authorized? The
probable answer is "no".
The statutes
described in this section were enacted during
a time in which practically all water supplied
under contract was supplied for irrigation
pursuant to the Reclamation Act or project
legislation that clearly restricts authorized
purposes to irrigation.
The intent of the
1906 and 1920 enactments and the 1939
legislation (insofar as it is addressed to

...The 1939 Act was designed
to

overhaul

the

repayment

scheme for reclamation but
not designed to grant

was

blanket
authority
in
the
Secretary
to
override

reallocation of water supplied for irrigation)
appears to have been to clarity that water

subsequent

Congressional

authorization
of
projects...Therefore,
section
9(h) does not provide an
independent
base
for

supplied for irrigation only could, by contract,
be reallocated for other uses. There is no
evidence that Congress intended to require
the Secretary to comply with either the 1906,
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delivering water
outside of the
(service area)....*7

to areas
authorized

report of the Committee on Irrigation and
Arid Lands states that ".-the character of the
right which is contemplated under the act is
clearly defined to be that of appurtenance or
inseparability from the lands irrigated
"90

This opinion was reversed by a subsequent
Solicitor's Opinion, but on a different issue.88
The result for transfers to a use outside of a
congressionally authorized service area is that,
under reclamation law, they are legally risky.

Second, Rep. Mondell, (R-Wyo.), who
carried the bill form the Committee on
Irrigation and Arid Lands and who was a
primary
sponsor
in
the
House
of
Representatives, began floor consideration of
the measure with a lengthy opening statement
which includes the following passage:

Appurtenancy

The broad deference in section 8 of
the Reclamation Act to state primacy in the
allocation of water provided by the bureau is
conditioned by two provisos. The first is that
the right to use water provided under the
Reclamation Act "shall be appurtenant to the

land irrigated...."9
defined in the

The
water
having
been
beneficially
applied
and
payments having been made

under the provisions of the
bill, the water right would

"Appurtenant" is not
act
"Appurtenancy"

become appurtenant to the
land
and
inalienable
therefrom...

requirements or remnants thereof are found
in the law of many western states, but their
meaning is not uniform. It can mean that an
interest in water associated with land may not
be severed from title to the land.
This
definition of appurtenancy would not present

The settler to landowner who
complies
with
all
the

conditions of the act secures
a perpetual right to the use of
a sufficient amount of water to
irrigate his land, but this right
lapses if he fails to put the
water to beneficial use and
only extends to the use of the
water on and for the tract
originally irrigated.
These
most important provisions of

an insurmountable hurdle for transfer of CVP

water.
It would simply require that a
transferee must also own the land to which
an interest in the water is appurtenant
However, appurtenancy can also mean that

water may not be severed from the land

without loss of the right to use the water. If
"appurtenancy" in section 8 has this meaning,

it would constitute a significant impediment
to transfers of CVP water away from the

the law prevent all the evils
which come from recognizing
a property right in water with
power to sell and dispose of
the same elsewhere and for
other purposes than originally

land.

Because
the
meaning
of
"appurtenancy" is unclear, a court may look
to the legislative history of the Reclamation
Act for guidance.
The legislative history

intended. This is an advance
over the water usage of most

contains sparse reference to "appurtenancy",

of the States, and it is not
denied that making water

but that which exists provides some support
for the proposition that, once water was
applied to a particular tract of land, the
water is inseparable therefrom.
First, the

rights appurtenant to the tract
irrigated will in some cases
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term in section 8. If so, the court would
likely refer to "Kinney on Irrigation and
Water Rights", the standard reference on
western water law of the time.94
Kinney

work hardship, but it is
believed that it is much better
to risk the individual hardships
which will inevitably occur

defines "appurtenances" as things belonging to

under
a
provision
of
appurtenance than to risk the
evils certain to result from
unlimited authority to transfer
water rights.91

another thing as principal and which pass as
incident to the principal thing but which did

not belong to it immemorially."95 He goes on
to indicate that "Although a water right may
be appurtenant to a certain tract of land, it is
the subject of property, and may be
transferred either with or without the land."94

Rep. MondeU's remarks evince the intention
to deny a landowner the right to transfer his

This is true, he says, even when legislatures

entitlement to transfer water provided by the
bureau, even where state law permitted such
transfers.
If
a
court
accepts
his
interpretation of "appurtenancy", transfers of

attempted to provide for inseparability.97 In
this context, Kinney addresses the meaning of
"appurtenancy" in section 8:

water away from the land to which it was
originally appurtenant are unlawful

"...there

nature

is nothing in the
and character of a

There are several reasons why a court

water right acquired under the

not likely adopt Rep. MondeU's
interpretation. First, the Supreme Court has
stated that the views of individual legislators,
even
sponsors,
do
not
control
the
interpretation of a federal statute.93
The

Arid Doctrine of appropriation
which makes it, upon any
principle of law that can be

would

conceived,

an
inseparable
appurtenance to any particular
tract of land, so that a sale or
transfer of the right would
work an abandonment, and
vest no right in the grantee.

significance of the remarks of key legislators
is diminished further when they are made
outside of debate, as were Rep. MondeU's.
Second,
Rep.
Mondell,
himself,
indicated during debate that ".-we are urging
no new experiment and exploiting no new

Upon

theories...[in] the principles which underlie
this measure, the policies which it outlines,
the detail of administration which it provides.
There is in it no new thing."99 If so, his
concept of "appurtenancy" may not have been
intended to be at odds with contemporaneous
notions of appurtenancy in western state
water law, even though "appurtenancy" in
section 8 appears as a general deference to

law to own, hold and dispose

the other hand, the
inherent
rights guaranteed
under our constitutions and

of all or any portion of our
property, either as a whole or
in parts, permits the sale and
transfer of a water right
separate from the land. This
principle

state law.

was

recognized

by

passing

the

undoubtedly

Congress

in
national

reclamation Act (cite omitted),
where, in section 8, it is
provided that the Secretary of
the Interior, in carrying out
the provisions of the Act, shall
proceed in conformity with the

Thus, a court might be impelled to
investigate the meaning of appurtenancy in
1902, as a means of ascertaining what

Congress must have meant when it used that
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laws of the respective States
and Territories; and, in the
same proviso, "That the right
to the use of water acquired

if "appurtenancy" is no bar to such transfers
in its approval of transfers of CVP water as
well as water provided by other projects." In
addition,
its
Water
Marketing
Policy
Statement and Criteria and Guidance would
be practically meaningless if it believed that
"appurtenancy" constituted a significant barrier
to transfers.l0oThe policy of the department on
"appurtenancy" appears to be grounded in the
belief that "appurtenancy"
was simply a
congressional directive that the early federal
reclamation contracts be granted only to
owners of land that would be irrigated with

under the provisions of this
Act shall be appurtenant to
the land irrigated," etc
As
will be noticed the proviso

does

not

state

what

"land

irrigated," nor does it attempt
to
make
the
water
an
inseparable appurtenance to
any land. It certainly cannot
be contended in the face of
the whole of this section, that
a person in either the states
of Wyoming or Idaho, who

project water, rather than speculators.

One federal court has addressed the
meaning of appurtenancy. In El Paso County
Water District v. Citv of El Paso101. an issue
before the court was whether water provided
by the bureau for irrigation could be used for

had fully paid for a water
right under the provisions of
the Act, and where the law of
those States recognize the
validity of a sale and transfer
of a water right separate and
apart from the land to which
it was first applied, can not

municipal

purposes without violating the
appurtenancy provision of section 8 of the
Reclamation Act
Texas had accorded a
higher preference for municipal use than for
irrigation use.
The court held that this
municipal purpose overcame the appurtenancy
requirement because section 8's larger
purpose was to defer to state control over
water allocation."*
However, the court's
analysis of "appurtenancy" is brief. It seems
to be inconsistent with the plain meaning of
section 8, which creates "appurtenancy" as a

sell his right, or transfer the
water claimed thereunder to
some other tract of land. The
same may be said relative to
the water rights acquired
under the Act in other states
under the principles stated

above (cite omitted).91

proviso to the general bow to state primacy
over the allocation of water.

Thus, Kinney concluded that Congress
(whatever Rep. Mondell had in mind) could
not have intended in section 8 to make
project water inseparable from the land
because to do so would be inconsistent with
not only with contemporaneous western water
law but also with "our constitutions."

A more sound way of deferring to
state law would be to adopt a definition, if
any, of appurtenancy that appears in
California law. Under California, given that
section 8 "appurtenancy" is ambiguous,
arguably a California definition should apply.

Unfortunately, no such definition exists. One
can argue that California has impliedly
rejected notions of appurtenancy as a barrier

A court might also defer to the
Department of the Interior for guidance as to
the meaning of "appurtenancy". While the
Department has not issued a definition of
"appurtenancy", it has behaved throughout as

to transfers. (See Chapter IV, infra-) As
such, in California, "appurtenancy" should be
interpreted so as to avoid such barriers.
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the court, the Circuit Court implied, it would
have been proper to have applied that rule

Beneficial use

rather than to have
determination."*

The last proviso of section 8 states
that "...beneficial use shall be the basis, the

measure, and the limit of the right (to use
water acquired under the provisions of the
Reclamation Act)"109 In that the beneficial
use requirement of section 8 appears as a
proviso to the general deference to state law,
some
have
wondered
whether
the
requirement creates authority for the bureau
or federal courts to develop notions of
beneficial use that are different than those
which appear in a state's water law. If such
authority exists, it might be used to stifle
transfers, for example under the theory that

made

the

de

novo

As explained below, California has
"special rules of law" establishing that
transfers of "surplus" water may be beneficial
uses.
These rules should control the
application of the "beneficial use" requirement
of section 8. As such, "beneficial use" is not
an impediment to the transfer of CVP water.
Reclamation Reform Act

The Reclamation Reform Act of
1982107 was intended to modernize the
ownership restrictions of reclamation law as

a transfer, per se, is not a "beneficial use"
under section 8 if it involves removal of water
from beneficial uses in a contractor's service

well as to apply new, higher repayment
requirements to some growers under certain

area.

condition.
The
address transfers.

Case law establishes that where state

RRA does not directly
However, it may act as a

disincentive to a transfer where the transfer
requires an amendment to a contract This

law is explicit on the meaning of beneficial
use under state law in a particular context, a
state's notion of beneficial use governs.
However, where a state law is not explicit, a
court may make a de novo determination of
"beneficial use" in furtherance of the
requirement of section 8. In United States v.
Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.10* the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that
"While there were provisions of federal law
which were intended to displace state
law...beneficial use itself was intended to be
governed by state law.*1* In this case the

section summarizes how this disincentive may
arise.108
Under the RRA contractors may elect

to avail themselves of more liberal land
ownership restrictions prior to scheduled

contract renewal, but, if they do, they will pay
full O&M rates for grower landholdings less

than 960 acres.109
These rates apply
automatically after a contract is renewed.110
However, upon a contract amendment for any
purpose which enables a contractor to receive

court affirmed a district court de novo
determination of beneficial use within the
Newlands Project in which the district court
had declined to be bound by a Nevada statute
defining water duties.

"supplemental or additional benefits", the
RRA requires payment of full O&M costs on

all land as a minimum.111 Thus, if a transfer
requires amendment of a contract deemed to
constitute
"supplemental
or
additional

However, in this case, the Nevada
statute had been repealed. In addition, the
statute may not have applied to Newlands
irrigators even when it had been in effect
Had the state of Nevada had in place a

benefits", growers, after such an amendment,

"special rule of law" on the question before

of the RRA are a disincentive to a transfer

will pay at least full O&M costs for the water
they receive.

The degree to which these provisions
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depends on several factors, including when
the district's contract will be renewed (and,
thus, full O&M rates apply anyway), whether
the district or growers therein have already
elected to begin to pay full O&M costs (so as
advantage of expanded
land
to take
ownership entitlements prior to contract
renewal) and how far apart full O&M rates
are from the fixed contract rates they pay
prior to the transfer. Also to be taken into
account in ascertaining the effect of the
"supplemental
or
additional
benefits"
requirement is P.L. 99-546, which provides
that all O&M costs (deficits and prospective
costs) as well as capital costs of the CVP be
repaid by 2030.m
It also imposes a
requirement
that
interest
accrue
on
contractor-district O&M deficits incurred after
October 1, 1985.m As a result, growers not

2.
Where
the
proposed
transfer is to a use not
allowed
under
a
current
contract; and

3. Where a district, in order to

effectuate a long-term transfer,
wants to reduce its contractual
entitlement to water and to
allow a receiving district (a) to
increase
its
contractual
entitlement or (b) enter into a
contract with the bureau.
As to whether transfers requiring a contract
amendment
would
also
constitute

"supplemental or additional benefits" and,
thus, threaten an amending
contractordistrict with the requirement to pay more
than full O&M rates (as a matter of regional
Bureau policy), relevant bureau regulations
promulgated to implement the RRA state as

already paying full O&M rates under the
RRA are faced with the financial equivalent
thereof for O&M deficits incurred since 1985.

follows:

Because of P.L. 99-546, the RRA
should not prove to be a significant
disincentive to transfers in the CVP, with the
likely exception of the exchange contractors
whose situation is described in Part D of this
chapter.
What disincentive exists depends,
first, whether CVP contracts need to be
amended to enable a contractor to effectuate
a transfer and, second, whether a contract

All contract amendments will

be construed as providing
supplemental or additional
benefits
except
those
amendments which do not
require the United States to
expend significant funds, to
commit to significant additional
water
supplies,
or
to
substantially modify contract
payments due the United
States.114

amendment enabling a transfer would
constitute a "supplemental or additional
benefit"
As to whether a transfer would
require a contract amendment, in the CVP, it
would appear that such amendments would be
required in three situations:

The transfer of water on an
annual basis from one district

to another
considered
supplemental

1. Where the existing contract

(will

to
or

provided

not be
provide
additional

did
npt
explicitly
permit
transfers (with the permission

benefits),

that

(1)

of the contracting officer);

with the United States, (2) the

both districts have contracts

rate paid by the district
receiving the transferred water
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supplemental or additional benefits under the
RRA unless they do not require the United
States to expend significant funds, commit
significant additional water supplies or to
substantially modify contract payments due

is the higher of the applicable
rate(s)
for
either
district, and provided further
that the rate paid does not

water

result
in
any
increased
operating losses to the United
States above those which
would have existed in the
absence of the transfer and
the rate paid does not result
in any decrease in capital
repayment to the United
States below that which would
have existed in the absence of
the transfer, and (3) the
recipients of the transferred
water pay a rate for the water
which is at least equal to the
actual O&M costs or the fullcost rate in those cases where,
for whatever reason,
the
recipients would have been
subject to such costs had the

the United States. Most transfers will not
require the United States to expend
significant funds or to commit additional
water supplies. However, many may entail
the modification of contract payments due to
the United States.
As a result, some
transferors of CVP water may be required by
the bureau to pay full O&M cost-rates for all
water they receive after the transfer.
As
indicated above, because of P.L. 99-546 this
likelihood should not, in itself, discourage too
many transfers.
In sum, as long as the bureau refrains
from exceeding the minimal rate increase
requirements triggered by the RRA, the RRA
should not be a major disincentive to

transfers in the CVP. However, if the bureau

water not been considered
transferred water.1"

determines, as a matter of policy, to charge
more than what is required under the RRA-as it may under the RRA~, the bureau will
discourage transfers.

Acquisition of irrigation water
from
federally
financed
facilities by exchange shall not
subject the users of such water
to Federal Reclamation law

Miscellaneous provisions

Certain
other
provisions
of
reclamation law may come into play when a
transfer of CVP water is proposed.

and these regulations if no
material benefit results from
the exchange to the recipient

of water from the federally
financed facilities.1M2

Section 301(d) of the Water Supply
Act of 1958117 provides that modification of a
reservoir project (say to facilitate a transfer of
water from an irrigation use to an m&i use)

The regulations also provide that the
Secretary can designate other contract
amendments as exceptions.

which would "seriously affect the purposes for
which the project was authorized..or which
would involved major structural or operational

These

regulations,

applied

to

the

changes

shall be made only upon the
approval of Congress...." Given the breadth

three situations in which a transfer would
require an amendment to a contract, indicate
that some, perhaps many, transfers for more
than one year and possibly even some annual
transfers will be construed to imply

of the purposes for which CVP reservoirs

have been constructed, the only problem this
section could present for a CVP transfer is if
the transfer required a major operational
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change in a reservoir. If it did, congressional

because of the difficulty in securing sufficient

approval would be required.

money to pay for these uses.
However,
where, as in California, it is unlawful to hold
a water right for purposes of maintaining or
enlarging instream flows, this policy presents

Under section 3 of the Reclamation
Act118, the Secretary must classify land as
suitable for irrigation before he may allow
water provided by the CVP to be used for

a problem. This may be less a problem of
federal policy than California law.m

irrigation on such land.
Thus, before a
transfer of water to an irrigation use may be
approved, a land classification analysis must

Finally, the Warren Actra authorizes
the Secretary to contract for the use of excess
storage or carrying capacity in projects
constructed
under
the
authority
of
reclamation law.
It also prohibits anyone
contracting with the Secretary under this
authority from charging in excess of the costs
paid the United States plus distribution costs.

be undertaken and successfully completed.
Because an irrigation transferee would likely
know whether his land is suitable for
irrigation in advance of a transfer (particularly
if the transferee is already a CVP contractor),

this requirement should present little problem
for CVP transfers to irrigation uses.

Thus, the Act prohibits "profits" on the
delivery charges imposed by the bureau
attendant to a transfer of Warren Act water.
This is not a major disincentive to the
transfer of CVP water because the project
stores very little Warren Act water.123

Reclamation law establishes repayment

requirements other than
contained in the RRA

those that are
and the COA

legislation already discussed. Thus, irrigation
users must pay rates to recover operating and
capital costs, but no interest on capital is

Part D: The exchange contractors

recouped from these users. M&I users must
pay interest on capital.119 Transfers must be
in compliance with these provisions of law.
As a result, an m&i transferee will end up
paying a higher rate for water transferred out
of irrigation. The effect on transfers of the
repayment requirements of reclamation law is

There are two groups of exchange
contractors who take water from the CVP.
One group is found in the San Joaquin
Valley.
The other is comprised of
Sacramento River contractors. Both groups
have different relationships with the bureau

than ordinary contractors. This part reviews
only the four exchange contractors located on
the west side of the San Joaquin Valley.

a broad subject and is treated in greater
detail by Richard Wahl in the larger report of
which this case study is a part However, one
aspect-the effect of repayment requirements
on
transfers
to
benefit
the
natural
environment-is treated here because of its
importance to the CVP.
It

is

departmental

policy

The four CVP contractors on the west

side of San Joaquin Valley that are exchange
contractors are the Central California

Irrigation District, San Luis Canal Company,
Columbia Canal Company and the Firebaugh
Canal Company. These entities and their
predecessors had been diverting directly from

that

repayment to the federal government for
after a transfer will be no less than it was

the San Joaquin River pursuant to riparian
water rights. By a single contract, executed
in final form on February 14, 1968, these
contractors agreed to accept a substitute
supply of water through the Delta-Mendota

prior to the transfer.lx
Where an entity of
one kind or another may hold an entitlement
to use water for environmental purposes, this
policy does not seem unfair, although it may
shortchange environmental uses of water
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argument is not sound because, as of now,
the exchange contractors hold contract rights
which they accepted in return for yielding
their riparian rights. Even if the rights which
the exchange contractors hold are still
construed to be riparian rights, these rights
have now been quantified.

Canal in exchange for water from the San
Joaquin River so that the bureau could
impound this water to serve Friant Unit
contractors.

The

exchange

contract

differs

markedly from ordinary CVP contracts, First,

its term is perpetual. Second, in recognition
of pre-project

rights,

the

contractors

Chapter IV:

pay

State Law Affecting Transfers

nothing for CVP water.
Friant Unit
contractors pay the costs of delivering water
to the exchange contractors. Third, arguably,
reclamation law, general as well as projectspecific, does not apply to the contractors.

of CVP Water

It might appear that the exchange
contractors are free to transfer their water
without restriction under reclamation law.
However, Article 6 of the Exchange Contract
limits the use of water provided by the CVP
to service areas described in the contract
Thus, it is likely that a contract amendment
is necessary to effectuate a transfer at least to

CVP.
In particular, important questions
remain
unanswered
in
the
areas
of
transferable interest, purpose and place of

Chapter IV indicates that general
reclamation law does not provide clear
answers to some questions that bear on the
legality of transferring water provided by the

use, and beneficial use.

As a result, under
California v. United States, courts will look to

California law for answers.
This Chapter
shows that California law lifts the cloud of
uncertainty from most of these issues. The

a use outside of the service areas of the
contractors. The contractors are concerned
that the bureau would exact a high price in
return for an agreement to amend the
contract, namely, the application of the
pricing and, perhaps, even the acreage
limitations established by the RRA.1*

chapter also explains the basic requirements
of California law that apply to CVP transfers.
In doing so, it demonstrates that, as a general
matter, California law provides strong support
for transfers of "surplus" water, including
conserved
water, by bureau contractors.
Where California law appears deficient is in
its refusal to permit any entity, even the state,

Apparently, the rationale for applying
RRA provisions to the exchange contractors
stems from the possibility that a contract
amendment would amount to a "supplemental
or additional benefit" under the RRA.
Assuming that provisions of the RRA may
lawfully be applied to the exchange
contractors, whether allowing a transfer
amounts to a supplemental or additional
benefit depends, in part, on whether the

to hold a water right to secure instream
flows.

for the CVP. Some transfers of CVP water
will require approval of the SWRCB because

exchange contractors presently could transfer

the bureau's water rights for the CVP restrict

an entitlement to use water. The argument
that they could not is based on the fact that
they used to hold riparian rights which,
absent quantification, may not be transferred
under California law."5
However, this

the place of use of water, even if project

The State Water Resources Control
Board, ("SWRCB"), has regulatory jurisdiction

over all transfers that require a change in the
place of use, purpose of use or point of
diversion set forth in the water rights permits

authorizing statutes do not, to the Central
Valley and adjacent areas of the Sacramento-

San Joaquin Delta.

In addition, they specify
points of diversion, in particular, from the
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Delta, that will need changing to effectuate
north-south transfers."6

380 through 387 of the Code.130 These and
related sections provide answers to other
issues affecting the transferability of water by

In 1980 California law was amended
to provide that it is

contractors left unresolved by reclamation
law.

the established policy of this

Section 380 states that the policy of
encouraging local agencies to transfer water
based on local and regional economic

state to facilitate the voluntary
transfer of water and water
rights consistent with the

conditions
is
"in
furtherance of
the
reasonable and beneficial use doctrine of
Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution131 as well section 109 of the
Water Code, cited above.
Section 382
declares that "fniotwithstanding anv other

public interest in the place of
export and the place of
import127

Thus began a nearly decade-long effort to
amend California water law to encourage
voluntary water transfers. The new policy
together with the amendments is important in
providing the legal basis for transfers of CVP

provision of law to the contrary, every local
or regional public agency authorized by law to
serve water to the inhabitants of the agency
may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise

water.

transfer water that is surplus to the needs of
California

law

establishes

the agency's water users for use outside the
agency." (Emphasis added.)

four

categories of transfers: (1) temporary urgency
changes; (2) temporary changes; (3) longterm transfers; and (4) transfers of reclaimed,
conserved and surplus water.128
As this
report is interested primarily in the latter two

Section 383 defines "surplus water" in
three ways. Section 383(a) authorizes water
agencies to transfer water "which the agency
finds will be in excess of the needs of water
users within the agency for the duration of
the transfer." Section 383(b) includes, within
the definition of surplus water, water "of
which any water user agrees with the agency

types of transfers, it is to provisions of
California law bearing on them that this
chapter now turns.

on mutually satisfactory terms to forgo use

A long-term transfer is defined as a
transfer "...for any period in excess of one
year."129 Section 1736 contains the basic test

for the duration of the transfer."

Section

383(c) authorizes an individual water user
within an agency to negotiate a transfer of

that long-term transfers must meet
It
authorizes the Board to "approve a petition

water that is surplus to the user's needs.
Thus, a local water agency such as a CVP
contractor is authorized to transfer water that
is surplus to the needs of all water users

for a long-term transfer where the change
would not result in substantial injury to any
legal user of water and would
not
unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other

beneficial uses."

served by the agency or surplus to the need
of an individual water user, including in
circumstances in which the user, himself, has

Most transfers in which bureau
contractors are involved will entail transfer of

negotiated the transfer. Obviously, "surplus"
water includes conserved water, as defined in

"surplus" water. Transfers of "surplus" water
by agencies of government are governed by

footnote 14, supra.

special provisions of law contained in sections
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Moreover, section 386 authorizes the SWRCB
to approve a transfer of "surplus" water

Sections 1011 and 1244 of the Code
provide additional support for the transfer of
"surplus" water. Section 1011 (a) establishes
that n[w]hen any person entitled to the use of
water under any appropriative right fails to

...only if it finds that the
change may be made without
injuring any legal user of water
and
without
unreasonably

use all or any part of the water because of
water conservation efforts, any cessation or
reduction in the use of such appropriated
water shall be deemed equivalent to a
reasonable beneficial use of the water to the
extent of such cessation or reduction in use."
Section 1011(b) authorizes the transfer of
water or water rights "the use of which has
ceased or been reduced as a result of water
conservation efforts." Finally, section 1244
declares that "[t]he sale, lease, exchange, or
transfer of water or water rights, in itself,
shall not constitute evidence of waste or
unreasonable use."

affecting fish, wildlife, or other
instream beneficial uses and
does not unreasonably affect
the overall economy of the
area from which the water is
being transferred.
California law also establishes that it is the

growers (as distinct from the districts in
which they operate), not the bureau, that
holds the important, beneficial, equitable
interest in water provided by the CVP.
Water Code section 1240 provides that an
appropriation must be for some beneficial

Two requirements must be met before
water may be transferred pursuant to the
"surplus" water provisions. First, section 385

use. It is the growers to whom the bureau
supplies CVP water, not the bureau, who

establishes that, just as the transferor-agency
must approve the transfer, so must the water
agency with jurisdiction over the area to
which the water is being transferred. Second,
all transfers must comply with the other
provisions of the Code that govern water
transfers. According to section 384,

apply the water to beneficial uses and, thus,
it is they who provide the basis for the
bureau's water rights. It follows that they,
not the bureau, hold the beneficial interest in
CVP water.

Prior to serving water to any
person for use outside the

discussion of reclamation law. First, these
provisions apply to water provided by the
CVP.
There just is not indication that
California legislators intended to exempt CVP
water users from them. The fact that it is
the United States, and not either CVP
contractors or the growers, who holds the
water rights for the CVP, does not mean that
the policies embodied in California law are
not intended to apply to transfers by CVP

These sections together resolve the
principal issues raised but unresolved in the

agency,
the
agency
shall
comply with all provisions of
the general laws of the state

relating

to

the

transfer of

water
or
water
rights,
including, but not limited to,

procedural and substantive
requirements governing any
change in point of diversion,
place of use, or purpose of

contractors.

use due to such transfer.

Second, these sections are "special
rules of law" that confirm that a transfer of
water that is "surplus" to the needs of one or
more users served by a bureau contractor
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may be transferred by the contractor, as a
matter of state law, and that such transfers
are a beneficial use under California law. As
such, transfers are a "beneficial use" under
section 8 of the Reclamation Act

implement California transfer policy within
the

broad

discretion

which

the

bureau

possesses under reclamation law.

Chapter V:

Bureau Policy Affecting CVP

Transfers

Third, they resolve that the growers
have a legal interest in the water provided by
the CVP, since it is the growers, not the
bureau, that applies the water to the land.

The import of Chapter m and IV is
threefold: (1) That neither project-specific
nor general reclamation law erects major
barriers to CVP transfers at least within the
time term of most CVP contracts; (2)
California
law encourages
transfers of
"surplus", conserved water, and, (3) Many

Fourth, they clarify that growers acting
through their contractors do not risk a claim
of forfeiture of water rights simply by
attempting to transfer them.

CVP contracts contain serious impediments to
transfers.

Fifth, in authorizing local agencies to
transfer water, these sections of the law
clarify that, under state law, a bureau
contractor may transfer water even though it
neither holds the water right nor applies
water to the land
Indeed, by requiring

These contract impediments can be
alleviated through the exercise of discretion
by the Mid-Pacific Region. Where contract
amendment are needed, the mandatory
provisions of the Reclamation Reform Act
should not pose a major disincentive to
transfers, but bureau policy authorized, but
not required, by the RRA may create
significant disincentives.

individual water users to work through local
agencies to effect a transfer of water that is
"surplus" to the individual water users' needs,
these sections affirm the critical role of
contractors in the transfer process.

This chapter reviews departmental and
regional bureau policy to ascertain its effect

In sum, California law encourages the

conservation of water by bureau contractors
by clearing the way for transfers of this water
by the contractors, themselves.
However,

on CVP transfers.
Departmental policy

California law cannot vest contractors or
growers with a transferable interest in CVP
water that is inconsistent with the limited

On

December

16,

1988

the

Department of the Interior issued "Principles

rights of renewal granted by Congress in the
1956 and 1963 acts described in Part C of
Chapter HL
Nor can it confer rights to
transfer that are inconsistent with the CVP
contract provisions discussed in Part C

Governing Voluntary Water Transactions
That Involve Or Affect Facilities Owned Or
Operated By The Department Of The

Nonetheless, its
provisions
encouraging
transfers, particularly of conserved water, can

Reclamation
Transactions

inform

(hereafter "Criteria") for the purpose of
assisting in the implementation of the
Principles.
These documents, provided as
appendices to the main report, establish

Interior" (hereafter "Principles"). About six
months
later,
the
Commissioner
of

the Mid-Pacific region's policies
governing transfers. Certainly, pursuant to its

continuing jurisdiction over the water rights
permits under which the bureau operates the
CVP, the SWRCB can require the region to

departmental
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issued
"Voluntary
Water
Criteria
and
Guidance"

policy

that

governs

CVP

water are considered as alternatives in water
resource management within Reclamation'

transfers. The contents of the documents are

reviewed in detail in the main report This
section summarizes some of the major policies
embodied in the documents to set the stage
for the discussion of regional CVP transfer
policy-

planning, operation, and other water resource

development"

Principle 5 states that the The fact
that the transaction may involve the use of
water supplies developed by Federal water
resource projects shall not be considered
during evaluation of a proposed project"

The first principle is consistent with
section 8 of the Reclamation Act as well as
with the holding in California v. United
States. It states, among other things, that
"Primacy in water allocation and management

The companion Criteria provision states that
the fact that "[water] was developed by virtue
of a subsidized Federal project or program
should not, in and of itself, be a barrier to

decisions rests principally with the States."
An elaboration of this principle in the
Criteria states that "State laws generally
provide procedures for transferring water
rights, and should be the primary mechanism
for protecting the sellers/lessors of water, as
well as third parties."

the transaction."
Principle 6 sets forth departmental
policy on the financial terms of transfers.
There are three important policies articulated

in this principle. The first is that the federal
government must not be made worse off
financially as a result of a transfer. Second,
prospective subsidies of irrigation water use
cannot be transferred to ra&i uses. Third,
the department announces its intent to refrain
from burdening the transfer with transaction
costs, in particular by refraining from

Principle 2 sets basic policy for the
involvement of the department in transfers,
stating that the department will facilitate a
transfer only when it can be accomplished
without diminution of service to other parties
being served by federal resources. Among
the factors that the bureau will consider if it
becomes involved in a proposed transfer are
third-party effects, compliance with NEPA,
land classification, the effect on project
operations and the effect of the RRA.

between appropriate costs and the market
value of the water."133 Thus, the department

Principle 3 states that the department
will participate in or approve transactions
when there are no third-party consequences,
or when such third-party consequences will be
heard in an appropriate state forum or
mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected

has committed itself to allow the wealth
inherent in a transfer of CVP water to flow
unencumbered to the parties to transfer.133
This policy is entirely consistent with
California water policy, which relies in part
on voluntary reallocation of developed water
to meet shifting needs.

parties. This principle leaves unresolved the
forum for the consideration of third-party
effects attendant to transfers that do not

to consider collaboratively with state, tribal

"charging a percentage of any 'profit' that

might

be

envisioned

as

the

difference

Principle 7 enunciates DOFs intention

implicate the jurisdiction of the SWRCB.

and local authorities necessary measures that
may be required to mitigate any adverse

Given the size of the CVP, this could be a
large of number of transfers.

environmental effects that may arise as a

The Guidance to Principle 4 indicates
that it is the intent of departmental transfer

result of a proposed transaction.

policy to "ensure that voluntary exchanges of
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In sum, by and large, departmental
policy on transfers of water is consistent with
California policy, as it should be under
California.

a "supplemental or
additional benefit"
entailed, what rate policy will the bureau
apply? RRA-related issues are particularly
acute for San Joaquin exchange contractors,
as Part D of Chapter m explains. Failure to
address these issues is at odds with the

Mid-Pacific Region policy

department's promise to facilitate transfers.

Chapter II shows that a considerable
amount of water has been transferred within
the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys

In addition, the region has not acted,
consistent with DOI Principle 1, to bring its
contract administration policies into line with
California law.
As Chapter IV explains,
California law establishes a policy to
encourage water conservation, in part,
through incentives to transfer "surplus" water.
It is not clear whether the region believes

among agricultural users within the CVP on
an annual basis. Other kinds of transfers,
however, are exceptional One reason for

this situation is that, as Chapter VI
elucidates, many growers have not been
interested in making their CVP entitlements
available for m&i development
Another

that

body

of

law

applies

to

CVP

reason is that the Mid-Pacific Region has not
acted to "facilitate" transfers, particularly long-

contractors.13* As a result, contractors do not

term transfers, in accord with DOI policy.134

proposal by an irrigation-only contractor to
conserve water and transfer it for use by an
m&i user outside the contractor's service
area. By contract, all would agree that the
contractor does not have a right to make this
transfer unless the bureau agrees to a
contract amendment
But will the bureau
agree to these kinds of proposals, as it
should, generally, as a means to be consistent
with California law? Or will it adopt a "use
it or lose it" response to these proposals and

know how

One policy that actively discourages
transfers is the region's reluctance to allow
contractors to make a "profit" on the sale or

lease of water.135

As a result, contractors

have little incentive to make water available
to users outside their own service area,
particularly on a long-term basis. This policy
has a particularly damaging effect on

incentives to conserve water.136 The region's
position on "profits" is at odds with DOI
policy set forth in Principle 6 of the DOI
Voluntary Water Transactions Principles.137

the region will respond

to

a

take the contractor's desire to transfer
conserved water as an indication that the
contractor does not need all the water it is
entitled to receive? Too many believe that
the region's response to conserve and transfer
proposals will be the latter.

Other ways in which the region
discourages transfers typically are not the
result of affirmative policy but stem either
from unclear policy or from the effect of
non-transfer policies on incentives to transfer.

What lies behind the region's less-

than-enthusiastic embrace of the DOI
principles? In part, the region may believe
that
it
is
responding
to
institutional
considerations raised by the bureau's long

For example, the region has not been clear
regarding the policy it will apply in setting
rates as a result of an approval of a transfer

time constituents, the CVP growers.

that does not trigger application of the RRA.
Potential transferors do not know what rate

In part

the region also appears to believe that the
CVP is just "different" from other bureau
projects because it is multi-use, because it has
so many contractors, because it has so many

penalties, if any, the region may exact as a
"toll" for the approval of a transfer. Similarly,
where a contract amendment is required and
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Those thoughts aside, however, many

facilities that are operated in a coordinated
fashion to meet contract demands, because
the third-party effects of transfers in the CVP

thought that the region should show more
flexibility, particularly where conserved water
was at issue. One stated that contractors fear

may be worse than in other projects and so
on."9 Some in the regional office question
whether the Department's policy statement
was intended to be implemented in the CVP

approaching the regional office to propose a
transfer of conserved water because "It's very
risky to say to the bureau, 1 don't want
water, I want money instead'. You can't take
this statement back.". One went so far as to
say that the principal impediments to CVP

or, at least, whether it is well-adapted to the
CVP.

transfers reside within the bureau, not the

Another concern expressed by regional
officials is that long-term transfers in the
CVP would be inequitable: Most of the water
would move to the powerful, rich districts in
contravention
of
congressional
policy
embodied in the Reclamation Act and CVP
authorizing legislation.140

districts.

Another opined that the bureau
would have nothing to do if it did not control

the allocation of water within the CVP and
so, out of bureaucratic imperative, it
discourages transfers. Still another believes
that the bureau is afraid of the "have-nots"
among CVP contractors who would complain

The author of this case study came
away with the belief that, at the core of the
region's reluctance to facilitate transfers so

bitterly if the bureau permitted water to be

far is the fear of loss of control over the
CVP that, it believes, would result from a

happen, one way or the other, either with the
bureau's assistance or over its objections.

transferred to anyone but themselves. Finally,
one said that long-term transfers are going to

much greater volume of transfers. This fear
plays itself out in the expression that "it is the
bureau that should control the reallocation of
water from one contractor to another or to

On May 7, 1990, the region issued a
Draft CVP Water Transfer Option Paper. It
is the region's attempt to align its regional
policy with departmental and California

new
contractors,
not
the
contractors,
themselves." It may not be so much the loss

policy.
A copy of the draft paper is
Appendix 2 to this case study. The paper
represents a significant departure from
traditional regional policy, but it only goes

of bureaucratic power that regional officials
seem to fear as it is the disorder, including
negative third-party effects, that they feel a
water market might entail.141 As a result, the
region has a strong tendency to want to
administer reallocation.143

part way. It drops the informal policy against
profiting on transfers.
And it explicitly
approves of transfers of water that is

conserved. On the other hand, it appears to
limit the transfer of water that is allocated for

What do its contractors think about
the bureau's reluctance to at least get out of
the way of transfers, particularly of "surplus"
or conserved water?149 No one to whom the
author of this report spoke thought that the

irrigation use only by contract to other
irrigation uses, absent an amendment to the
contract
And the policy applies only to
annual transfers, although the paper appears

bureau should simply permit markets for CVP
water to develop unrestrained. Some feared

to contemplate longer-term transfers.

the chaos of the market Others thought that
the regional office had a very difficult task on
its hands in implementing the DOI Water
Transaction Principles.

Reaction

to

the

new

policy

was

apparently mixed.144
Finally, the region
decided to withdraw the policy for further
review. In the intervening year, the drought
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in California worsened. Much of the energy
of regional staff was dedicated to dealing with
the drought As a result, long-term transfer
policy formulation was
shunted
aside.
However, short-term temporary transfers

even when cities offer to pay many multiples

of the marginal value of the water to the
growers.

A phrase often used in discussions

about this phenomenon is "heritage value".
Often mentioned concomitantly with heritage
value in water is the Owens Valley Syndrome:
We can't let the cities take even a small
portion of our water or they'll take it all
and/or well never get it back.

received considerable attention as a means to
alleviate shortages. A series of short-term
transfer policy papers was prepared, the last
of which was issued on March 14, 1991.
Importantly,
this policy paper permits
"amounts of payment in excess of the costof-service water rate" resulting from transfers
to be retained by the transferor. This policy
represents a break with the past and may be
an indication of the direction in which the
region may go in developing long-term policy.

Loss of heritage value and Owens
Valley concerns are lessened if the topic
turns to transfers of water that contractors

determine is "surplus" to their needs,
especially if the water transferred is made
available by conservation measures. Indeed,
many share the notion that the cities, even

Chapter VI: Institutional Considerations

under a worst-case drought scenario, may not
need much more than what irrigators can
conserve, without loss of net income to
agriculture generally. Nonetheless, perhaps
only a minority of growers in the Valley see
the issue in this light Boards of Directors of

This chapter explores the mix of
considerations that impede or otherwise shape

transfers of CVP water that are non-legal and
non-policy. They include non-market values

bureau
contractors,
in
control
under
California law of transfers from within their
boundaries, reflect the understanding and will

in water, water supply district attitudes and
policies, reactions to regional and state policy,
lack of data, and other matters, lumped
together, in this chapter, under the phrase

of the majority.

"institutional considerations."143 The discussion
of these considerations appears at this point

The environmental value of water is

in the report because, as they reflect how

another significant, non-market value in
water. Concern with these values can lead in
two different directions as far as transfers of

people feel about water, they are of great

significance hi shaping project transfer policy.

CVP water are concerned. On the one hand,
if transfers are a substitute for new dams,
they may be a plus. On the other hand,
some transfers can be environmentally
damaging.
Thus, transfers from CVP

Non-market water values
Obviously, water has value to people
that extends beyond its market value. These
values are helpful in explaining why there

contractors north of the Delta to San Joaquin
districts may cause water quality and other
problems in the Delta.
Transfers of
conserved water, if not regulated, can
threaten wetlands and streamflow, particularly

have not been more transfers of CVP water
provided for irrigation to m&i and even
environmental uses.

in the west side of the San Joaquin Valley.

Water is sometimes worth much more
to Central Valley growers than its market

The emergence of the public trust
doctrine in California may have contrasting
effects on transfers. One the one hand, the

price. Thus, it should come as no surprise
that growers and their districts are often
disinterested in selling water for use by cities
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2. Fear of third-party effects
of conservation on (a) return
flow
users;
(b)
on

SWRCB may look at transfers as a means of
meeting public trust obligations.
On the
other hand, consideration of public trust
water needs in the Bay/Delta hearings is
thought by some to have had a chilling effect
on transfers: Until there is resolution of these
hearings, neither the bureau nor its irrigation
contractors are sure how much water is
available for transfer.

environmental water uses.

3. If agriculture transfers water

to the cities, we'll play into
the hands of environmentalists
who want to use transfers as a
substitute for projects.

Other "insthutionaT concerns

4. Transfers to the cities will
create
more
sprawl
and

Foremost among these concerns is
attitudes, often developed in response to

degradation

of

the

environment

long-time bureau policy.

Principal among
these attitudes is a "use it or lose it" culture
that pervades the project

5. There's been no crisis yet.
Major transfers to the cities
have not yet been needed.

Related to this attitude is the fear of
going first Thus, while some contractors are
aware of changes in departmental policy
regarding transfers, they don't want to be the
first to find out that regional policy regarding
long-term transfers still is driven by use-it-orlose-it policy. Combined with this fear is the
complexity of accomplishing the transfer.
Permission must be obtained not only from
the regional office of the bureau (with
uncertain consequences for water rates), but,
in some cases, from the SWRCB, and

This gives everyone time to

jockey for the upper hand in
negotiations.
Chapter

VII:

Conclusion

and

state), all this against the backdrop that some

This report has shown that there are
few, significant legal impediments to the
transfer of CVP water. Indeed, California
law, which is controlling on most aspects of
transfer
policy,
encourages
transfers,
particularly of "surplus" and conserved water.

within the CVP community will view the
transferor as a traitor for making water
available to a "highest bidder" instead of to
CVP "have-nots."

The region needs to take the final
step to bring its regional policy into line with
both California transfer and departmental

environmental agencies (both federal and

policy. It can do so, most importantly, by re

Other concerns expressed include:

designing its transfer policy so as to rid it of
disincentives to water conservation. Focusing
on the development of transfer policy to
encourage conservation reduces the perceived

1. Lack of understanding of
the capabilities of the system:
Can a transfer of conserved
water be effectuated between
one contractor and another?
Is the aqueduct capacity there
or not?

threat of transfers to the Valley's agricultural
economy because conservation does not imply

drying up vast quantities of land now in
production.
It would also likely gradually
generate enough water to meet growing
urban water requirements as well as to help
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meet environmental needs for water.146 At a
minimum it is a reasonable, moderate step
for the region to take as it tries to implement
a transfer policy more in line with California
and departmental policies.

The transfer policy, itself should build
on the May 7, 1990 draft, but should go
further by:
1. Clarifying that the policy
applies to long-term transfers.

2. Clarifying that the region
seeks to facilitate, not impede,

voluntary transfers of water,
particularly of conserved water,
in a manner that is consistent
with reclamation law, and
accounts for third-party effects
(in the proper forum). The
clarification should extend to
stating that the region will
administer
contracts,
and
consider amendments to them,
in a manner to facilitate
transfers. General acceptance
of California transfer policy
would be helpful in this
regard.

3. Clarifying the policy that
the region will use regarding
recalculation of rates for water
triggered
by
a
transfer
attendant to both RRA and
non-RRA situations.
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usage patterns of some CVP contractors also provide water for habitat, primarily through return
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34. 32 Stat 390; 43 U.S.C 372, 383.

35. California v. United States. 98 S.Ct 2985, 3002.
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transports northern California water from San Luis reservoir for use in Santa Oara and San
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44. The only congressional committee report on the project was a report by the U.S. Senate
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation published in 1933. The strongest statement regarding
place of use contained in this report is
The plans for development and utilization of water resources involved in the
committee's investigation are directly related to and predicated upon the present
and future needs of this great central valley of California. S. Rept No. 1325,
72nd Congress, 1933. At p. 488 of Tart 1, Authorizing Documents, Central
Valley Project", H.R. Doc. No. 416, 84th Cong., 2d Sess (1956).

45. 63 Stat 852.
46. I&
47.

Id

48.

Id

49.

63Stat854.

50. 64 Stat 1036.
51. Public law 90-65, 81 Stat 167.
51 Public Law 96-570, 94 Stat 3339.
53.

Act of October 23, 1970, 84 Stat 1097.

54. See Figure 1, supra. "Factual Data on the Central Valley Project-Sacramento River
Division."
55.

See discussion of "Initially authorized facilities", supra, text 19-25.

56.

69 Stat 719.

57.

Id

75
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In County of Trinity v. Andrus. 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. CaL 1977), the court held that the
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In Nevada.

Although the government diverted, stored and distributed the water, the
contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water or water-rights

became vested in the United States is not well founded. Appropriation was
made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for
the use of the land owners; and by the terms of the law and of the contract
already referred to, the water-rights became the property of the land owners,
wholly distinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation
works~.The government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the
water..., with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as
reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and
maintenance of the works. 463 U.S. at 123.
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82. The combination of contract terms and conditions and other justifications for the assertion

|

of regulatory power over the equitable interest in water provided by the bureau has led to what
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of the CVP. It quickly pieced together a deal to buy water out of New Melones, at $5.64 per
acre-foot, with the cost of the purchase to be defrayed by Fish and Game, Ducks Unlimited
and the Grasslands Water District The water was delivered by the bureau to Grasslands for
use on wetlands, a beneficial use under California law. When a transfer of water from the
Yuba County Water agency to the East Bay Municipal District fell through in 1989, Fish and
Game worked out a deal to move a portion of this water to Grasslands. Fish and Game
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propitious for anadromous fish runs. These ad hoc deals show imagination, but they provide no
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122. 43 U.S.C. 523 et sea.

123. Interview with Robert Stackhouse, fh 5, supra. Most Warren Act storage water is found
in Millerton Lake in the Friant Unit of the CVP.
124.

Interview with Mike Porter, fh 10, supra.

125.

Gray, Driver and Wahl, fh 108 supra.
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126. The CVP's Delta-Mendota Canal is often filled to capacity. As a result, a transfer of
CVP water from the Delta typically would require use of the SWP's California Aqueduct which
is not an authorized point of diversion for the CVP.
127.

CaL Water Code section 109(a).

128. Gray, Driver and Wahl, supra, fh 108 , at 24. The description of California water law
contained in this Chapter is taken mainly from this publication, pp. 24-32.
129.

CaL Water Code section 1735.

130. It has been questioned whether these provisions of law apply to transfers proposed by
bureau contractors that do not require the approval of the SWRCB. It seems clear that these
provisions do apply in these circumstances. First, it seems clear that California intends to apply
these provisions to transfer situations even where the SWRCB's jurisdiction is not invoked.

The reference to the SWRCB in section 386, as described in the text, is meant to impose
requirements on the SWRCB in those circumstances in which a transfer bv a local agency
requires a change in place or purpose of use or point of diversion. There is no implication that
the other provisions of these sections do not apply when no such changes in water rights
permits are required. Second, California v. United States and Alpine Land establish that, unless
state transfer policy is inconsistent with a congressional directive, state law applies. Except for
the minor place and purpose of use directives set forth in Part 1 of Chapter IV, no such
congressional directives exist to preempt these state law provisions.
131. Article X, Section 2, states that [t]he right to water~.is and shall be limited to such water
as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and
shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or
unreasonable method of diversion of water."

132. Criterion and Guidance, Principle 6.

133. This commitment was most recently confirmed in the remarks of John Sayre, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior for Water and Science in remarks before "Water Marketing 1990:
Moving from Theory to Practice", a conference at the School of Law, Denver University,
November 15.

134. The author's understanding of regional policy is based primarily on a series of interviews
conducted by the author with several senior-level regional officials in late 1989-earty 1990 and,
again, with two of them on April 26,1991. These regional officials were Larry Hancock,
Director, Mid-Pacific Regional Office of the bureau; Robert Stackhouse, Regional Project and

Repayment Officer, Mid-Pacific Region; Merv de Haas, Chief; Repayment Branch, Mid-Pacific
Region of the bureau; and James Turner, Regional Solicitor, DOL The author wishes to stress,
however, that the conclusions regarding regional policy which he has drawn in this chapter are
his alone.

No regional official can be said necessarily to agree with these conclusions.

author circulated a draft of this study to two of the above officials, but did not receive
comments on this draft from these officials prior to submitting the final study.

135. Based on interviews with senior-level regional bureau officials. Sg£ fh 134, supra.
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The

136. The policy against profits appears to hold with particular force in the water conservation
situation. One official stated: If we screwed up and gave a contractor more water than he
needed, why should he be able to make a profit on that?"

137. A discussion of the effect on efficiency and equity of allowing contractors to make a
profit on the sale or lease of water provided by the bureau is contained in the main report
138.

See £n 134, supra.

139.

Id.

140.

W.

141. Conversation with Merv de Haas (see fh 134 sugra), April 26, 1991 (as to third-party
effects).

142. The bureau's preference for administrative reallocation is particularly troublesome for
water conservation. The region has neither the manpower nor the political will to get tough
on contractor water usage. Thus, contractors have no real regulatory incentive to enhance the
efficiency with which they use water. At the same time, as described, the region has not
facilitated the development of a market for conserved water. Suspended between a bureau that
is both unable to regulate and unwilling to let a market for conserved water to develop,
contractors conserve only when they must for reasons peculiar to their districts, such as
drainage. They do not conserve because there might be a market for their conserved water,
except, at most, on an annual basis. And so, a significant water conservation opportunity is lost.
In response to this scenario, the author was told by one official in the regional office
that the office had received virtually no requests for long-term transfers of conserved water.
He appeared to deduce from that fact that there was little interest in transfers of conserved
water. More likely, the author believes, is that the absence of requests stems from the policies
in place that discourage such transfers or, at least, fail to facilitate them.
143. The author of the report spoke to several contractors and contractors' representatives in
the preparation of this report: Jerry Butchert (General Manager, Westlands Water District);
Mike Porter (General Manager, Central California Irrigation District); William Camp (thenManager, Firebaugh Canal Company), BJ Miller (consultant); Jason Peltier (Executive Director,

CVP Water Association); Steve Hail, (then-Director, Land Preservation Association); Richard

Moss, (General Manager, Friant Water Users' Authority); Mark Atlas (Counsel to Sacramento
River water users); David Cone (Manager, Broadview Water District); Paul Bartkiewicz

(Counsel to CVP water users).
•

144. A problem with the draft policy apparently was that it did not contemplate an irrigation
transferee taking more water than its existing contract permitted absent contract amendment,
thereby raising the threat of the application of the RRA.

145. Material for this chapter was generated primarily from the author's interviews, cited in fns
134 and 143, supra, as well as from pp. 32-34 of "A catalog of obstacles to water transfers in
California, Final Draft, a Report to the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program,", by Marc
Reisner, June, 1990.
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146. The amount of water available from conservation measures will vary by region of the
CVP. Estimates of conservation potential on the west side of the San Joaquin Valley range
upward of from between 10,000 acre-feet per year to as much as several hundred thousand
acre-feet Other areas may have less potential, particularly where they are already water-short
Sacramento River contractors may be able to conserve substantial quantities of water through
crop changes. Other means of conserving water may not actually save any water that does not
already return to the river.
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EMERY COUNTY PROJECT

EMERY COUNTY PROJECT, UTAH
Background

Cottonwood Creek - Huntington Canal. Both
the reservoir and the canal were constructed
as a part of the project Additionally, several
smaller pre-project reservoirs upstream on
Huntington Creek store water that is released
into Huntington Creek.

The Emery County Project is located
in east-central Utah about 25 miles southwest
of Price, Utah. The project is located in the
Green River basin, a part of the upper
Colorado River basin (See Figure EC-1).
The project was authorized by the Act of
April 11, 19561 as a participant in the
Colorado River Storage project

the

Project operation and maintenance is
carried out by the Emery Water Conservancy
District The District was formed in 1961. It
comprises about 3,600 square miles and

The project was planned to provide
farmers in Castle Valley with an

covers almost all of Emery County, including
the cities and towns located within the county
boundaries.
The
District
entered
a
repayment contract with the Bureau in 1962.
Amendatory contracts were entered in 1972
and 1978.

expanded and dependable supply of water for
irrigation. Prior to the project's completion,
the area was one of limited agricultural
opportunity with a standard of living that was
below average for the State of Utah. The
limited storage facilities were inadequate for
providing the late season water necessary to
bring crops to full maturity.

The District has entered water supply
contracts with two irrigation companies, the
Cottonwood Creek Consolidated Irrigation
Company and the Huntington-Cleveland

As currently operated, the project
provides a supplemental water supply for
about 14,000 acres of irrigable acres or
project land and a full supply for about 771
acres.2 The increased production in livestock

Irrigation Company. These two companies
serve essentially all of the presently irrigated

feed led to a correlating increase in the
production of beef, sheep and dairy products.

use to the company, and the companies
agreed to pay a portion of the District's

Additionally, the project provides recreational
and fish and wildlife benefits, and supplies
over 8,000 acre feet annually of project water
to Utah Power and light Company's Hunter
Plant for coal fired electric power generation.

repayment obligation and a portion of the
annual operation and maintenance expenses.3

land within the project boundaries.
The
District agreed to provide a specified quantity
of project water for supplemental irrigation

Additionally, each of the two irrigation
companies entered an agreement with the

Bureau in the early 1960s in anticipation of
the construction of the Emery County Project
wherein the company gives the Bureau the
perpetual right to use its water rights to the
extent equivalent project water is made
available to the company. Specifically, each

Project features include a dam and
reservoir, several smaller reservoirs, a siphon,
and several canals and ditches. The major
project feature, Joe's Valley Dam and
Reservoir, has a total capacity of 62,500 acre

company agreed to limit its call under primary
water rights to a certain percentage of the
annual irrigation demand from April through
October and quitclaimed to the U.S. primary
water rights in excess of these percentages,

feet Water is released into Seely and then
Cottonwood
Creeks
and
is distributed

downstream through canals and ditches.
Some of the water is diverted to the
Huntington North Reservoir, through the
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stored as part of the project water supply
(company storage water). The percentages
range from 4 to 23 which is equivalent to
3,400 to 19,600 acre feet of water.
The
United States, in exchange, agreed to deliver

$1.81 per share or acre foot while municipal
and industrial users pay about $22 per acre
foot This obligation is fixed and must be
paid even if the full amount of project water,.
an acre foot per share, is not delivered. For
example, the 1990 allocation was 50 percent
of the amount users subscribed for. This also
means that the users pay no additional fee in
those years when they receive more than an
acre foot per share of project water.

to the company an equivalent amount of
project water. If equivalent project water is
not made available to the company, the
company has the right to call for the delivery
of company storage water.4
While the
companies have not yet invoked this latter
provision, the recent water shortage may
cause them to review their option to do so
under these early agreements.

Operation and maintenance costs

Under the repayment contract, the

District is responsible for operation and
maintenance of the project The District is

Finally, the District has been a party
to two contracts with Utah Power and Light
Company and one contract with the Castle
Valley Special Service District, for providing
project water for municipal and industrial
purposes.3

required

to maintain a reserve fund of
$20,000 for operation and maintenance. This
fund
is
only
available
for
meeting
extraordinary and unforseen costs, rather than
the
ordinary
costs
of operation
and
maintenance.
The irrigation company

Project Costs

responsible for about $23 million over a 50
year repayment term.
The first annual

contracts with the District require the users
to pay a proportionate share of the District's
operation and maintenance costs.
Each
irrigation company's share of the total O&M
and replacement costs is based upon their
purchased quantity of project water in
relation to the total quantity of project water
sold or otherwise disposed of by the District

payment was made in 1971, and the irrigators

As

have paid about $975,000 as of 1989. Utah
Power and Light is responsible for about $3.7
million and Castle Valley Special Service
District will pay about $92,000 of the total

obligation, the users must pay their share of
O&M costs whether or not they receive their

obligation.

Water Rights

Repayment obligation

The total project cost for Emery
County is $17,996,848.
The irrigators are

their

share

of

the

repayment

full entitlement of project water.

Power revenues subsidizing the

irrigation portion will pay for about $73
million of the totaL This leaves about $4.6
million of nonreimbursable costs.6

The

United

States

holds

title

to

project storage and direct flow water rights.

Each of the irrigation companies owns
primary (nonproject) direct flow water rights
on Cottonwood and Huntington Creeks,

While the portion of repayment
allocated to irrigation users is not charged
interest, the municipal and industrial users
are. Hie M&I proportion of the principal
construction
obligation
represents
an
unsubsidized amount, again unlike the

irrigation component

with

subject to the early exchange agreements
discussed above.

Irrigation users pay
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Description ofproject water rights

flows of Huntington and Cottonwood Creeks
in order to improve the irrigation water
supply.
Incidental fishery and recreation
benefits were recognized for Joes Valley and
Huntington North Reservoirs. Early project
reports specifically stated that the project
would provide no opportunity for power
development or domestic water supplies.10

Several of the project water rights
were assigned to the United States from
other entities. The Utah Water and Power
Board, a state entity, assigned to the U.S. two
pending applications for storage rights at

Joe's Valley Reservoir site that resulted in
storage permits for over 217,000 acre feet of
water.7 Additionally, the U.S. owns about
5,500 acre feet of storage rights in
Huntington North Reservoir and about 300
acre feet in several smaller reservoirs. The
U.S. also holds direct flow rights on Seely
Creek, Huntington Creek and Jacobson
Hollow totalling about 80 cfs. All of these
direct flow rights are for irrigation use except
15 cfs (or 120 AF) that is for fish, wildlife or
stockwatering uses. Finally, the U.S. has a
contract or agreement, discussed above, with
each irrigation company to 'store a part of
their direct flow primary water rights in
exchange for the delivery of equivalent
project water.8

However, local farmers did not subscribe for
all available project water, and shortly after
the project's completion, Utah Power and
light Company (UPL) needed a water supply
for its Huntington Plant operations. The first
project irrigation water was delivered in 1966,
and the first industrial water was delivered to

UPL in 1973. Since then, UPL has acquired
an additional 2,576 acre feet of project water
for industrial use and a local district has
converted 189 acre feet of project water to
municipal use.

Utah Power and Light transfers
In 1972, Utah Power and Light
Company (UPL) subscribed to 6,000 acre feet
of project water to supply cooling water to its
coal fired thermoelectric power plant in

Allocation ofproject water

Huntington Canyon. UPL entered into a 40

Project water is allocated on an
annual basis by the District, considering
contract obligations to each irrigation

year

term

repayment

contract

with

the

Bureau and the District for the use of this
project water. Under the contract, UPL is
obligated to pay the District $120,000 per
year for the contract term, and its share of
operation and maintenance expenses. The
total price paid averages about $800 per acre
foot, or $20 a year per acre foot for 40 years.
The price reflects nonsubsidized capital costs
attributable to the 6,000 acre feet of water
plus a project interest rate of about 3.046

company and to UPL and Castle Valley
Special Improvement District Each spring,
the District meets and makes a decision on
the estimated available water supply. The
irrigation companies and municipal and
industrial users are given a percentage of
their project water entitlement If there is
an adequate supply, all users will receive 100
percent of their entitlement and the total
amount delivered will be 28,100 acre feet.9 If
the supply is short, all users' deliveries are
equitably reduced.

percent per annum.

was

UPL was able to obtain this 6,000
acre feet of project water because of an
undersubscription
by
farmers
in
the
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company
(HCIC) that resulted in a financial hardship

planned primarily to regulate and store the

for the company. HCIC was unable to make

Emery County Project Transfers
The

Emery

County

Project
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company

its full annual construction payment obligation
to the District for several years at the
project's inception. When UPL expressed an

issues

in

annual

or

general

stockholder's meetings.13
In the late 1970s, UPL again looked
to the acquisition of Emery Project water for
its expanded operations.
The Company
began negotiating with individual farmers for
the purchase of primary water rights and the

interest in acquiring project water, the
District worked out a negotiated settlement

with HCIC whereby UPL agreed to bring all
payments current and HCIC agreed to
relinquish about 5,500 acre feet of project

relinquishment of project water rights along
with the associated lands. UPL paid about
$603 per acre for the relinquishment of

water.
Most of the water was never
subscribed for, but a small amount was

relinquished
by
individual
farmers.
Additionally, to provide UPL with the
quantity of water the utility requested, the
shareholders of the Cottonwood Creek
Consolidated Irrigation Company relinquished
about 500 acre feet of project water back to
the District

project water and associated acreage of farm
land. In this second acquisition, a total of
2,576 acre feet of project water was
purchased. Each fanner who relinquished his
project water to UPL signed a relinquishment
agreement
that was conveyed
to
the
appropriate irrigation company.
They also
assigned their stock certificate to UPL.

The individual relinquishments were
made in order to come up with the 6,000
acre feet needed by UPL in an equitable

As with the 1972 acquisition, UPL

manner so that UPL would agree to buy into
the project supply thus saving HCIC and the
District from a difficult financial situation
caused by undersubscription.
Each of the
irrigation companies relinquished a quantity of
water that was equally proportional to the
amount originally contracted for.11

had to reach an agreement with each one of
the irrigation companies before the companies
would relinquish the purchased water back to

UPL also conceded to certain
conditions requested by the irrigation
companies and irrigators. For example, UPL
provided some funds to HCIC for the
installation of wafer measuring devices. UPL
is charged the same canal conveyance losses
and the same assessments as all other
shareholders in the respective irrigation
companies. The utility also agreed to pay a
special
industrial assessment
to cover
administrative costs associated with its stock
acquisition and use of water. Additionally,

(HCIC) as to how the subject water should
be allocated and used.
In the end, UPL
agreed to sign a Letter of Understanding that
granted
several concessions
to
HCIC,
including adherence by UPL to specific
operating criteria.
No similar concessions
were
granted
the
Cottonwood
Creek

even though it became the largest stockholder
in each irrigation company, UPL agreed not

States and a separate repayment contract was
negotiated between the Bureau and UPL. In

to participate in voting for directors of
individual canals or of the general company.
It reserved the right to vote on general

1987, a repayment contract was entered
between the District, the Secretary of the

the District This proved to be the most time
consumptive level of negotiations because of
philosophical differences in the positions

taken by some representatives of UPL and
Huntington-Geveland Irrigation Company

Company.
Once an agreement was reached with
the
irrigation
companies,
the
District
relinquished the shares back to the United

Interior and Utah Power & Light Company.
UPL agreed to a new fee schedule for the
88

water,
which
reflected
the
actual
(nonsubsidized) project cost plus interest
associated with these project water rights, and

Bureau. This type of local opposition also
was a major obstacle for the City of

averaged about $1,000 per acre foot The
interest was calculated using a debt service
concept for all previous years of the project,
and went as high as 13 percent The debt
service schedule resulted in a higher cost per

below.

acre foot

The Castle Valley Special Service
District acquired 189 acre feet of irrigation
project water when it purchased a parcel of
land on which it planned to locate a sewage
treatment facility. The Castle Valley District

Huntington's

proposed

transfer,

described

Castle Valley Special Service District
transfer

than in the first UPL purchase. The total
price of $2.9 million was paid off in one lump
sum at the time the contract was entered, in

paid $600 per acre for the relinquishment of
project water.
The water rights were

order to avoid the necessity for the District
to submit the additional obligation to a
general vote."
UPL also pays an annual
O&M fee of $1 per acre foot Additionally,
the irrigation obligation was reduced so that
the irrigation companies are responsible only
for repayment related to the portion of
irrigation water now supplied.
UPL
continued
to
be
responsible
for
all
conservancy district assessments on lands
retired from irrigation.

represented by shares of stock in HuntingtonCleveland Irrigation Company (HOC). The
seller relinquished the stock back to HCIC,

which then reissued the stock to the Castle
Valley District The Bureau never raised the
issue of the individuals receiving a profit for
the sale of project water. There apparently

was no profit issue because the transfer was
structured as a relinquishment of the right to
use project water rather than a sale of project

What are the significant differences
between UPL's 1972 acquisition and the 1987
acquisition? In 1972, most of the 6,000 acre

water.

Once Castle Valley had reached a
tentative agreement with the irrigation
company and the Conservancy District, the

feet acquired had never been subscribed for
by any irrigation users. In the 1987 UPL
purchase (and the 1989 Castle Valley Special
Service District purchase), all of the water
was transferred from existing irrigation use to
new municipal or industrial uses. In both
cases, UPL had to reach an agreement with
the irrigation companies, the conservancy
district, and the Bureau.
In the 1972
purchase, UPL did not have to deal with as
many individual farmers. The difference in
the amount of time it took to complete each
transfer seems to be tied to UPL's ability to
negotiate successfully with the irrigation

Conservancy District approached the Bureau.
Castle Valley negotiated with the Bureau for
over two years before reaching a final
agreement for the transfer of the project
water. The rate for the project water was
increased to the municipal rate of $22 per
acre foot This amount was determined by
adding an interest factor of about 3.046
percent to the remaining nonsubsidized
repayment obligation attributable to the 189
acre feet
Castle Valley questioned the need to

companies. It took about 13 years for UPL
to finalize the second transfer. Once UPL

change the type of use. The water would be
delivered through a pressurized irrigation
system (separate from the culinary system)

had reached an agreement with the irrigation
companies, it took only one to two years to
reach agreements with the District and the

and only used for gardens, lawns, pastures
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contract between the Bureau and

and other outdoor uses.
Many of the
residential lots in Emery County are about
two acre parcels.
The District's Board
approved the final agreement with the

Emery

Water Conservancy District, however, listed
only irrigation, fish and wildlife, and
recreation, as authorized project purposes.
The 1972 contract allocating project water to

Bureau in 1989. This water is now delivered
to the City of Huntington, although this is
not enough water to satisfy the city's current

the Utah Power & Light Company recognized
industrial and other uses for project water,
and specifically allowed the Company to use
6,000 acre feet of project water for use at its
stream-electric generation plant. Municipal
use was specifically authorized in the 1989
Castle Valley Special Service District contract.
The Conservancy District agreed to provide

demands.

City of Huntington proposed transfer

In 1989, the City of Huntington
purchased 500 acre feet of project water
represented by shares in the HuntingtonCleveland Irrigation Company. The City paid
about $250 per share or acre foot, for a total
cost of $127,000. The City could not take
the water directly, but theoretically could
obtain an equivalent supply through an
upstream exchange with Utah Power and
Light Company (UPL). UPL would make no
commitment until the City converted the use
toM&L

project water to Castle Valley for municipal
and industrial purposes.

Therefore, even
though municipal use was not expressly
authorized by the project enabling legislation,
and not expressly mentioned in the original
repayment contract, this has not presented a

bar to changing project water to municipal

and industrial uses. Under Utah State water
law, changes of use applications had to be
filed with the State Engineer for the transfers
to municipal and industrial uses.14

The City approached the HCIC. The
Company's Board, however, never approved
of the conversion proposal
They were

Adjusted repayment obligation

concerned with the decreased volume of flow

The Emery County project provides

in the canal because the 500 acre feet would
be transferred from the lower end of the
canal and instead taken out above the head
of the canaL Additionally, the Board was
apparently concerned about impairing their
own ability to make an exchange with UPL.

subsidized project water for irrigation users.15
When UPL subscribed for 6,000 acre feet in
1972,
a new repayment contract was
negotiated and UPL's obligation reflected the
actual
nonsubsidized
cost
of
project
construction plus interest attributable to the
6,000 acre feet The 1987 UPL contract and
the 1989 Castle Valley contract also reflect a
nonsubsidized, interest bearing obligation.

The local opposition to the conversion
frustrated the City, which therefore eventually
sold the water back to irrigators with
qualifying project lands.

The Bureau's Utah Projects Office has
adjusted
the
construction
repayment
obligations of the municipal and irrigation
users in order to comply with the 1939
Reclamation Project Act requirement that the
M&I use "not impair the efficiency of the
project for irrigation purposes."16 They have
interpreted this provision to require that the
Bureau ensure that the remaining irrigators

Limitations on change of purpose of
use

The Emery County Project was
authorized under a statute that contemplated

irrigation, flood control and hydroelectric
power generation. The original repayment
90

not be impaired in their ability to meet their

Company offered and paid $603 per acre foot
of project water with its associated land.
Again, the project water was relinquished by
the users to the irrigation companies, and by
the companies to the District Castle Valley
paid $600 per acre foot for its purchase of

repayment obligation.17
An interest component was also added
to the repayment obligation of the M&I
users. The 1939 Act provides authority to
the Bureau to add interest to municipal use
contracts.18 There is also authority for the
interest included in the 1989 Castle Valley
contract under the 1988 Bureau Principles
Governing Voluntary Water Transactions,
which state that

project water (separate from the land).
Finally, the City of Huntington paid about
$250 per acre foot for its 500 acre foot
purchase (separate from the land). There
was no Bureau involvement in any of these
transactions until it was time to negotiate a
repayment contract with the transferee.

[a] change in use from
irrigation to municipal and
industrial
purposes
would
require a change in the
repayment of costs to include
interest during construction
and interest on investment, but
only

to

the

extent

remaining
years
payment period.19

Conclusion
Future conversions from irrigation to
municipal-industrial uses are likely if the
transferee is willing to pay the adjusted rate

of about $22 per acre foot (assuming 100%
supply) and is able to obtain local approval.

of the
in

From the transfers that have been reviewed,

the

the major hurdle appears to be approval and

acceptance by the irrigation companies. This
was the apparent reason for the City of
Huntington's inability to change the use of its

This 1988 provision refers to change in use,
which would seem to be inapplicable to the
type of transaction represented by the 1972

project water.

UPL faced similar difficulties

in negotiating with the Huntington-Geveland

UPL subscription. However, unlike the 1939
Act, the 1988 Bureau Principles refer to
changes to both municipal and industrial uses.

Irrigation Company (HCIC).

The transfer
process took several years and was finally
resolved by UPL's concession to several
conditions to satisfy HCIC Once the transfer
approval process reaches the level of the
conservancy district and the Bureau, approval
seems to be more certain.

Profits

While the Bureau's position is that it
does not allow the making of profits from the

sale of project water, the transfers of project
water rights in Emery County have occurred
with no apparent limitations imposed by the
Bureau or by the Department of Interior.
As mentioned above, this may be because
they have been structured as relinquishments,
not sales. There definitely was consideration
paid for this relinquishment, however.
In
UPL's first acquisition, money was paid to a

small number of individual farmers who
voluntarily agreed to relinquish their rights to
project water. In the second acquisition, the
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ENDNOTES

1. 70 Stat 105, 43 U.S.G § 620 (1982 and Supp. 1985).

I

2. An additional approximately 5,000 acres within the project area is considered irrigable but
no longer receives project water because of transfers to Utah Power and Light Company,

j

described below.

>

3. See Contract Between The Emery Water Conservancy District and the Huntington-

1

Cleveland Irrigation Company dated June 27,1962; and Contract Between the Emery Water

I

Conservancy District and the Cottonwood Creek Consolidated Irrigation Company dated June
25, 1962.
4. See e.q.. Contract between the United States and Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company
Relating to Exchange and Adjustment of Water Rights, Contract No. 14-06-400-2523, dated

June 27, 1962.
5.

<•.,

j

See contracts among the District, the Bureau and Utah Power and light dated Nov. 17,

T

1972 and June 8, 1978, and Contracts Between the Emery Water Conservancy District and the

Castle Valley Special Service District

j

■ >

6. Telephone conversation with LaVar Richman and Mike Hansen, Utah Projects Office, U.S.

j

7. The Utah Water and Power Board had acquired these applications in 1947 from the Utah

\

State Land Board. Apparently the applications were originally filed in anticipation of a future

j

Bureau of Reclamation (Sept 20, 1990).

I

storage project
■•

8. See discussion, supra. The Bureau was obligated under these agreements to file a change
application with the Utah State Engineer for the exchange of project water. An application
was filed but apparently never approved (see Utah State Engineer file for exchange no. 142).

A later comprehensive change application likely was in part intended to legitimize this exchange

)

'■
,

j

(see Utah State Engineer file no. 14199).

9. A 1951 Bureau report estimated the annual average water supply at 31,400 acre feet See

j

10. See Bureau of Reclamation Definite Plan Report for Emery County Project at Chap. II, p.
10 (196_J.

!
i

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Emery County Project Feasibility Report (Feb. 1951).

11. Telephone conversation with Mack Bunderson, Attorney for the Emery County Water
Conservancy District (Nov. 14, 1990).
12. See CB. Burton, A Challenge in Water Supply Planning: Achieving a Balance Between
Industry Needs and Agriculture in Emery County Utah, proceedings of the Symposium on Water
Resources Related to Mining and Energy - Preparing For The Future, American Water
Resources Association (Nov. 1987).
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13. This would have been required under Utah Water Conservancy Law, Utah Code, §73-9-32.
14. See supra note 8 and associated text The Bureau filed one comprehensive change
application in the 1980s to cover past and future transfers.
15. Irrigators pay an amount based on their ability to pay, the subsidy comes from Colorado
River Storage Power Revenues. See Act of April 11, 1956, ch. 203, 70 Stat 105, § 5.
16. 53 Stat. 1194, 43 U.S.C § 485h(c).

17. Telephone conversation with LaVar Richman, Utah Projects Office, Bureau of Reclamation
(Oct 23, 1990).
18. 53 Stat 1194, 43 U.S.C § 485h(c)(l).
19. Se£ Department of the Interior, Principles Governing Voluntary Water Transactions,
Criteria and Guidance for Principle 6 (2) (Dec. 16, 1988).
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FRYINGPAN-ARKANSAS PROJECT

FRYINGPAN-ARKANSAS PROJECT CASE STUDY
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project was
authorized in 1962* for the purpose of
providing a supplemental water supply for
irrigation, municipal and industrial uses in the
lower Arkansas Valley of Colorado. Other
planned project benefits include flood control,
recreation, power generation, and the
conservation and development of fish and
wildlife resources. Pre-authorization studies
demonstrated a significant shortage of water
for irrigation almost annually in the Arkansas

system includes the north system that collects
and transports an average of 18,400 acre feet
of water annually through facilities located on
the North Fork of the Fryingpan River, and
the south system that collects and transports
an average of 50,800 acre feet of water
annually from both the Fryingpan River and
Hunter Creek basins. On the east side of the

divide, the water is carried into Turquoise
Lake, about five miles west of Leadville. The
lake has an active capacity of 120,478 acre

Valley. However, the irrigation demand for
and use of project water for irrigation has not
reached anticipated levels. This case study
presents

some

background

data

on

feet The project water leaving Turquoise
Lake goes through the Mt Hbert Powerplant
to generate power, then directly into Twin
Lakes Reservoir. The reservoir has an active
capacity of 67,917 acre feet, and is controlled
by the Bureau of Reclamation.
Finally,
Pueblo Reservoir, near the City of Pueblo, is
the terminal storage facility for the project
with a total capacity of 357,678 acre feet
This reservoir is also designated as the flood
control facility of the project

the

Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, then looks at
some issues affecting the potential for both
temporary and permanent transfers of project
water.

Physical Setting and Project Facilities
The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project is a
multipurpose project extending from the
headwaters of the Fryingpan River and

The project is operated by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation under a repayment

contract with the Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District The District was
formed in 1958, and encompasses 280,600
acres of irrigable land in the Arkansas River
basin covering about 26,000 square miles.
The District currently serves about 1,100 farm
families
and
15
domestic
suppliers.
Population within the District has grown from
under 200,000 at the project's inception to
about 600,000 today. Most of the growth
since 1960 has been in El Paso County.
Many of the communities within the District
have declined in population during this time.
If the domestic demand increases in these
other communities and additional delivery

Hunter Creek on the western slope of central
Colorado over the divide to the Arkansas
River basin in southeastern Colorado. The
project follows the river eastward to the
Arkansas Valley and the plains area of
southeastern Colorado (see Figure FA-1).

Project features consist primarily of
west slope facilities to divert, collect, and
transport water over the divide to the upper
Arkansas, and storage facilities on the upper
and lower Arkansas to regulate river flows.
West slope facilities also include the Reudi
Dam and Reservoir that provide storage for
replacement and regulation of water for
downstream Colorado River basin users, as
well as recreation and fish and wildlife
enhancement The west slope collection

systems are built, the project could eventually

serve 42 domestic suppliers that are currently
eligible to receive project water.3
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Project Costs

obligation.
Revenues received from M&I
water sales are applied first to the O&M
costs allocated to the M&I water supply.
Any excess revenue is then applied to the
interest on the construction obligation and
then to the principal of the M&I construction
obligation. All revenue from the ad valorem
tax and from the miscellaneous water service
contracts is first credited against any deficit
O&M obligation allocated to irrigation and
M&I uses, next against the interest on the
M&I construction obligation and finally
against the principle of the M&I construction
obligation.4

The project was originally authorized

at $170 million for capital costs, excluding
interest
during
construction.
Final
construction costs, excluding interest during
construction
and
deficit
interest
on
investments and penalties, was about $509
million. With interest and penalties, the total
jumps to nearly $600 million. Of this latter
amount, about $425.5 million is allocated to
three reimbursable accounts.3 As of 1989, the
reimbursable users had paid about $11.7
million, leaving a balance of about $413.8
million (see Table FA-1).

Nonreimbursable

construction costs totalling about $1723
million were allocated to several purposes
including fish and wildlife conservation,
recreation, and flood control and navigation
(see Table FA-2).

toward

obligation for the power facility.
If the
revenues received from the District and
storage contracts are not enough to cover the
District's repayment obligation then power
revenues will be applied to cover the deficit.
It is expected that power revenues will not be
needed for this purpose.

Revenues to pay for the reimbursable
portion of the project come from four
sources: (1) an ad valorem tax; (2) an $8.00
per acre foot charge for project water
delivered; (3) a $320 per acre foot charge for
rental of winter storage space; and (4) monies

collected

under

nonprqject

water

Power revenues are being applied
the construction cost repayment

Currently, the Bureau operates and
maintains the project excluding (1) the
Fountain Valley conduit which is maintained

service

by the Fountain Valley Authority and (2) the
specific recreation and fish and wildlife
facilities which are operated and maintained
by the United States Forest Service and the
State of Colorado. The Bureau receives a
federal appropriation to cover the operation
and maintenance costs of the facilities it
operates and maintains. The Bureau then is
reimbursed for actual
O&M expenses
allocated to the irrigation and M&I uses, first
from the water sales including winter water
storage and miscellaneous water service
contracts and then, if there is still a deficit,
from the ad valorem tax collected by the
District The District operates on the balance
of the collected ad valorem tax, the sale of

contracts.

The District collects the ad valorem
tax and turns over 90 percent of the assessed
tax to the Bureau. The District also collects
the fee for delivered project water and winter
storage space and submits these revenues to

the
Bureau.
Except
for
O&M
reimbursement,
discussed
below,
most
revenues submitted to the Bureau are
credited against the District's M&I repayment
obligation. No money is credited against the
irrigation repayment obligation unless revenue
from irrigation water sales and storage of
winter water in a given year is in excess of
the O&M obligation allocated to irrigation for
that year. Where there is such an excess, it
is credited to the irrigation repayment

return flows, and from some savings.5
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Table FA-1
Reimbursable construction costs,
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project

Type of use

Total construction

Amount paid as of 9-30-89

repayment obligation

Irrigation
Commercial Power
Municipal & Industrial7

Total

Source:

$ 71,265,333
213,786,358
140,453,099

0*
$2,531,781

$425,504,790

$11,694,930

9,163,149

U.S. Dept of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Statement of Projea Construction &

Repayment report, based on Budget Specifications as of Sept 30, 1989.

Table FA-2

Nonreimbursable construction costs,
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project

Type of use

Allocated construction cost

Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Recreation
Flood Control & Navigation
Highway Construction

$90306,902
41361,444

15,249,809
1,573,220
22,775,164
992340

Scenery Conservation
Historical & Archaeological
Total

$172358,879

Source: U.S. Dept of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Statement of Project Construction &
Repayment report, based on Budget Specifications as of Sept 30, 1989.
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Arkansas

Project—(1)
maximize
the
conservation and use of water; (2) protect
existing
and
potential, future
western
Colorado water users; and (3) preserve
recreational values.

Project Water Rights

The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project was
designed primarily to divert water from the
western slope for storage and use on the
eastern slope.
As a result, project water
rights include direct flow rights from the
Fryingpan River and other tributaries of the
Roaring Fork River and storage rights on
both sides of the divide. Decreed direct flow
rights total over 3,000 cfs although the tunnel
size limits the flow to about 945 cfs. Storage
rights include about 102,000 acre feet on the
west slope (Reudi Reservoir) and about
625,000 acre feet on the east slope (Twin
Lakes, Turquoise and Pueblo reservoirs).

In
addition
to
the
Operating
Principles, the District has over the years
allocated project water under its Water
Allocation Policy and established procedures.
The process begins in early spring when the

Bureau advises the District Board of the
projected water supply based on current snow

pack conditions.
The Board
invites
applications from ditch or canal companies,
municipalities, and domestic water user
associations. At its May meeting, the Board
makes a discretionary decision as to how
much water will be allocated to each
applicant, considering the amount requested
by the applicant, the overall supply and total
requests, the Operating Principles and the
Water Allocation Policy. If additional water
becomes available, a second allocation is
made in July following essentially the same

The District is the legal holder of
project water rights.
However, under the
project Operating Principles* the United
States can require the District to convey the
water rights to it

Under the repayment
contract, the District has a first right to the
available project water supply until the
project is paid out
Once pay out is
complete, the District will have a permanent
right to the available supply. Project water

procedure.11
Under the Allocation Principles 51

rights are decreed for a number of beneficial
uses, including irrigation, municipal, industrial,
power, recreation, and fish and wildlife.

percent of the year's supply is made available
for municipal users, and at least 49 percent is
made available for agricultural users.
No
municipal user is required to take a minimum

The average annual usable water
supply has been estimated at 80,400 acre feet

This figure is based on data covering a 38year period, 1928-1965.9 But as indicated in
Table FA-1, in many years the allocation is
far less than the available supply because of

amount of project water in any given year,
and there is no penalty for their failure to
subscribe to any specific amount of project
water. Most municipal and industrial users
do not yet need or request all of their

low demand.

allocated amount of project water.

Water
not claimed by municipal users out of their
share, plus unallocated project water carried

Allocation of Project Water

over from the previous year is made available

first to other municipal and domestic users
and then to irrigation users." The District
also owns the return flows from the imported

Allocation of (1) the project water
supply and (2) the conservation pool of
project storage space is governed by the
project Operating Principles.10 The Operating
Principles were developed to carry out the
objectives contemplated by the Fryingpan-

project water that may be purchased by
project water users for the same price as all
other project water.
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There is great variability in the
amount of project water requested or used
each year.
In addition, the proportion of
project water used by agricultural vs.
nonagricultural users varies greatly from year
to year. There are a number of reasons for
this variability.
First, project water is

Agricultural Storage Rights
The peculiar nature of the interest

held by agricultural users within the
Fryingpan-Arkansas project service area
makes it difficult to define such rights and
consequently impairs the free transfer of
these rights. Not only are they subject to
some discretion of the District Board in
allocating the annual water supply, unlike the

supplemental
to
nonproject
supplies.
Therefore, the use of project water increases
during years in which there are lesser supplies
of nonproject water. Further, although M&I
users are entitled to up to 51 percent of the
supply, many M&I users have not yet
requested any or all of their share of the 51
percent Therefore, more than 49 percent of
the supply has regularly been available to

municipal
carryover

users

they

storage

have

no

accounts

individual
project

reservoirs. The agricultural user's share of
project water is carried over in project
storage space but not in individual accounts.
If the individual farmers do not take their
allocated water by May 1 following the year
in which the water was initially allocated, the

agricultural users. Table FA-3 gives the total
amount of project water allocated and the
percentage allocated to agricultural use
between 1972 and 1989 (the balance went to
municipal or industrial uses).
Agricultural
percentages below 49 indicate that the

water is retained in a general storage account

and is subject to reallocation by the District14
Individual agricultural users do have
two types of temporary storage rights
available: (1) winter storage rights and (2)

requests from agricultural users was below 49
percent of the supply for that year.13

Table FA-3.

Project water allocations, 1972-1989.

% allocated to

Years

Total water taken
(in acre feert

agricultural use

1972-1980

201,691

86%

1981

23,944

1982
1983

66,107

1984

29,239

1985
1986

24,285

72%
73%
8%
6%
20%

19,133

1988

79,494

72%
56%
90%

1989

108,728

80%

1987

in

23,645
12,542
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Board of Trustees would meet annually to
reach an agreement for the following year's
program. The agreement would dictate the
percentage of each company's water rights

rights under "if and when" storage contracts.
Water stored under these rights, however, is
subject to being dumped if the reservoir

space is needed for project water or for flood
control (if their water is stored in the joint
use flood control space). Because of this
uncertainty, farmers are currently seeking a
reallocation of reservoir storage space to give
them firm storage.15

that

The Fryingpan-Arkansas Project was

outside

of

the

the

period of

additional project water (in the conservation
pool) or to make room for potential flood
waters under the Project flood control criteria

planned with sufficient space in Pueblo
Reservoir for the storage of decreed project
water during the nonirrigation season. Prior
to project construction, irrigation companies
had diverted the flow of the Arkansas River
available

and

allowable storage. Since the decree became
final, annual meetings are still held but there
is no longer a need for an annual agreement.
The decree established estimated percentages
that are not subject to annual reconsideration.
However, the fanners' rights are still not firm;
their water is subject to being dumped if the
reservoir space is needed for the storage of

Winter storage program

when

may be stored

(in the joint use pool).
"If and when" storage contracts

normal

irrigation season in order to maintain soil
moisture levels in those fields to be planted
during the following growing season. This
idea was incorporated into early project
planning by providing storage space in Pueblo
Reservoir to hold the waters that otherwise
would have been diverted - to fields or
reservoirs between Pueblo Reservoir and
John Martin Reservoir. This water can then
be released during the following irrigation
season.16.

Both agricultural users and M&I users
may enter into an "if and when" type of
storage contract to hold their nonproject
water in a project reservoir. However, as is
suggested by the title, the storage space
obtained under this type of contract is not
firm; like the water stored under the winter
water program, the "if and when" water will
be dumped if and when the space is needed.

Efforts to Obtain Firm Storage Space
In the 1960s, representatives from the
District and each irrigation company began to
hold informal meetings that resulted in an
agreement to begin a voluntary winter storage
program and the creation of a representative

program by applying for a permanent winter

Under the current allocation scheme,
Pueblo Reservoir capacity includes a 234,000
acre foot active conservation pool (to
regulate imported and native flows for
municipal, industrial, and irrigation uses); and
a 66,000 acre foot joint use pooL The joint
use pool must be vacated and used for flood
control between April 15 and November 1st
of each year. The cities collectively have a

storage decree in water court The decree
became final in November 1990.

guaranteed minimum of 159,000 acre feet of
carryover storage space in. project reservoirs

Board of Trustees to evaluate and manage
the program. At the suggestion of the State
Engineer, the District and the Board of
Trustees decided to formalize their voluntary

within the active conservation pool, broken
down as follows: Fountain Valley Pipeline,

The program has enabled fanners to
start crops in the spring or complete valuable
crops in the falL Prior to the decree, the

not less than 78,000 acre feet; Arkansas
Valley cities, towns and entities lying east of
100

Pueblo, not less than 37,400 acre feet;
Pueblo, not less than 31,200 acre feet; and
Arkansas Valley cities, towns and entities

No change to the system is likely to
satisfy all project participants, who have
diverse concerns with regard to any expansion
and reallocation of Pueblo Reservoir capacity.
The irrigators want 40,000 acre feet of firm
project storage and an adequate annual water
supply. The municipalities want to protect
their ability to take and store their allocation
of project water but some cities also want the
ability to store nonproject water. Currently,
nonproject water can be stored only under "if

lying west of Pueblo, not less than 12,400
acre feet17
Following a succession of years in
which the farmers' stored winter water was
dumped, in 1984, 1985 and 1987, the
irrigators asked the District and the Bureau
to evaluate the potential for dedicating up to
40,000 acre feet of firm storage in Pueblo
Reservoir to the winter water storage
program. The municipal users also became
involved in the study, asking the Bureau to

and

water.

As a result of the municipal users

winter water dumped, became a three year
comprehensive
evaluation
of
potential
improvements to current operations for the
benefit of all users. Final recommendations
were presented in the form of potential
scenarios that juggled the relative weight of

District rules and policies may limit
the transferability of agricultural project water
in two ways.
First, under the District

the municipal demand for project

allocation rules, individual agricultural users
have no right to receive a specific quantity of
project water." Municipal users collectively

the percentage of project water
allocated to the municipal users;
the amount of project storage

allocated

to

is

Agricultural Water

water,

capacity

District

Administrative Control of the Transfer of

the following interests:

•

The

possibly an environmental impact statement.
Many project participants are worried that a
reallocation will require an amendment to the
District's Allocation Principles, allowing other
potential users into the project

request, what began as a one year study to
address the farmers' concerns of having their

•

contracts.

water will reduce potential imports of project
water thus reducing the quantity of project
water they can provide to users in the
District, and reducing the revenues needed to
meet their repayment obligation.
Any
expansion and/or reallocation may trigger the
NEPA process, requiring the Bureau to
prepare an environmental assessment and

comprehensively look at ways to expand and
reallocate Pueblo Reservoir storage capacity
to give the cities space to store nonproject

•

when"

concerned that any space used for nonproject

have a right to a minimum of 51 percent of
the annual supply and this figure is further
allocated by region (see discussion, supra).
Each spring, all users must apply to the
District for project water for the following

municipal

users;

•

the dedication of up to 210,000 acre
feet of project storage capacity in
Pueblo Reservoir to the irrigators
Winter Water Storage Program; and
• the reservation of 30,000 acre feet
of project storage capacity for the
storage of nonproject water in
Pueblo Reservoir.

year. The District then allocates water from
the municipal water pool to meet municipal

users' requests and makes a discretionary
decision as to how much water should be
allocated to each agricultural user from the
remaining supply.
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will be used outside of the service area or
district; (2) increased costs for entities located
outside the service area or district; and (3)

Second, the District has a policy that

has made some irrigable lands within the
District ineligible for project water.
The
policy reads:

subordination to the rights of project water
users within the District

Inasmuch as [ ] Project water
is
designed
to
supply
supplemental water, the [ ]
Board declare[s] that it is the
Policy of the District not to
replace with Project water

Under the repayment contract, project
water may not be sold or otherwise disposed
of outside of the District boundaries. Cities
are permitted to resell their allocated project

supply, but only within the area served by

them.21

decreed water sold by persons
or entities. In applying this

The Bureau currently is a party to five

rule, the Board shall consider
the

total

supply

of

""if and when™ contracts for storage of
nonproject water. One of these contracts is
with the City of Aurora, which is assessed a
much higher price for this storage space than
entities located within the District Entities

the

applicant and the percentage
thereof sold or replaced.19
This policy has significantly reduced

within the District pay $4 an acre foot while
Aurora is charged $32 per acre foot The

the sale of project water in the Colorado

Canal system, where a large portion of the
decreed nonproject water rights were sold to
the Cities of Colorado Springs and Aurora.20
The effect of the transfer was to make about
36,550 irrigable acres in the Colorado Canal
System ineligible for project water.

variance in the fee is based upon Bureau
understanding of the repayment needs of the
project as well as other factors. The increase
to Aurora is meant in part to compensate for
the fact that Aurora and its users pay no ad
valorem tax to the District

Some of the municipal users in the
have suggested that this policy
reduces the potential storage capacity in
Pueblo Reservoir because available project
water supply cannot be sold to willing
irrigation buyers who do not qualify under
the policy.
Therefore, the unsold supply
remains in the reservoir, taking up storage
space that might otherwise be available for
use by the cities for the storage of project or
nonproject water.
District

All "if and when" contracts for the
storage of nonproject water are the first to
spill when necessary for flood control or to
make room for additional project water
nonproject water is subordinated to project
water. However, the nonproject water of a
user outside the District is spilled before the
nonproject water of a user inside the District

Aurora's attempt to acquire an "if and
when" contract from the Highline Canal
illustrates some of the out of service area
restrictions discussed above.
Near the

Out of Service Area Restrictions
Project,

inception of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,

service area or district boundaries can affect
the ability to transfer project water and
project storage entitlements in three ways: (1)
outright prohibitions on transferring project
storage or supply entitlements if the water

In the Fryingpan-Arkansas

Highline Canal entered an "if and when"

storage contract

for

10,000

acre

feet

of

storage in Turquoise Reservoir. This contract

was for the storage of Busk-Ivanhoe
(nonproject) water brought through the Busk102

Ivanhoe Tunnel and ultimately used for
agricultural
purposes
within
District
boundaries. Highline Canal Company created
a separate entity, Busk-Ivanhoe Inc. (BE),
and assigned the storage contract to BIL

The Bureau offered to enter a new
contract with Aurora with a new rate
structure and under terms and conditions that

would make the storage among the first to be

spilled. The Bureau indicated that if it was a
city within the District boundaries trying to
acquire this "if and when" contract from BII,
then the Bureau might agree to the
assignment with possible amendment of the

This transaction facilitated a subsequent sale
to Aurora of 95 percent of the BE stock.
Aurora was interested in acquiring both the
water supply and the right to the storage
space in Turquoise Reservoir.
Aurora
offered to pay the BII shareholders an
additional sum of money if the shareholders
succeeded in getting the necessary approvals
for Aurora to use the "if and when" storage
contract At this point, the Bureau became
involved in the transfer.

service .charge due to the change of use from
irrigation to M&I.
Infra-Regional
Entitlements

ReaUocation

of

Municipal

As discussed above, the District
allocates a minimum of 51 percent of the
annual project water supply to municipal and
domestic use.
This percentage of annual
supply is further subdivided by region of use
within the District, as follows:

The Bureau's position was that an "if
and when" contract to store water for use
within the project service area cannot be

assigned to an entity outside the service area.
The Bureau cited several reasons for its
objection to this type of assignment or
transfer of contractual right First, Aurora

•

no less than 25 percent to the
Fountain Valley Pipeline that

does not pay ad valorem taxes to the District,
so the price paid for the storage space should

services the City of Colorado

be increased to compensate for this lack of
revenue towards repayment Second, the use
of the stored water would change from

irrigation
to
municipal
and
industrial,
warranting a new rate structure. Third, the
Bureau was concerned with setting a bad
precedent if it allowed BII shareholders to
profit from the transfer or assignment of a

•

Springs, the City of Fountain,
and other entities in the same
vicinity;
no less than 12 percent to

•

cities, towns and entities lying
east of Pueblo;
no less than 10 percent to the City

•

subsidized

government
service
contract
Finally, Aurora would be gaining a storage
right contrary to the intent of Section 13 of

of Pueblo; and
no less than 4 percent to the cities,
towns and entities lying west of
Pueblo.

The District has an unwritten policy
that municipal or industrial users within these

the Repayment Contract, because the BII
contract was not a first to spill contract
That is, it was an "if and when" contract for
the storage of nonproject water to be used
within the District boundaries, and as such
would be the fourth category of water to
spill.
In contrast, water stored for use
outside the boundaries is the first to spilL

regions may work out

agreements

among

themselves to transfer their allocation of
project water. The District will not increase
the overall percentage to a region, but will
generally abide by any arrangements that are

worked out among users within a region.
The transferor may not profit, according to
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new prison. La Junta has refused to agree to

the District; the only incentive is the hope of

a permanent reallocation, but has entered a
contract with the County to waive up to 2,000

improving the local economy.

acre feet a year of project water on a year to

Crowley County has been involved in
negotiations with the City of La Junta for a
reallocation in two separate cases. Initially,
the county and the State Department of
Corrections (DOC) were seeking a water
supply for the new prison near Ordway
because the size of the prison was increased
from 250 beds to 950 beds. The County
Engineer projected an additional water supply
need of 110 acre feet due to the expanded
capacity of the prison. The DOC agreed to
obtain the water, and was looking at various
options including a reallocation of project
water from the City of La Junta. La Junta is
allocated up to 2,000 acre feet annually of
project water supply within the 12 percent
allocated to communities east of Pueblo, and
has not yet needed its allocated supply. As
mentioned above, cities pay only for project

year basis. This water then becomes available
to the County on the condition that the
County pay the $8.00 per acre-foot charge for
delivered project water. The District Board
approved
the
contract,
and
reallocation was made in 1990.

the
first
Although

there was an issue of whether the feedlot use
was industrial or agricultural, for now it is
being considered industrial, and so within the
M&I allocation percentages.
Future reallocations are anticipated by
the District
The City of Lamar may be
negotiating with the City of Las Animas for
a reallocation of part of Las Animas' share of
the 12 percent of project water supply

water allocated by the District and stored or

allocated to municipal users lying east of
Pueblo.
The City of Lamar needs an
additional supply for industrial use within the

delivered.
The District encouraged the
county and DOC to work with La Junta but

not using its full allocation of project water.

City.

apparently La Junta is reluctant to agree to
any permanent type of reallocation.
The

Currently, the District has an informal
unwritten policy to facilitate these types of
regional arrangements once the parties have

DOC is still working on the acquisition of a
permanent supply.

agreed to the basic idea of a transfer. The
Bureau has not gotten involved in specifying
procedures as yet Guidelines adopted by the

In the second case, Crowley County
was seeking an additional water supply in
connection with a feedlot in Ordway, and
again approached the City of La Junta. The
feedlot had been sold apart from its
underlying
water
rights
in
1987.
Subsequently, a major dust problem arose and

Bureau and District may encourage more
inquiry into these types of transfers by other
users and also provide some certainty that any
arrangement worked out would be favorable

to the Bureau and the District Board:

the Environmental Protection Agency became
involved.
The County approached the
District, and the District in 1989 allocated500

acre

feet

as a

The City of Las Animas is currently

Management of Project Supply to Provide
Recreational Flows

one-time emergency

solution to the feedlot for dust control. The

About 18 percent or $90 million of

County then negotiated with La Junta for a
more permanent solution, asking La Junta for
a reallocation of 2,000 acre feet
This
amount of water would take care of the
County's needs for both the feedlot and the

project

costs

were

allocated

as

nonreimbursable expenses for the purposes of
fish and wildlife.
Additionally, about $41

million has been allocated to the recreation
purpose of which about $25 million has been
104

invested in recreational facilities around
Pueblo Reservoir.
While maintenance of
flows in the Arkansas River may have been

under the ■ project enabling legislation to
provide flows for rafting, since rafting was
likely not contemplated by Congress when the
legislation was approved. Additionally, early
flow releases may not be consistent with the
water conservation plan requirements under
the Reclamation Reform Act, because of the
consequent loss to evaporation.22
Flows
sufficient for rafting may be harmful to other

contemplated at the project planning stage,
1990 was the first year the Bureau was asked

to maintain a specified flow in the river to
provide flows for rafting.
Early each spring, the Bureau holds a
public meeting to discuss its draft operating

project purposes such as fish and wildlife,
particularly when there are severe fluctuations

plan for the upcoming year. Representatives
from the rafting industry routinely attend the
meeting and in 1990 asked the Bureau to

between day and night* And
water that is moved down the river in the
summer months for rafting includes water that
would otherwise be released in the winter

insure that there is available a minimum flow
of 700 cfs in the summer through August 15.

months for the enhancement of fish flows.
The Bureau expects there will be some
weighing of benefits in the long term plan,
and that some water will be released for
rafting flows. Finally, any significant change

This would be done by monitoring flows in
the Arkansas River at the Wellsvflle gaging
station and releasing water when flows
decrease to less than 700 cfs. The Bureau
agreed

to

provide

releases

necessary

to

in the operation of the project could trigger
the
NEPA
process,
requiring
an
environmental assessment and possibly a full

maintain the 700 cfs following negotiations
during which the rafters offered to pay for
any water lost to evaporation by early
releases downstream. The Bureau did not
assess the rafters for this loss, which was
determined by the Bureau to be about 272
acre feet

environmental impact statement

One significant side benefit from the
maintenance of this minimum flow was to
raise the level of Pueblo Reservoir. The
reservoir has been one of the heaviest used
recreational areas in the state between 1987
and 1989, and declining water levels had
significantly reduced the fish take.

The Bureau's formal position on
future management for recreational flows will
likely await the development of a long term
plan. While there has been some talk of
creating a recreation management area on the
upper Arkansas River, there are some
conflicts that need to be resolved.
The
rafting industry in the upper Arkansas is a

lucrative business that contributes significantly
to the local economy. However, the Bureau
questions whether there is any clear authority
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ENDNOTES

1. Pub. L. No. 87-590, 76 Stat 389 (codified) at 43 U.S.C § 616.

2. See Report on Arkansas Valley Conduit, Black & Veatch, Consulting Engineers (1972), at
11-11

3. This figure is allocated among (1) irrigation uses; (2) commercial power uses; and (3)
municipal and industrial uses and the municipal and industrial delivery system. See Table FA1.

4. See Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 1989 Annual Report, at 8. There
are long-term water service contracts between the Bureau and the following entities: Twin
Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company, 54,452 AF; the City of Colorado Springs, 17,416 AF; the

}
;

City of Aurora, 5,000 AF; Pueblo Board of Water Works, 5,000 AF; Busk Ivanhoe Inc., 10,000
AF; and the Homestake Project, 30,000 AF. Sg£ U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Reclamation, Review of Operations, Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Colorado (Sept 1990), at
Table 4 [hereinafter Review of Operations]. There are also several short-term "if and when"

}
j

5. Prior to 1981, the District retained 60 percent of the ad valorem tax. This was reduced to
ten percent in the 1981 repayment contract amendment Until this 1981 change, the District
was able to put some of the collected taxes into a savings account

}

storage contracts described in a later section of this case study.

6. There has been payment against the irrigation obligation since Sept 30, 1989, but this data
has not yet been compiled and is unavailable at the time of this report

7. This obligation is allocated to (1) M&I uses and (2) the municipal and industrial delivery
system. While a part of the ad valorem tax is applied to the M&I uses obligation, only the
direct beneficiaries pay for the delivery system obligation through a special assessment
8. See House Doc. No. 130, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., "Operating Principles, Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project, Adopted by the State of Colorado, April 30, 1959 (as amended December 30, 1959,

and December 9, 1960."

[hereinafter Operating Principles.]

9. Review of Operations, supra, at 11.

10. See Operating Principles, supra. Project storage space is first divided up by the Bureau
among authorized project purposes including (1) fish and wildlife, (2) recreation, (3) flood
control (Pueblo Reservoir only) and (4) irrigation and M&I uses (the conservation pool).
11. See 1989 Annual Report and Letter from Kevin B. Pratt, Attorney for the District, to
Larry MacDonnell, Natural Resources Law Center (Mar. 11, 1988).

12. See Operating Principles, supra, at 4. There is an unsettled issue as to whether the
percentage allocated to municipal users includes any carryover storage. For example, if the
cities comprising the Fountain Valley Authority carried over 60,000 acre feet, they would only
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be entitled to a new allocation of 18,000 acre feet so that their total storage and allocation
would not exceed their share of 78,000 acre feet. This limitation has not yet been tested
because of the current surplus of storage and water supply.

13. See Review of Operations, supra, at Table 8. Total water taken figures do not indicate
the available water supply, which in many years exceeded the amount requested.
14. The District may approve extensions of storage of the agricultural user's allocation beyond
May 1 based upon available space; it has done so in the past
15. The agricultural users may alternatively be seeking a guarantee of monetary relief when
their water is spilled, particularly their winter water.
16. See Review of Operations, supra at 15.
17. See Review of Operations, at 12.
18.

See Allocation Principles, at 3.

19.

See Water Allocation Policy at para. 11, adopted Feb. 19, 1981.

20. The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 also plays a role in preventing the sale of Colorado
Canal system project water. See Public Law No. 97-293, 96 Stat 1272.
21. See Repayment Contract, at 10. Colorado law also limits transfers to district boundaries,
Colo. Rev. Stat § 37-45-134 (1) (E) (1973), but allows potential transferees to petition the
board or the court for inclusion of their lands within the district, Colo. Rev. Stat § 37-45-136
(1973 & Supp. 1989).

22. See 43 U.S.C. § 390jj. Under the RRA, Section 210, each district is required to develop a

plan with definite conservation goals, measures, and time schedule for meeting the conservation
objectives.

23. Significant daily fluctuations are not common and not as detrimental as seasonal
fluctuations that can wash out spawning beds.
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KENDRICK PROJECT

KENDRICK PROJECT, WYOMING
Project Description

History of the Kendrick Project

The Kendrick Project is located in
Natrona and Carbon counties in central
Wyoming (see Figure K-l). Included in the
Project is Seminoe Dam and Power Plant,
situated about 72 miles SW of Casper
upstream on the North Platte River. The
Seminoe Reservoir is the primary storage
facility for the project with a present capacity
of 1,017,279 acre-feet (af). Approximately 37
miles downstream of Seminoe is the Alcova

Until 1933, the lands now included in
the Kendrick Project were open range and
used primarily by sheepherders. The U. S.
Reclamation Service first investigated these
lands for possible irrigation in 1904 but no
action was taken at that time. The Kendrick
Project (formerly the Casper-Alcova Project)
was further investigated in 1933 by the U. S.
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR).
The
renewed interest was due to regional water

Dam, Reservoir and Power Plant with a
storage capacity of 184,295 at The Alcova
reservoir is used primarily to divert water into
the Casper Canal for irrigation of lands in the
Kendrick Project Water is maintained at a

shortages caused by a drought that began in
1931, and due to the Project's sponsorship by

Wyoming Senator John Kendrick. Senator
Kendrick was
motivated by the
high
unemployment rate in Natrona county's oil

high level in Alcova Reservoir to provide
adequate gravity head for the Casper Canal
diversion.

and

gas

industry,

and

by

his

personal

gratitude to the county citizens over a recent
election victory.

The 59-mile long Casper Canal is the
backbone of the distribution system and has
a diversion capacity of 1200 cubic feet per
second (cfs). The distribution system includes

Project Authorization

190 miles of laterals and sublaterals, and 42

Recovery Act of 1933. The Secretary of the
Interior made a finding of feasibility in 1935
and the project was authorized by President
Franklin Roosevelt later that same year under
terms of section 4 of the Act of June 25,
1910* and section 4(b) of the act of
December 5, 1924*. Construction began in
1935 and the first irrigation water was
released into Casper Canal in
1946.
Maximum expenditures of $20,004,254 were
authorized for the project under Title II of
the National Industrial Recovery Act The
stated purpose of the project was irrigation,
flood control and power generation for

The Kendrick Project was initiated
under provisions of the National Industrial

miles of drains.
As of 1986, the system
provided irrigation water to 131 full-time
farms and 360 part-time farms with a total
population of 1,531 people served.1
There
is currently about 24,000 acres being irrigated
by the Kendrick Project.
The Kendrick Project is closely
associated with the North Platte Project
Included in the North Platte Project is the
Pathfinder Reservoir which lies on the North
Platte River between Alcova and Seminoe
Reservoirs, and the Guernsey Reservoir which
is 185 miles downstream from Pathfinder.
The North Platte Project was authorized in
1903 and the supporting water rights have a
priority date of 1904 or 1923 (1923 is
Guernsey only).

municipal development

As of 1984, actual

total construction costs were $36,420,778/

The letter of recommendation by the
Secretary, dated August 27, 1935, chose the
best irrigable lands commended by the Casper
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Canal to be included in the Project This
consisted of 66,000 acres which was divided
into two units of 35,000 and 31,000 acres
each. The scheme of development provided
for initial irrigation of only the first unit
(35,000
acres)
because of uncertainty
regarding the adequacy of water supply. It
was determined in the feasibility rinding that
the cost of production would probably be
returned to the government within 40 years
by charging $2 per acre a year, with the
remaining debt financed by the generation of

certain Nebraska appropriations senior to
Kendrick Project storage and natural flow
water rights.5 Thus the Kendrick Project is
often not in priority.
Control of North Platte River flows

Each year, Colorado, Nebraska and
Wyoming agree to an annual plan that
controls the North Platte River for the
benefit of irrigation, hydroelectric power, and
instream flows.4 The annual operating plan
optimizes power generation with fall and
winter releases of water from upstream
reservoirs. These waters pass through four

hydroelectric power.

A Power Plant was proposed for the
Alcova Dam to meet Casper's growing energy

power

plants

before

being

recaptured

demands. The Alcova Power Plant was found
feasible by the Secretary in 1949 and
authorized in 1950 under section 9(a) of the
Reclamation Project Act of 1939. The plant

downstream in the Glendo Reservoir.7
Maximum upstream reservoir capacity is thus
created prior to spring runoff. During the
irrigation season (May 1st through September

started seasonal power production in July,
1955.

30th), water is moved downstream in
accordance with delivery obligations under
Reclamation contracts and rights to the

Hie North Platte decree

natural streamflow, while taking into account

flood control and tributary inflows.

The

A year after the Kendrick Project was
approved, in 1934, the state of Nebraska

operations

initiated litigation against Wyoming seeking

provide the necessary water for irrigation
while trying to provide "the additional

equitable

apportionment

of

North

of this reservoir system must
maintain accounting of water ownership and

Platte

River water. Colorado was impleaded as a
defendant in the proceedings and the United
States was granted leave to intervene. The

benefits of hydro-electric power, reservoir
recreation, and instream flows.1*

problem

The Casper Al-Cova Irrigation District

that

arose

concerned

over-

appropriation of the North Platte River's
dependable flow and the fact that neither

Repayment contract

Colorado nor Wyoming regulated their
diversions to be subordinate to senior
appropriators downstream in another state.
The Kendrick Project was junior to practically
every appropriation downstream to the TriState Dam in Nebraska and was a threat to

The Casper-Alcova Irrigation District

(CAID) was organized and created in
conformity with Article 7 provisions of
Chapter 122 in the Wyoming Revised
Statutes, 1931. CAID's purpose was to act as
the repayment agent for the irrigation costs
of the Kendrick Project
In 1935, CAID
entered into a repayment contract with the
USBR that provided for the construction of
necessary irrigation works for the first 35,000
acres. CAID was required to impose and

these senior Nebraska water rights. The
resulting decree regulated the storage of
nonproject water, and enjoined the storage of
project water between May 1 and September
30 of each year except in accordance with the
rule of priority.

The Court went on to hold
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collect assessments from benefited lands
within the District for the purpose of
covering its share of the construction costs.
The remaining costs were allocated to
hydroelectric power.
In practice, CAID

water was available.
CAID's share of
construction costs were lowered to $600,000

and an annual fixed charge of $10,000 was
assessed for the cost of operation and
maintenance of the "reserved works". The
District also agreed to take over the care,
operation and maintenance of the project
irrigation delivery and drainage works without
cost to the United States as of January 1,
1958.10

assesses a per acre fee on irrigated acreage
within the District

Payments by CAID were not to
exceed 40 years and a schedule of 80 semi
annual payments of $35,000 was agreed upon
for a total of $2,800,000. This was less than
CAID's actual pro rata share of construction
costs which was calculated to be $3,080,000.
CAID's payments were left negotiable so that
if power plant earnings were insufficient to
cover the total cost within 40 years, CAID's
payments could be restructured up to a
maximum total payment of $3,080,000.

The amended contract called for
additional water to be made available to the
District at $030 per af if sufficient quantities
existed.
For a 5-year period commencing
January 1, 1958, all payments for "additional
water" collected by CAID were to be used
exclusively for constructing seepage control
facilities. When accumulated revenues from
the sale of additional water totalled $600,000,
no further payments for. the additional water
were required from the District

The contract states that the Project is
governed by Reclamation laws and that the
Project's development should in no way

impair water rights of the North Platte
Reclamation Project
Landowners in the

The amended contract abrogated the

recordable

contracts that landowners had
entered into under the original 1935 contract.
The amendatory contract did not set forth a

district were required to execute recordable
contracts with the United States, whereby

user contract requirement analogous to the
prior system.
Several other important
provisions were included in the amended
contract First, that the United States would
not abandon or relinquish any seepage or

each individual landowner would agree to the
terms and conditions set forth in Article 38 of
the contract
This was
a
necessary
prerequisite for land to be supplied with
Project water.

return flow attributable to irrigation of lands.
"[Sjuch water is reserved and retained for use
on the Kendrick Project"
Secondly, proof
of beneficial use of Project water must be
submitted to have permits granted by the
State of Wyoming.
All rights to Project
water secured as such, are regarded as
appurtenant to the land to which it was
issued.
It is also stated that the United
States does not relinquish title to the project
works
or
reserved
works
and
that
maintenance and control of the reserved
works remains with the U.S.
Finally, the
amended contract is expressly limited to lands
in the first unit The second unit (31,000

Amendatory contract

The repayment contract was amended
on November 25,1957 because rectification
of the original 35,000 acres showed that only
about 23,000 acres were irrigable and these
had a lower paying capacity per acre than

assumed

in the original contract
The
amendatory contract was authorized pursuant
to Federal Reclamation Laws, and the
Congressional Act of September 4, 19579.
The amended contract called for the United

States to deliver 2 af of water per irrigable
acre during the irrigation season if enough
111

$10,000 to the USBR for operation and
maintenance of these headworks but does not
pay for any water delivered, including
"additional water" in excess of 2 af per acre.

acres) is recognized as part of the Kendrick
Project, but its rights to service from the
project works remained suspended.
District rTnannn? difficulties

Irrigators are currently charge $79.00
for the first acre irrigated, and $9.00 for each
additional acre. This entitles the landowner
to 2 af of water per acre. The price for
additional water is variable, but as of August
1990, the cost was $5 per af.
Additional
water is limited to 1 af per acre."

The high elevation, short growing
season, and marginal soil conditions have
made it difficult to grow high value crops on
Kendrick Project lands.
Forage crops
predominate with alfalfa hay grown on over
one-half of the irrigated lands. The limited
amount of land being irrigated and low crop
values has impeded CAID's ability to

Water Rights

maintain its operation and maintenance costs,
and service its USBR debt Likewise, CAID

has
not been
rehabilitation of its
Prior to the water
into with the city

It was initially proposed that the
Kendrick Project be granted the 1904 water
right maintained by the North Platte Project
because
the
Kendrick
Project
could

able
to
finance
the
leaky distribution system.
service contract entered
of Casper in 1982, the

reasonably be interpreted as an extension of
this earlier project
This was strongly

District had made no payments toward
construction costs.
District money was
instead invested into improved drainage

objected to by the irrigators in eastern
Wyoming and western Nebraska who had

systems.
Personal Communication, Jack
Miles, President of the Casper-Alcova

1915

application

of

the

rights.

The

Project

was

authorized with a 12/1/31 priority date for
Seminoe Reservoir and a 4/25/36 priority date
for Alcova Reservoir. Water from storage in
the reservoirs remained the property of the

Irrigation District
Current

water

repayment

contracts

USBR as appropriated by state permits.

Two subsequent amendments of the
repayment contract were agreed upon; the

The
District
has
operated
the
irrigation system since 1958 but the USBR

first on June 1, 1965, and the second on
November 2, 1973. Both amendments were
for deferments of water charges.
A
rehabilitation and betterment contract was
entered into between CAID and the USBR
on June 16,1966. This provided CAID with
$150,000 for rehabilitation of the irrigation

continues operation and maintenance of the

dams, reservoirs and power plants.
The
adjudicated water rights held by the United
States from the State of Wyoming are listed
in Table K-l. The water stored in Seminoe
and Alcova Reservoirs is attached to lands
within CAID by secondary permits (See Table
K-2). These water rights are for irrigation,
domestic and stock water uses.

system.

At present, CAID operates, maintains,
and is liable for the irrigation system,
although the USBR maintains a supervisory
role. The reservoirs and dams (Le., reserved
works) are operated and maintained by the
USBR. CAID pays a fixed annual fee of

Water Needs
Wyoming

for

the

City

of

Casper,

Historically,
the city of Casper
depended solely on ground water supplies to
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Table K-1. Water Rights Held by the United States.

PERMIT

FACILITY

4552R

Seminoe Res.

12/1/31

Irrigation, power,
flood control

1,017,279 af

4630R

Alcova Res.

4/25/36

Irrigation, power

184,295 af

18681

Seminoe Power Plant

4/25/36

Power

1,990 cfs

21174

Alcova Power Plant

11/27/51

Power

3,800 cfc

PRIORITY DATE

CAPACTTY

Table K-2. Water Rights Held by CAID for Individual Land Owners Within the District

PERMIT

18683

DITCH

Casper Canal

APPROPRIATION

ACRES
(approximated
24,000

12/1/31

CFS

secondary

SOURCES

Seminoe Res.

supply
18488

Casper Canal

24,000

7/27/34

secondary

North

supply

River

330.44

Poison

Platte

Spider

Creek

18682

Casper Canal

24,000

4/25/36
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Alcova Res.

Alcova Res.

The actual population and water
demands of the Casper area are less than
earlier predicted. The projected population
of the Casper area for 1990 was 84,800 with
an average and maximum water demand of 14
and 42 mgd, respectively. In 1989, the actual
population receiving municipal water in
Casper
and
the
outlying
areas
was
approximately 54,500.
The average and
maximum water demands in 1989 were 10.3
and 29.9 mgd, respectively. In 1988, which
was an exceptionally hot and dry year, the

meet its demand for municipal water.
However, projections of population growth
made in the late 1970's indicated that the
present water supplies would not be sufficient
to sustain the city's growth. In 1977, Casper
serviced approximately 49,000 people with an
average demand of 83 million gallons per day

(mgd) and a maximum demand of 25.0 mgd.
By the year 2,000, the city's population was
expected to be more than double and the
average and maximum water demand was
projected to increase to 17.9 and 53.8 mgd,
respectively.12

average water demand was 12.6 mgd with a

maximum daily demand of 35 mgd.
Casper has two water rights to divert
North Platte River water for the purpose of
recharging ground water wells. These water
rights consist of a priority date of 1926 for 10
cfs and a priority date of 1963 for 20.5 cts.
Considering the potential water produced by

Casper's Options in Meeting Its Municipal
Water Demand
Casper has considered several options
for obtaining new municipal water supplies.
One possibility is to purchase ranch lands and
acquire their senior water rights or ground
water sources.
Although conceivably cost
effective, this is politically unpopular.
It

recharging wells under the 1926 permit, the

maximum sustainable yield is estimated at 12.6
mgd with a maximum supply of 22.1 mgd.
This production falls short of the estimated
future water demands of Casper. The 1963
water right could be affected by senior
irrigation or storage rights during droughts.

would be necessary to purchase approximately

5,600 acres. Such a large-scale transfer would
have
socio-economic
impacts
on
this
predominantly agricultural area. There would

In response to increasing municipal
demand, Casper obtained a permit to divert
14 cts from the North Platte River to a water
treatment facility in 1970.
An additional

be a considerable loss of crop production and
some loss of farming-related employment.
Impacts on vegetation and wildlife might also
result
Two proposed transfers from

diversion permit for 14 cfs was obtained in
1977. Presently, Casper's water treatment
facilities have a normal operating capacity of
18 mgd. These water rights are junior to
almost every user in the region. The State
Engineer has stated that the junior rights for
diversion to the water treatment facility may
be cut off to meet demands by senior
irrigation and storage rights, and to keep

irrigation to municipal/industrial use were
denied between 1980 and 1985 by the State
Water Control Board.
A second option under consideration
is to develop unallocated water within the
North Platte basin. This may not be a viable
alternative because of the restrictions imposed
on the state by the North Platte decree.
Recent plans to construct a dam on Deer
Creek near Casper was met by lawsuits from
the state of Nebraska intended to halt

within the limitations imposed upon the state
by the North Platte decree. Thus, the city of
Casper does not have a reliable water supply
during times of drought

construction.
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Another option is to use water from
transbasin diversions into the North Platte
River. High costs have made this alternativ
e unattractive.
The development of
groundwater supplies was also considered, but
preliminary investigations proved this option

accomplished by repairing the irrigation
system to improve its efficiency and eliminate
water delivery losses. The water saved by
improvements in the irrigation system could

to be unreliable.

Feasibility
of
an
improvement program

then be made available to Casper.

The alternative which has been acted
upon by the city of Casper, is to utilize
agreement with CAID and the U.S.
government The allocation of a portion of
the Project's water supplies to Casper could
be mutually attractive to Casper, CAID and
the USBR.
Casper would be provided a
supply of water on an annual basis from
available storage to alleviate potential future
water shortages.
CAID would benefit by
receiving money which it could use to pay off
its debts and rehabilitate the irrigations
system.
This would in turn benefit the
USBR.

canal system. From aerial photographs of the
Kendrick Project, approximately 5,200 acres
of seep areas were identified along the main
canals and laterals. Average consumptive use
rates for the predominate phreatophytes and
grasses in the area were determined from
published literature values in order to
estimate consumptive use of water seepage

from the distribution system. Water seepage
not consumed by plants or evaporated would
make up return flow to the North Platte
River. It was determined that if all seeped

Utilization of Kendrick Water by the City of
Casper

lands were eliminated, approximately 8,137 af
of water per year would be conserved for
beneficial use in the Kendrick Project A
canal and lateral improvement program could
not eliminate all seepage, but such a program
would be effective in reducing Project water
loss to nonrbeneficial consumption.
This

There were potential state and federal
obstacles to transferring water from the
Kendrick Project to the city of Casper. The
Wyoming water rights that assign the Project's
storage water to lands within CAID were
amended to allow a portion of the water

would mean less water being released into

Casper Canal to meet the same irrigation

supply to be transferred to municipal use.
The federal Kendrick Project authorization

demands.

which states the Project's purpose as
irrigation, power generation and flood control
was also considered. One option available to
USBR

was

to

request

Congress

WWE determined that the impact of
Casper's diversion and improvement plan on
the flow pattern of the North Platte River
would be minimal, both above and below
Casper.
A portion of the releases from

to

authorize a new purpose for the Project

Rather than do this, the USBR chose to use
the general authority provided by section 9(c)
of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939,u

Alcova Reservoir that historically were
diverted into the Casper Canal would now be
released directly into the river for Casper's
use, thus increasing the river's flow. Further
downstream, the implementation of an
irrigation improvement program would result

which allows authorization to furnish a
municipal water supply, only if "it will not

impair the efficiency
irrigation
purposes."

of

the project
This
could

system

The City of Casper hired a consulting
engineer, Wright Water Engineers (WWE),
to investigate the distribution system in order
to identify and quantify water losses in the

Kendrick Project water through a cooperative

the

irrigation

for
be
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grassland communities of central Wyoming.
Although artificially created by the Kendrick

in less return flow into the river from the
irrigated lands. Overall, there would be a

Project, these habitats have developed into a
unique and valuable feature of the terrain.
The elimination of seepage water that
sustains these plant communities would have
an adverse impact not only on the vegetatio
n, but also the wildlife dependent upon the
communities. Most impacted would be the
wildlife closely associated with wetland
habitats such as muskrats, ducks and redwinged blackbirds. Mule deer could also be
adversely affected by losing wetland/marsh
feeding areas and from loss of travel corridors
and cover. Raptors and mammalian predators
would also be impacted by reductions in the
abundant prey base. It is unlikely, however,
that any threatened or endangered species
exist in these areas.

slight net increase in flow between Alcova
Dam and Casper.
Casper's diversion of
Kendrick water for the water treatment
facility and associated return flows would alter
the present flow pattern of the North Platte
River downstream of Casper but the change

would be minor.
WWE

recommended

various

improvements to the irrigation system that

would conserve much of the wasted water.
Improvements would consist of lining the
canal and laterals with an impervious material,

or the installation of pipelines.
Other
improvements would involve rehabilitation of
headgates, siphons, bifurcations, checks, and
drops.

The
environmental
assessment
recommended that of the twenty-seven seeps
surveyed, five consisting of wetland-type
communities should be protected. Mitigatio

Environmental assessment

The
city
also
contracted
with
Environmental Research and Technology Inc.

(ERT)
to
conduct
an
environmental
assessment of a proposal to purchase 7,000 af
of water per year from CAED's Kendrick

n could consist of simply not lining those
stretches of canal and laterals associated with
these five seep areas. It was. recommended
that the rehabilitation program be restricted
to seeps dominated by vegetative communities
characterized by greasewood, big sagebrush
and alkali flats.
Since much of the
surrounding area offers similar habitat, there

Project water supply. The proposed canal
rehabilitation
program
would
save
approximately 4,000 af of water per year lost
to nonbeneficial consumption by drying up
roughly one-half of the total estimated
seepage acres. Approximately 2,900 af of
additional water consisting of return flow
would also no longer need to be diverted into
the canal, for a total of roughly 7,000 af of
water conserved. Hie rehabilitation program
would be done in phases with initial
improvements used to determine the actual
amount of water conserved.

should be minimal impact on wildlife if the
seepage flows are restricted in these areas.
Enough seep acreage dominated by these less
desirable plant communities exists to obtain
the necessary water savings.
Finding of no significant impact

Representatives from the USBR, City
of Casper, CAED, U. S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS), and Wyoming Game and
Fish Department (WGFD) met to develop a
plan which would minimize the effects a
water transfer would have on the wetland
habitat As a result of this meeting, CAID

Twenty-seven distinct seep areas were
identified by ERT. Seep areas characterized
by wetland vegetation communities such as
cattail-bulrush, bulrush or wetland meadows
are unique and ecologically important
Wetlands are rare in the sagebrush and
116

agreed to preserve 1,589 acres of the highest
value wetland habitat With this agreement,
USFWS and WGFD determined that the
proposed project would not significantly affect
the wildlife and wetland habitat of the Project
area.

In accordance with the Council on
Environmental Quality Regulations for
implementing the National Environmental
Policy Act, the Regional Director of the
USBR (Lower Mississippi region) issued a

Casper was also obligated to pay a

Article
United
per af
capital

9 further required the City to pay the
States a water service charge of $24
to be credited to repayment of the
costs of the Kendrick Project as

of $150,000 annually for the
system improvement program.

allocated to irrigation. Article 10 obligated
Casper to pay the U.S. its pro rata share of
the estimated annual operation, maintenance
and replacement costs.

Finding Of No Significant Impact (FONSI)
for the use of Kendrick water supply by the
City of Casper. The FONSI was approved
on October 19, 1981. This signified that no
environmental impact statement was necessary

The contract states that the total
water delivered to the city over the first 10
years may not exceed the total amount of

water declared available from the completed
water conservation measures. The City may,
however, request up to 7,000 af in a single
year during this 10-year period, if the water
is available. After the initial 10-year period
has expired, only the annual amount of water

for the proposed water transfer.
Negotiations for a Water Transfer
Water service contract between USBR, CAID
and Casper

declared

available
due
to
completed
conservation measures can be delivered to

Casper with an upper limit of 7,000 af of
water per year.
It is the duty of the
Contracting Officer to determine the actual
amount of water saved by each segment of
work. The contract calls for all rehabilitation
work to be completed within 15 years.

On April 15,1982, the United States,
CAID and City of Casper entered into a
water service
contract
(2-07-70-W0534)
pursuant to section 9(C)2 of the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939 (53 Stat 1187) and the

Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat 388). The
contract called for the U.S. and CAID to

Casper's water use is designated in the
contract for municipal and domestic purposes
only. If the City uses the water for industrial

supply the City with up to 7,000 af of water
annually from the Kendrick Project
The
contract required the water supply be
developed
through
water
conservation
measures, thereby not impairing irrigation
water supply.

1966.

minimum
irrigation

purposes, Article 14 requires the City to pay
water service charges equal to the prevailing
charges for industrial users. The contract is
clear that the water transfer does not
constitute a water right vested in the City,
but rather a water supply through a
contractual right The contract also does not
allow Casper to carry over storage water from
one year to the next The contract remains

The City in return, agreed to

provide sufficient funds for CAID to repay its
entire debt to the United States and to
rehabilitate the irrigation system. The cost
to Casper included $750,000 in three annual

installments of $250,000 each to cover
CAIDfs debt to the USBR. The $750,000

effective for 40 years and may be renewed
upon request by the City. The amendatory

debt consisted of $600,000 for construction
costs
as
established
by
the
amended

repayment contract of 1957 between CAID
and the USBR remains in force.

repayment contract of 1957, and $150,000 for
the rehabilitation and betterment contract of
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Secondary appropriation permits

The water service contract expresses
a
strong
federal
interest
in
water
conservation. Article 27 states:

Casper's application for permits to
appropriate surface water from Seminoe
Reservoir (permit #27689) and Alcova
Reservoir (permit #27690) were approved by
the State Engineer on July 12, 1982. The
permits expressly limit appropriations to the

[t]he City and District
shall develop and implement
an effective water conservation

program for all users of water
which is provided from, or
conveyed through, federally

quantity of water conserved or a maximum of
7,000 af per year at a rate not to exceed 42
cfs. Limitation set forth in the permits state
that during years of deficient water supply,

constructed
or
federally
financed facilities. That water
conservation program shall
contain
definite
goals,
appropriate water conservation
measures, and time schedules
for

meeting

the

the City is limited to the water

conserved that year. The quantity of water
conserved is to be determined by the USBR,
subject to approval by the State Engineer.
Limitations stated within the permit are
controlling if they conflict with provisions of

water

conservation objectives.14

the Water Service Contract

Agreement between CAID and Casper

Wyoming legislative funding and authorization

for the water transfer

In addition to the water service
contract entered into between the U.S.,
CAID and Casper, a separate agreement was
reached between Casper and CAID on the
same date. The latter agreement is expressly
made subject to the provisions of the Water
Service Contract The agreement between
Casper and CAID established a Betterment
and Rehabilitation Fund to utilize the system
improvement funds paid for by Casper.
CAID agreed to give Casper the first right to
negotiate a contract to purchase additional or
supplemental water which could become
available.
The
agreement
further

In 1985, the Wyoming Legislature
passed special legislation
allowing the
rehabilitation project to proceed. Chapter
90, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1985. The Act
provided for funding from the state of
Wyoming for the purpose of assisting
construction costs.
Wyoming agreed to
contribute $1,263,000 or fifty percent of the
construction costs, whichever is less.
The Act also impliedly exempts the
project from any conflicting provisions of
state law by specifically setting out the
intention to provide the City of Casper with
a water supply equal to the amount of water
saved by improvements to the irrigation

stipulated that the city must share with CAID

in case of an overall water shortage, but
CAID must allow the City to use 5,000 af of
water if that much is available. Once the
7,000 af of water are saved by the system

system.15

improvement program, the parties agreed to
Project Implementation

a minimum $25 per af charge to be used to
increase
overall
system
efficiency
and
eliminate waste.
Both parties agreed to

Preliminary investigations

complete work on the system improvement

CAID and Casper were required by
the Water Service Contract to furnish the

program within 12 years if possible.

118

USBR with a developmental plan for the
System Improvement Program and an annual
work schedule.
CATD requested technical
assistance from the U.S. Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) in order to accomplish these
goals. CAID employed SCS to do a longrange development plan for the System
Improvement
Program
which
could
accomplish 7,000 af of water savings within
12-15 years. SCS identified specific project

these factors were not used in transmission
calculations because they accounted for only
about 3% of the total water loss. Two other
methods were also employed to measure
water loss, the ponding test and infiltration
study.
Both of these methods directly
measure the rate of water infiltration into the
canal or lateral bed.

segment to determine water loss per square

The progress report describing work
done in 1983 concluded that transmission
losses were dependent upon four principle
variables: (1). length of time that the water
resides in the ditch; (2). the quantity of water
in the ditch; (3). the hydraulic conductivity of
the soils, and (4). the geologic setting.16
Future studies showed that seepage rates
varied seasonally depending upon
the
moisture content of the soils.

foot of wetted canal area. The SCS report
identified costs ranging from $55 per af to
$4,099 per af of water conserved for different
sections of the irrigation system. In general,

The 1983 progress report focused
primarily on five lateral segments. Generally,
measurements of transmission losses were

areas which could result in the required 7,000

af of cumulative water savings and determin
ed which sections of the distribution system
were most cost effective to rehabilitate. In
doing so, the SCS estimated seepage loss for
different sections of laterals using the Moritz
equation. This equation uses the permeability
rate of the soil texture type present in that

laterals

appeared

more

cost

effective

similar to estimates obtained using the Moritz
equation. The factors considered in choosing
laterals to be studied included infiltration
rates, water use history, and geologic setting,
combined with the findings of the Long

to

rehabilitate than the main canal.
Ongoing studies and system improvements
Yearly

hydrological

studies

Range Plan concerning cost effectiveness.

were

conducted starting in 1983 to quantity CAID's
water losses so as to determine how much

As a result of the 1983 study,
construction was initiated on lateral #41. A
pipeline was used to replace 15,435 feet of
earthen ditch which resulted in a water
savings of 382 af per year.
The USBR
certified the transfer of this water to the City
in a letter dated January 18, 1985."

water was saved by the various improvement

projects. These studies were conducted by a
CAID hydrologist in cooperation with the
USBR, city of Casper, SCS, and Wyoming
State Engineer. The most important method
used
in
these
studies
to
determine
transmission losses was the inflow-outflow
method.
This technique simply measures
water volume as it enters and leaves a canal
section, taking into account any irrigation
diversions.
The difference between the

The 1984 Progress Report described
more studies on transmission losses within
different canal and lateral segments. Phase I
of a rehabilitation plan for lateral #210 was
initiated.

amount of water measured entering and
leaving the reach is the volume of water lost

This involved lining the upper

14,283 feet of the lateral with concrete for an
estimated water savings of 333 af per year.
Included in the estimated water savings was a
correction for any continued water loss after

in that stretch.
Rainfall and evaporation
were also quantified. Although evaporation
exceeded precipitation resulting in a net loss,
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Refuge. The Kendrick Project lies within a
geological formation that has a potential for
large selenium content in the bedrock and
soils.
The Kendrick investigation was
conducted by an interdisciplinary field team of
scientists from the U. S. Geological Survey,

construction
was
completed.
Postconstruction losses include seepage through
the concrete and evaporation.
Work on
lateral #210 was to be completed in 1985. A
shift in research emphasis was planned for
1985 which
involved
examining
more
sublaterals in addition to lateral segments.

U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and USBR
with cooperation from the Wyoming Game
and Fish Department20

Similar progress reports have been
released
every
year
giving
data
on
transmission losses and the implementation of
the system improvement program. In addition

Reconnaissance
sampling
was
conducted on the water, sediments, and biota
of the Kendrick Project Concentrations of
toxic compounds in the surface
and
groundwater were generally at safe levels.

to lining canals for water savings, the annual
progress reports describe other improvements
such as siphon construction which also
translates into calculated water savings
attributable to the City. Most construction to
date has focused on the smaller laterals.

Presently, the City has taken no water out of
the Project The water is viewed as insurance
for the City's water demands.19 An analysis

The
biggest
exception
was
selenium.
Dissolved selenium concentrations were
greater than the National Standard of 10 ug/L
for public water supplies in nearly 50% of
the water samples. Several samples exceeded
the 50 ug/L limit for livestock watering.
Concentrations of selenium in the North
Platte River, which supplies drinking water to
Casper and several adjacent communities,
were always less than 5 ug/L.
High
concentrations of boron, cadmium, and

of improvement costs through 1989, indicated
a cost to the city of $542 per af of water.

mercury were reported from a few sampling
locations within the Project

Impacts
Quality

livers and eggs from birds captured
in the Project area were analyzed for trace
elements and pesticide residuals. Potentially
toxic concentrations of selenium were found
in these tissues. High levels of selenium were
also reported from fish and aquatic plants
taken from within the Project boundaries.
Concentrations of arsenic, boron, and mercury
were generally low in all tissue samples;
however, boron was found in aquatic
macrophytes at levels that could pose a

Rehabilitation of main canal segments may be
considerably more expensive. As of the 1989
Progress Report, the total volume of water
available to the city of Casper for municipal
use on an annual basis totaled 1,852 af."

of

Irrigation

on

Environmental

A study was conducted to determine
if irrigation drainage in the Kendrick Project
area had adversely impacted or could
potentially affect water quality, fish and
wildlife populations, or human health. The
study was

conducted because of growing

concerns that irrigation can lead to increased
concentrations of potentially toxic elements
in surface and subsurface waters. The most

danger to consumer organisms.

noteworthy
documentation
of
such
environmental degradation occurred at the

Kesterton National Wildlife Refuge in the
San Joaquin valley. Elevated selenium levels
from irrigation drainage were linked to
reproductive failure of waterfowl in the

North

Fish and invertebrates captured in the
Platte
Rhrer
had
very
low

concentrations of arsenic, boron, mercuiy, and
selenium in their tissues. These low levels
indicate no potential for physiological harm.
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A slight increase in selenium was found in
fish tissues downstream from the Kendrick
Project compared with upstream. No similar
increase in other contaminants was noted in
a downstream direction.
Although high
selenium concentrations were found from
several trophic levels within the Kendrick
Project, the relationship between irrigation

drainage and the elevated concentrations is
unclear.
Potential environmental impacts
from irrigation drainage can be an important
factor

to

feasibility

consider
of

when

transferring

examining
water

to

the
non-

irrigation uses.
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NEWLANDS PROJECT,
NEVADA

NEWLANDS PROJECT, NEVADA
Authorized by the Secretary of the

the Truckee and the Carson Rivers.

Interior in 1903, the Newlands Project was

time, some of these lands were being irrigated
by direct diversions from the rivers.
The

one of the first projects constructed by the

Bureau of Reclamation.
Water from the
Truckee and the Carson Rivers supports

irrigation on land in western Nevada.
case

study

presents

the

physical

At the

Bureau of Reclamation first constructed the
Derby Diversion Dam on the Truckee River
and the Carson River Diversion Dam on the
Carson River as well as the main distribution
canal for the Carson Diversion. With the
completion of the Truckee Canal in 1906,
water from the Truckee River became
available for use on project lands in the
Lahontan Valley. Water storage for project
use followed with the completion of the Lake
Tahoe Dam in 1913 and Lahontan Reservoir

This

setting

including the sources of water supply, a
discussion of the Newlands Project and the
Truckee-Carson
Irrigation
District,
a
description of the water rights, and a
summary of efforts to transfer project water
to wetlands maintenance in the Stillwater
Wildlife Management Area.

in 1915.
Physical Setting
Funding of $1,250,000 was originally
The project area is located in west

authorized for construction of the project.

central Nevada in the vicinity of Fallon. See

As of September 30, 1988 construction costs
for the various project features totalled nearly
$21 million.1
Payments under repayment

Figure NL-1. It is a very arid area with an
annual precipitation of about five inches.

contracts totalled about $3.8 million with a
remaining obligation of about $1.5 million
scheduled to be paid out by the year 2017.
Most of the remaining costs will not be

Two rivers flow through the general area: the
Truckee and the Carson.
Both of these
rivers begin in the central Sierra Nevada
mountains of California and flow east into the

Great Basin.
The Truckee River flows
ultimately into Pyramid Lake. The terminus

reimbursed.

of the Carson River is the Carson Sink. The
annual average flow of the Truckee River at
the California-Nevada state line is about

Truckee-Carson Irrigation District
Originally the Bureau contracted
directly with the irrigators for the supply of
water.
Subsequently, the Truckee-Carson
Irrigation District (TCID) was formed. In

590,000 acre-feet The annual flow of the
Carson River averages about 290,000 acrefeet

1926,

Newlands Project

Shortly

after

Congress

passed

TCID

assumed

the

repayment

obligation for the reimbursable costs of the
Newlands Project
It also took over the
operation and maintenance of the project

the

Reclamation Act in 1902 the Secretary of the
Interior withdrew 232,800 acres of public land

Between 1967 and 1987 an average of
about 63,000 acres of land were irrigated in

in Nevada from homestead entry for possible
development in association with a reclamation
project
In 1903, the Secretary formally

the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District.2 Total
average diversions of water from the Truckee
and Carson Rivers for use in the Newlands

approved a plan for a reclamation project
that would irrigate 240,000 acres of land.
The lands to be irrigated were located along

Project during this period were about 370,000
acre-feet
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to
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Figure NL-l.
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There are 1,200 farms within the
project service area with a total irrigable area
of 73,859 acres.
The farm population is
about 8,000.3 The gross value of agricultural
production on these lands in 1986 was about

the river, resulting in the near extinction of
both species.
The U.S. Supreme Court
denied the reserved right claims, however, on
the basis that all tribal rights had been
determined in the Orr Ditch decree.

$21,000,000 with an average value per
irrigated acre of about $330. Alfalfa was

In 1925, the United States filed a
quiet title action to determine its water rights
in the Carson River. A final decision was

grown on about 70 percent of the irrigated
acreage.

not forthcoming until 1980.'
The federal
district court held that irrigators within the
Newlands Project with project water rights
are entitled to a maximum 3.5 acre-feet per
acre for lands that are "bottom lands" and 4.5
acre-feet per acre for lands that are
"benchlands."6
Net consumptive use was
determined to be 2.99 acre-feet per acre.

Water Rights

In 1913, the United States brought an

action in federal district court seeking to
establish its rights to the use of water from
the Truckee River for both the Pyramid Lake
Indian Reservation and the
Newlands
Project4 Known as the Orr Ditch litigation,
this action sought a right to divert 10,000
cubic feet per second (cfs) for the Project
and 500 cfs for the Reservation. The final
decree in 1944 awarded the Reservation with
an 1859 priority date for water to irrigate

Project Water Allocation

Efforts by the Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe to ensure that the maximum possible
quantity of water in the Truckee River

5,875 acres on the Reservation.
It also
provided the Newlands Project with a 1902
priority date for 1,500 cfs from the Truckee

reaches Pyramid Lake caused the Secretary of
the
Interior
to
begin
issuing
annual
regulations known as Operating Criteria and
Procedures (OCAP) in 1967. The OCAPs
govern Truckee River diversions to the
Newlands Project and the annual allocation
of water available from both rivers for
irrigation use and for other purposes.
In

River for the irrigation of land within the
Project, for power generation, and for
municipal and domestic water supply and
other purposes.

In 1973, the United States filed an
action in federal district court seeking
additional water rights in the Truckee River
on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Indian
Reservation. These claims were based on the
need for water to maintain the fishery in

1970 the Tribe brought suit against the
Secretary
alleging
that
the
OCAP
inadequately provided for the needs of

Pyramid Lake which water, the government
asserted, was impliedly reserved when the
Reservation was created.
Evidence was
presented that between 1920 and 1940 the
surface area of Pyramid Lake had shrunk by

Washington, D.G agreed with the Tribe that
the Secretary had a fiduciary duty to the
Tribe to ensure that the Newlands Project
water supply is managed so that all Truckee

Pyramid Lake.

The

federal

district

court

in

River water not otherwise obligated by court
decree or contract will flow to the lake.7 The
1972 OCAP had allocated 378,000 acre-feet
of water from the Truckee River at Derby
Dam for irrigation use. The court revised the
OCAP, limiting diversions for irrigation to

about 20,000 acres.
One consequence was
the creation of a delta at the point where the

Truckee River enters the lake. The delta
prevented two fish species indigenous to the

lake from reaching their spawning grounds in
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about 288,000 acre-feet of water for the 1974

the status of individual water rights within the
project These rights are based on contracts
and certificates issued either by the Secretary
of the Interior or by TQD. Many of the
entitlements were issued by the Secretary in
the early days of the project prior to the

irrigation season. It also required that project
diversions from the Carson River to serve
irrigation needs should be relied on to the
fullest extent possible and that diversions

from the Truckee River for these purposes
should be minimized. In addition, the court
stated that irrigation water deliveries should
only be made to lands with valid rights to
receive water from the project

creation of TQD. TQD last issued contracts
in the 1950s.
In a number of cases, lands not
designated in any entitlement were receiving
water for irrigation. The 1980 Alpine decree

In 1973, TQD intentionally violated
the OCAP by diverting more water than
permitted.
The Secretary of the Interior
announced his intention to terminate the
1926 contract under which TCED operated
the Newlands Project TQD filed suit to
prevent this contract termination and to have
the OCAP declared invalid as a taking of its
property rights to project water without due
process of law. The 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the imposition of the
operating criteria and
ruled that the
Secretary's termination of the contract did not
deprive TCID of its constitutional rights.1 In
this decision the court determined that TCED
does not itself hold any water rights but
rather is in the position of a manager.
Further it held that its managerial position

specified that transfers of project water rights
including changes in the place of use are to
be made in accordance with Nevada law.11 A
number of project water users subsequently
filed applications with the Nevada State
Engineer to change the place of use of water
from water-righted properties not being
irrigated to those that were being irrigated
without water rights.
The federal circuit
court upheld the approval of 129 transfer
applications by the State Engineer against a
challenge by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.12
In particular, it agreed with the State
Engineer that the transfers would not injure
the Tribe's water rights or prove detrimental
to the public interest - the review standards

set forth in Nevada statutory law.
An
unresolved
question
is
whether
the
transferred project water rights may have
been
abandoned,
forfeited,
or
never
perfected.0

was specifically subjected in the 1926
repayment contract to the authority of the
Secretary to adopt regulations affecting the
management of the project

Transfers to Wetlands

In its 1983 decision concerning rights
of the Pyramid Lake Tribe to additional
water from the Truckee River the U.S.

In its natural state the Carson River
flowed east to a desert terminus in an area

Supreme Court had concluded that the water
rights established under the 1944 Orr Ditch
decree for the Newlands Project vested only
with those irrigators within the project who
had applied the water to beneficial use.9
Moreover, the operating criteria adopted in
the

1973

federal

district

court

known as the Carson Sink.

Hows from this

river produced a number of marshes in the
Lahontan Valley. In 1900, the wetlands area
in the valley totalled about 85,500 acres.14
Much of this area was encompassed in the
Stillwater
Wildlife
Management
Area
established in 1948. Of the 33,400 acres of
wetlands thought to be in this area at the
turn of the century, only about 5,000 acres

decision

specifically limited delivery of water to lands
for which a "current valid water right exists."10

These rulings placed a premium on clarifying
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remain. Stillwater and other Lahontan Valley
wetlands provide an important habitat for
Pacific flying waterfowl, for wildlife in
Nevada, and are one of only 13 sites in North
and South America to be classified as a
hemispheric reserve within the Western
Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve Network."

Transfer Issues

The loss of these wetlands resulted in
large part from increased upstream use of the
Carson River, primarily by agricultural users
including those in the Newlands Project
Currently the only water reaching the
Stillwater Marsh comes from Project irrigation
return flows and infrequent precautionary
spills from Lahontan Reservoir. Efforts by
the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to increase
flows of the Truckee River into Pyramid
Lake have decreased diversions from that
river into the Carson basin and have
increased the reliance of Project irrigators on

interest

The transfer of water from irrigation
use in the Newlands Project to wetlands use
in the Stillwater Wildlife Area raises several
issues of interest for this case study. These
include: (1) the change in project purposes
and (2) die nature of the transferable

Changes in project purposes

The Secretary of the Interior originally
authorized the Newlands Project for purposes
of supporting an irrigation-based agricultural
development in a 232,800 acre area of
western Nevada. The project service area
subsequently has been reduced to about
135,000 acres and only about 74,000 acres are
entitled to receive project water. Lahontan

Reservoir now is managed for recreation uses
but the only direct use made of water

remaining Carson River flows for project

delivered
irrigation.

purposes.

The need to directly supplement
inflows into Stillwater, without further
importing the already overburdened TruckeeCarson system led the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Nevada Department of Wildlife,
The Nature Conservancy, the Environmental
Defense Fund, and others to initiate a
program to acquire water rights from willing
sellers in the Newlands Project area.
Congress has appropriated more than $6
million in support of these efforts to date,
under which the FWS and The Nature
Conservancy have acquired more than 7,000
acre-feet of Newlands Project water rights.
The FWS estimates that more than 40,000
acre-feet of water must be made available to
support the minimum desired 14,000 acres of

under

this

project

has

been

The Stillwater Wildlife Management
Area is within the originally intended service
area of the Newlands Project17 Thus, water

transferred for wetlands use in this area
would still be used within the originally
contemplated service area.
Certainly the project was never
intended to supply water for wetlands
maintenance. In fact, project facilities and
uses have been responsible for the loss of
much of the original wetlands area. It may
be argued that the transfers do not really

involve a change in purpose of use since
water will still be used for "irrigation" of
wetlands vegetation. Nevertheless, there is
little question that this new use of water is
for very different purposes than those
envisioned when the project was authorized.

wetlands to achieve the wildlife objectives for

the Stillwater Wildlife Management Area.14
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A 1989 Solicitor's Opinion considered
the authority of the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire Newlands Project water rights for
use in the Stillwater Wildlife Management
Area and to use project facilities to transport

Transferable interests

As discussed, primarily because of
litigation by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
the legal status of water entitlements held by
irrigation users receiving water from the
Newlands Project has been the subject of
several federal court decisions.
The basic
project water rights for the Truckee and
Carson Rivers
have been adjudicated.
Specifically recognized beneficial uses in the
adjudication are irrigation, power generation,
and municipal and domestic water supply.
The Carson River adjudication provided
"bottom land" irrigation with 3.5 acre-feet per
acre and "benchland" irrigation with 4.5 acrefeet per acre.29 Net consumptive use was

this water." This opinion concludes that fish
and wildlife uses were authorized by Congress
when it authorized the related Washoe
Project in 1956.19 Additional authority was
found in a section of the 1939 Reclamation
Project Act concerning the ability of the
Secretary
to
enter contracts
for
the

adjustment of water rights "necessary and in
the interests of the United States and the
Project"20 Still further support arises out of
the Water Project Recreation Act of 1965
which authorizes the Secretary to operate
reservoirs to provide for fish and wildlife
enhancement31 The opinion references an
earlier Solicitor's Opinion concluding that
"when the project report and legislation

determined to be 2.99 acre-feet per acre.
The

courts

have

held

that

the

beneficial interest in the rights to receive
water from the Newlands Project "reside[s] in
the owners of the land within the Project to
which those water rights become appurtenant
upon the application of Project water to the
land."26 Thus the United States may not seek
a reallocation to the Tribe of the water right
decreed to the U.S. in the On Ditch decree
for the Newlands Project since that portion of
the decree aimed only at providing water for
irrigation of land within the Newlands Project

authorizing the project are unclear, the
Secretary has broad discretion to use the

facilities or even modify the features of a
project so long as those modifications are
consistent with the legislative descriptions of
the project"22 Otherwise, projects must be
operated
consistent
with
legislative

authorization(s) and any feasibility reports
submitted to Congress at the time of
authorization.23

service area.
In 1990, Congress enacted a statute
(discussed in greater detail below) containing
a section specifically authorizing the Secretary
to operate the Newlands Project for fish and
wildlife purposes as well as for recreation,

Nor
does
the
Truckee-Carson
Irrigation District (TCED) have any ownership
of water rights from the Newlands Project
Rather
TCID's
interest
has
been

characterized as "strictly managerial."27 The
Truckee River Agreement which was
incorporated into the On Ditch decree and
which gave TCED the right to dispose of a
portion of Truckee River water at Derby

water quality, and "any other purpose
recognized as beneficial under the law of the

State of Nevada."34 This Congressional action
removes any uncertainty that may have
existed regarding new uses of Newlands

Dam did not provide TCED with a property
interest in this water.
Moreover, TCID's
management interest in the Newlands Project
was subject to the authority of the Secretary

Project faculties.

of the
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Interior

set

forth

in

the

1926

detrimental to the public interest The tribe
also unsuccessfully challenged a subgroup of
applications on the basis that the rights had
either never been perfected or had been
abandoned or forfeited as a matter of Nevada

repayment contract to adopt regulations
concerning operation of the project and

which was used to reduce the amount of
water TCID was authorized to divert.38 In
the words of the Ninth Circuit:

law.

The Tribe v. Morton decision,

In a 1989 decision the Ninth Circuit
strongly affirmed that Nevada law applies to
the transfer of the water rights held by
landowners within the Newlands service
area.33 Moreover, it reached this conclusion
on the basis of the language in the original
1902 Reclamation Act that state law applies
to "control, appropriation, use, or distribution
of water used in irrigation, or any vested right
acquired thereunder..."33
A 1980 federal

of course, reduced the amount

of water TCID was authorized
to divert But TCID had no
water rights. Only the nature

of its managerial duty was
affected.
This does not
amount to a taking of property
without due process.9
Only those water entitlements that have been
perfected through application to irrigation use

on service area land have become vested

district court decision concerning adjudication
of the Carson River water rights of the

property rights.

project

The U.S. Supreme Court has noted
that there are at least five different forms of
water entitlements under which irrigation
users have received water supplied from the
Newlands Project30 Two involve an exchange
of pre-project appropriative water rights for
permanent entitlements to project water.
The others involve a permanent commitment
of water for irrigation of certain described
lands. These various entitlements collectively
provide for the delivery of water to 73,000
acres of land, although only about 60,000
acres are presently being irrigated.31

conjunction with the clear deference to state
water law, impels the conclusion that
Congress intended transfers to be subject to
state water law."34

As discussed earlier, many of these
entitlements have been used for irrigation of
lands different than the lands originally
identified in Project certificates or contracts.
To correct this situation the present users
filed 129 applications with the Nevada State

reclamation projects."35
Once the State
Engineer has approved the transfer, the
Secretary of the Interior cannot veto that
decision.36

Engineer to change the place of use. The
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe challenged the

held by landowners in the Newlands service
area that are considered vested property

change applications on a variety of grounds.
The
State
Engineer
approved
the
applications, finding that the transfers would
not injure the tribe's water rights or be

rights.
These are rights evidenced by
contracts or certificates to irrigate specified

had stated

that

"the conspicuous

absence of transfer procedures,

taken

in

Moreover, the cases hold that U.S.
interests can be adequately represented in the
transfer process utilized in Nevada that
applies to Newlands.
The notice and
participation provisions in Nevada law
combined with the ability to appeal the State
Engineer's decision

to

the

federal district

court "provide full vindication of the admitted
federal interests in the operation of federal

In summary, there are water rights

areas of land with a maximum duty of water
per acre depending on whether the lands are
130

bottom lands or benchlands. To be valid, the
rights must have been beneficially used (i.e.
perfected) and not abandoned or forfeited

program that has evolved since issuance of

the Solicitor's Memorandum.
Acquisitions
will continue to take place on a willing-seller
basis, for example, and the use of certain
"selection and transfer" criteria will help to
protect against increased Truckee River
diversions and to incorporate other publicinterest values.
The Secretary also is

There is probably a presumption that the
transferable consumptive-use portion of these
rights is 2.99 acre-feet per acre for transfers
to non-irrigation use. Changes of these rights
are to be accomplished in accordance with
Nevada state law and may not be prevented
by the Secretary of the Interior except under

authorized to use, modify or extend Project
facilities on a non-reimbursable basis to
deliver water to the Lahontan
Valley
wetlands, and to reimburse non-Federal

Nevada state law.

By comparison, water use not based
on a valid, pre-existing contract or certificate
and put to beneficial use has not vested as a
property right The Secretary of the Interior

entities "for reasonable and customary costs
for operation and maintenance of the
Newlands Project" associated with the delivery
of acquired water.38

may modify the quantity of water available to
TCID to distribute since the right of
allocation granted to the district is not a

Conclusion

property right but a managerial right only.

The Newlands Project provides

important

The legal status of project water originally
allocated to irrigation but not delivered and
used for that purpose remains unclear.

1990,

Congress

enacted

of

water

an

originally

intended to be used for irrigation purposes
being reallocated to environmental protection
objectives.
Reallocation
is
being
accomplished both by market-based transfers
of water rights and by administrative
allocation through the Operating Criteria and
Procedures. Extensive litigation concerning
this project has established that the rights of
irrigation water users are legally protected
only to the extent that these rights have

Public Law 101-618

In

example

water-

rights settlement legislation for the Truckee

and Carson Rivers that touches on several of
the transfer issues discussed above. The Act
includes,

for example, a section that
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
operate and maintain the Newlands Project
for existing irrigation purposes and for fish
and wildlife, municipal and industrial water
supply, recreation, water quality, "and any
other purposes recognized as beneficial under
the law of the State of Nevada."37
This
provision resolves any uncertainties" or
ambiguities
that might
have remained
following issuance of the Interior Solicitor's
1989 Memorandum on the use of Newlands
Project facilities for delivery of Project water

vested through use of water in compliance
with state and federal law. Such legally valid
rights may be transferred by the appurtenant
land owners in accordance with state law.

Other project water originally available for
allocation by the irrigation district but for
which such legally vested rights have not been
established
is
being
administratively
reallocated by the Bureau of Reclamation.

for non-irrigation purpose.

The Act also codifies many important
features of the water-rights acquisition
131
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NEW MEXICO CASE STUDIES1
Introduction

History

The Rio Grande Valley in New
Mexico has been host to some of the earliest

The Rio Grande River arises on the
slopes of the San Juan mountains in Colorado
in a drainage basin that is distinct from that
of the Colorado River. From there, the Rio
Grande flows almost straight south through
New Mexico until it strikes the international
border with Mexico. Subsequently, it flows
southeast along the Texas-Mexico border.

inhabited settlements in the United States.
Today,

the highest concentration of New

Mexico's population lies within the valley,

which contains the cities of Santa Fe,
Albuquerque, Las Cruces, and Truth or
Consequences.
The latter three cities lie
directly along the river.
The region is
extremely arid, which has led to water
conflicts
among
the
various
political
jurisdictions

along

the

Rio

Grande

The mild climate, rich soil, and easily
accessible irrigation water attracted early
settlement
When the Spanish explorers
arrived in the Rio Grande Valley in the first
half of the sixteenth century, the Pueblo
Indians were already irrigating crops (U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 1931, p. 1051). They

-

Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico.
The Rio Grande Compact of 1945, allocating

water among these entities, places limits on
increased water use.
As a result, New

diverted water from the Rio Grande into
ditches, now known as acequias, raising corn,
beans, and squash. More extensive irrigation

Mexico now augments the flows of the river
by diverting part of the state's allocation of
Colorado River water to the Rio Grande
Valley by means of the federal San Juan
Chama Project Another important factor in
the development of the Rio Grande Valley
has been the presence of vast stores of
groundwater, which are heavily utilized. New

diversions were

constructed in the valley
between 1840 and 1850. One estimate is that
by 1870, 125,000 acres were being irrigated.
However, a major flood occurred in 1874, and

additional

problems,

such

as

inadequate

drainage, led to a loss of over 75,000 acres

Mexico law recognizes the interconnections of
groundwater with
surface
flows-indeed
procedures have been worked out under
which some surface water rights from the Rio
Grande River can be transferred
to
Albuquerque
by
converting
them
to
groundwater rights. Surprisingly, however, for
such an arid area, there still appears to be

during the succeeding 40 years (Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District, 1980). Another
early problem, which surfaced about 1890,
was severely diminished flows due to
irrigation development in southern Colorado.
At El Paso, the river was dry for more
frequent and longer periods during the
summer months.

significant additional measures that could be
taken to increase the efficiency of surface

. Developments in the lower Rio

water use.

For example, the surface water
rights of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District have not been quantified, and there
is a great deal of uncertainty over the
possibilities
for
and
procedures
for

Gmnde Valley
Grande Project

-

the

Rio

As a result, the lower Rio Grande
Valley was one of the first areas to receive
attention after passage of the Reclamation
Act in 1902.
Irrigation surveys began in
1903, and the Bureau of Reclamation

transferring these rights.
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transfers within this project is complicated by

completed its feasibility report for the Rio
Grande Project in 1904.
The Secretary
authorized the project in December 1905. In
1906 a treaty was signed with Mexico,
guaranteeing them 60,000 acre-feet of water
annually using the storage capacity of the
project As a result, in 1907, $1 million of
nonreimbursable funds was appropriated by
Congress as the State Department's share for
satisfying the international obligation.
The

project

stores

water

in

controversy over
groundwater.

interstate

transfer

of

Developments in die middle Rio Grande Valley
— die Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District

Flooding, sedimentation, and rising
groundwater
tables
caused
significant
problems for agriculture in the middle Rio
Grande Valley. The sandy riverbed resulted

in considerable sediment transport.
When
this sediment was deposited, it tended to raise
the level of the riverbed, increasing the
potential for flooding the surrounding areas.
The continued application of irrigation water
raised water tables, leading to irrigation
drainage problems. One estimate is that in
the early 1920s 72% of the lands in the valley
had a water table less than 4 feet below the

two

reservoirs-Elephant Butte Dam (constructed

between 1908 and 1916 with a storage
capacity of 22 million acre-feet) north of
Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, and
Caballo Dam (constructed between 1936 and

1938 with a storage capacity of 034 million
acre-feet) south of the city (see Figure 1). In
addition, the project includes five diversion
dams for delivering irrigation water to
irrigation districts in two states—the Elephant
Butte Irrigation District in New Mexico and
the El Paso County Improvement District No.
1 and the Hudspeth County Conservation and
Reclamation District in Texas (refer to Figure
1). These districts lie in a narrow band along

surface (MRGCD, 1980, p. II-2).
In order
to cope with these problems, the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District was formed in
1925.

By 1936 the district had completed El

Vado Dam on the Rio Chama, a tributary of
the Rio Grande (see Figure 2), to store water
and regulate releases,
in addition to

the river valley.
The Elephant Butte
Irrigation District contains lands to the north,
west, and south of Las Cruces, New Mexico.
The El Paso County Water Improvement
District No. 1 lies just south of the city of El
Paso, Texas (which also borders the river).
The Hudspeth District in Texas lies farther to
the south. Although major municipalities lie
along the river, the project was designed to
deliver irrigation water and to provide
recreational opportunities. Clearly, there is
the potential for transfers from agricultural to
urban uses. Las Cruces could develop an
interest in acquiring surface water. However,
the principal interest in transferring irrigation
water from the Rio Grande Project to date
has been from the growing urban area around
El Paso, Texas. Two agreements have been
executed in the El Paso area - one in 1962
and another in 1988. The potential for water

constructing 4 diversion dams on the Rio
Grande River, 190 miles of levees, 350 miles
of drains, and 250 miles of canals, and

rehabilitating another 400 miles of privately
developed irrigation ditches (MRGCD, 1980,
pp. 1-1 and ni-3).
These were all works
constructed by the district, rather than by the
federal government
By 1936, the district
estimated that it had lowered the water table
5 feet on over 90% of its lands, as well as
successfully keeping the Rio Grande River in
its channel (MRGCD, 1980, p. EH-3).
Today lands of Middle Rio Grande

Conservancy District comprise a long, narrow

band along the river, with an elevation of
about 5,250 feet at the district's northern tip
(Cochiti Dam) and 4,500 feet at its southern
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to the district's repayment obligation for the
rehabilitation work. The Corps of Engineers

border (see Figure 2). The district extends
150 miles from north to south, but is only 1
to 5 miles wide.
Today it contains some
278,000 acres, of which about 129,000 are
considered irrigable.
The district also

was assigned responsibility for constructing
flood control reservoirs and levees.

six Indian pueblos (the Cochiti,
Domingo, San Felipe, Santa Ana,

The district divides its lands into two
categories for assessment purposes. "Class A"

Sandia, and Isleta), and 28,500 of its acres lie

lands are those irrigable lands of a farming
unit of five acres or more. All other lands

contains

Santo

within these Indian reservations. The district
intersects
the
towns
of Albuquerque,
Bernalillo, Los Lunas, Belen, and Socorro.

are designated as "Class B" lands, including
previously
agricultural
lands
that
are

subdivided. The basis for charging class B
lands is their benefit from the drainage and
flood control aspects of the district Class A
lands are assessed charges on a per-acre basis,

Although El Vado Dam and all of the

works

on the * middle Rio Grande were
constructed by the district, rather than by the
federal government, additional problems were

whereas Qass B lands are charged based on

to eventually bring the federal government

the

into the picture.
Under the terms of the
1945 Rio Grande Compact, New Mexico was
judged to owe a debt of 150,400 acre-feet to

improvements.
By a district resolution
adopted in 1959, 25% of the district's total
assessments are made against class A lands

Texas.

and the remaining 75% against class B lands
(MRGCD, 1980, p. HI-6).

Furthermore, problems had arisen in

Elephant Butte Reservoir when it was filled
in 1942: a large delta of silt formed just

above the lake, making it difficult to fill the

assessed

valuation

This scheme, which

of

land

and

has generated

reservoir. In order to solve these and other
problems, the Rood Control Act of June 30,
1948, approved a comprehensive plan for the
Middle Rio Grande Project The Bureau of
Reclamation
was
to
undertake
the
rehabilitation of the district's El Vado
Reservoir (accomplished between 1954-55)
and
the
district's
diversion
dams

some controversy between Qass A and Class
B ratepayers in the district, appears to have
some drawbacks.
As Table 1 shows, the
amount of irrigable acreage in the district
falling under the Qass A rates has generally
declined (from 59,467 acres in 1979 to 51,780
acres in 1989), largely due to urbanization.
On the other hand, the number of Class B

(accomplished between 1957 and 1958);
rehabilitation work on the district's main
canals, laterals, drains, and acequias (1953-

ratepayers

has

increased

over

the

same

period, (from 41,248 to 57,841). Even more
dramatic is that the assessed valuation on
which Qass B rates are based has roughly
quadrupled over the same period. The result

61); and channelization of 45 miles of the

Rio Grande River.
For the purpose of
facilitating this work, all of the district's
facility maintenance was turned over to the
Bureau in 1955 (the district reassumed
operation and maintenance responsibilities in
1975) (MRGCD, 1980, pp. Ett-3 and HI-4).

of these trends is that the mil rate for Qass
B ratepayers has fallen (from 10.03 mils in
1979 to 4.87 mils in 1989), while the
irrigation assessments per acre have increased
(from $14.41 per acre in 1979 to $29.71 per

Another aspect of the arrangement was that

acre

the

off the

requirement that Class A ratepayers shoulder

district's remaining bonds, converting them to
an interest-free repayment obligation under
Reclamation law. This obligation was added

25% of district costs has meant that a greater

Bureau

of Reclamation

paid

in

per-acre

1989).

burden

In

falls

other

on

an

words,

the

increasingly

smaller number of Class A ratepayers. In the
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Table 1.

Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
Hater Rates

Class B

Class A

Acreage

Year

Total
Charge

Toll
Charge

Property

Valuation

Mil Number of
Rate

Charges

Payers Per Payer

($)

(acres) ($/acro) <$/acre)(S million) (Mils)

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

54,089
53,872

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

58,596
58,249
58,034

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

57,489
57,396
52,176
51,880
51,780

53,729

53,330
59,467

57,732
57,621

10.16
9.45
9.90
13.40
14.41

n.a.

17.77

344

19.75
19.75
21.12
25.85

376
428
451
451

n.a.

n.a.
n.a.

259

25.88
31.34

33.85
22.49
29.71

14.66
18.27
0.51
6.54

480
845
887
1.037
1,032

9.18
8.03
7.10

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

7.17
10.03

n.a.

n.a.

41,248

63
100
108

11.15

42,763
44,113
45,385
46,857
48,142

10.46
3.98
3.36
4.06
4.87

49,320
51,128
53,008
56,182
57,841

102

12.45
12.68
9.82
9.37

93
90
104

66
56
75
87

Notes:

Toll charges for just those acres irrigated were levied
starting in 1986. These are included in the total charge.
n.a.H denotes "not available."

Sources:

Data for 1975 through 1977 are fron Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District Development Statement, Middle Rio Grande Conservancy

District, 1980, p. II1-1 (Table 1) and p. 111-2 (Table 2).
Data for succeeding years are froa district records.
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minds of some district members, this has
placed increasing economic pressures on the
remaining fanners, potentially forcing more
out of agriculture.

Albuquerque
cultivation.

area

is

no

longer

under

Water augmentation from the Colorado
River-the San Juan Chama Project

Until 1986, all of the agricultural
water rate (capital and operation and
maintenance) was levied on a per-acre basis,

The San Juan Chama project was
conceived of as a way to allow New Mexico

regardless of how much water was delivered.
Hence, the rate structure provided little
incentive to conserve water.
In 1986 and
1987, "toll charges" of $14.66 per acre and
$18.27 per acre were levied on just those
acres actually taking water. The result was a
dramatic decrease of more than 5,000 Class A
acres between 1986 and 1987 (refer to Table
1). As a consequence, the district reduced
the toll charges to much smaller amounts in

to utilize a portion of its share of water
under the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact in that part of the state with the
greatest population and water demands. This
project
diverts
water
in
southwestern
Colorado from the upper tributaries of the
San Juan River (which in turn is a tributary
of the Colorado River) through a series of

succeeding years.
While this episode
illustrates the conservation potential of higher
agricultural water charges, it also illustrates

tributary of the Rio Grande (see Figure 2).
The project was authorized in 1962 (P.L. 87483) and was constructed between 1964 and

the dilemma of the district under its current
requirement
that
Class
A
agricultural
ratepayers share 25% of the district's costs-

1971. In addition to the required tunnels and
diversions
dams,
the
project
involved
construction of one new storage reservoir on

commodity charges could

the Rio Chama, Heron Reservoir, and
enlarging the outlet works of the existing El
Vado Reservoir downstream. The project is
authorized to divert a maximum of 270,000
acre-feet in any one year, limited to a total of
1,350,000 acre-feet in any consecutive ten

tunnels under the Continental Divide into the
upper tributaries of the Rio Chama, a

force additional
acreage out of production. One way for the
district to avoid the drawbacks of its current
rate structure would be to adopt a rate
structure under which applicants desiring to
transfer out of Class A status are required to
prepay their Class A assessments for past
capital charges, as well as the expected value

years.
The firm yield of the project is
estimated at 96,200 acre-feet

of their pro-rata share of operation and
maintenance costs.

small transfers of privately owned surface
water from within the boundaries of the
district have taken place. However, for a

The project was designed to provide
supplemental water supplies to a number of
cities and irrigation entities in the Rio
Grande Valley (see Table 2).
The major
contractors are the city of Albuquerque
(48,200 acre-feet) and the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District (20,900 acrefeet). The contracted water deliveries from
the project total 79,150 acre-feet, with an

number of reasons, explored more fully
below, no such transfers of district rights have

additional 5,000 acre-feet authorized to
maintain a recreation pool in
Cochiti

taken

Reservoir. The Bureau of Reclamation is in
the process of contracting for the remaining
12,050 acre-feet of San Juan Chama Project

The principal potential for water
transfers from the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District is to the city of
Albuquerque and its suburbs. A number of

place

to

date,

even

though

a

considerable amount of district acreage in the
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Table 2.

Allocation of Water from the San Juan-Chama Project

Water use

Contractor

-\

(acre-feet)

T\

48,200

Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy Dist.

20,900

5,605

Dept. of Energy
Pojoaque Valley

1,200

Espanola
Taos
Los Lunas

1,000
400
400

Irrigation Dist.

1,030
.

Bernalillo
Twining

400
15

Total contracts

\

■

I
•■•*

]
}

;

79,150

Cochiti Reservoir

Recreation Pool

Source:

Quantity

Albuquerque

Santa Fe

;

5,000

Total Commitments

84,150

Uncontracted

12,050

.

Total

96,200

?

firm yield

Bureau of Reclamation records, Albuquerque,
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New Mexico

water.

As explained in more detail below,
not all of this water is required by the
current contractors in the immediate future,
and so there is interest in leasing these
supplies.

advantages: (1) it will be much longer before
they have an impact on the flows of the Rio
Grande and (2) they can provide water
pressure to the higher neighborhoods farther
from the river.
Albuquerque is taking
advantage of this arrangement by essentially
mining
its
groundwater,
especially

The legal setting

groundwater that is at some distance from the
river. As the effects of this mining on the

"Groundwater law and management in
the Albuquerque area

river gradually increase, they will be offset by
the city utilizing its surface water supplies
from the San Juan Chama project In the

New Mexico has taken several steps

meantime, the city has interest in leasing its
San Juan Chama project supplies (the city
currently has no means to treat and utilize
surface water supplies from the Rio Grande
River in its urban delivery system).

to ensure rationale use of its groundwater
resources. Under New Mexico law, the State

Engineer has the authority to "declare" a
groundwater basin, after which time he can
regulate pumping. To date, 32 groundwater
basins have been declared covering well over

Leasing of San Juan Chama Project water

50% of the state (see Figure 3). The largest
of these is the Rio Grande Basin, which was
declared in 1956 and covers 26,209 square
miles extending from the Colorado state line

the

Albuquerque arises principally from two
sources: (1) the surplus water brought into

to the Elephant Butte Reservoir.

soils

The potential for water transfers in
middle Rio Grande
area
around

the Rio Grande Valley by the San Juan
Chama Project and (2) the growing urban

Given the porous nature of the sandy
in the Rio Grande Valley near

Albuquerque, the aquifers of the surrounding
valley are considered to be intimately

water

connected to the flow of the river. Under
procedures worked out by the state, well

groundwater supplies.

Albuquerque's water delivery system

on

high

quality

The city has more than 100

wells within the city boundaries and located
at varying distances from the Rio Grande.
Spreading the wells out over the city also has
the advantage of keeping the necessary size

of delivery lines small (compared with having
one central supply point).
Locating wells

farther

from

the

river

has

two

on

and

the

the
city's

The city of Albuquerque has had to
forgo very substantial shares of its San Juan
Chama project water because it had no means
for using the water or for storing it. As a
result the city attempts to lease its surplus
San Juan Chama Project water. Currently,
the city has annual sales contracts for leasing
from 1,058 to 10,824 acre-feet of its San Juan
Chama Project water, where the quantity
varies depending on the request of the
subcontractor. The city's leasing price, $40.70
per acre-foot, is set at the city's contract cost
to the Bureau of Reclamation, plus 5% to
cover city administrative expenses. A total of

would not affect its flow for several decades.

exclusively

put

local entities

whereas wells several miles from the river

groundwater.

of Albuquerque

pressure

Leases by the Cay of Albuquerque to

pumping rates are evaluated by the impact
they are expected to have on the flow of the
Rio Grande. Wells near the river (within 1
mile) are judged to have an immediate effect,

depends

demands

resulting

other
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Figure 3
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29 contracts have been signed with a variety

feet of Albuquerque's San Juan-Chama
Project water each year. The state made a
one-time payment of $23 million for using
water through the year 2010.

of entities, such as car washes, mobile home
parks, nearby subdivisions, and sod farms.

The average amount of water taken under
the contracts with the city would be 36.47

acre-feet if the minimum amounts were taken
and 373 acre-feet if the maximum amounts
were taken. Most of the contracts range in
size from 3 to 100 acre-feet However, the
two largest agreements are for up to 6,000

Lease
between
winegrowers

Albuquerque

and

Albuquerque also has agreements to
provide some of its San Juan-Chama Project

acre-feet for the New Mexico Department of
Natural Resources and from 500 to 2,000
acre-feet for an association of winegrowers

water to winegrowers who have about 1,000

acres of grapes under cultivation near Engle,
New Mexico (east of Elephant Butte
Reservoir).
Under the initial agreement,
dating from 1981, the now defunct French

near Elephant Butte Reservoir.

Leasesforrecreationalpurposes between
Albuquerque and the New Mexico

Winegrowers Association purchased 400 acrefeet in 1982, 1,000 acre-feet in 1983, and
2,000 acre-feet in 1984. In subsequent years

Department of Natural Resources

the group was to purchase increasing amounts
up to 16,000 acre-feet per year in years 15
through 25 (1996 through 2006). However,

The lease for up to 6,000 acre-feet of

San Juan Chama Project Water to the state

Department of Natural Resource stems from
an earlier arrangement. There is considerable

of the

use of the Elephant Butte Reservoir for
recreational boating.
But in one previous

demand for water had fallen far behind the
amount under contract

this agreement was terminated at the request

year, the reservoir level had fallen as low as
3,000 acre-feet (the reservoir's total storage
capacity
is
2.2
million
acre-feet).
Furthermore, under the Rio Grande Compact

Association

The water

in

1986

purchased,

because

but

the

unused,

under the 1981 agreement-some 2,720 acre-

feet—was inherited in equal parts by two
successor agreements, one with Zanchi and

any water spilled from Elephant Butte
Reservoir is considered first to be San Juan

Son, Ltd and the other with the Sierra Water
Users' Association.
Most of the water

Chama project water (before any water from
the Rio Grande Basin is spilled). In order to

supplied to these two entities since 1986 has

be able to use at least some San Juan Chama

been from this inherited amount Under the
1986 agreement with Zanchi and Son, Ltd.,
the growers are entitled to at least 500 acre-

project water for recreational purposes in
Elephant Butte Reservoir, federal legislation
passed in 1974 (P.L. 93-493) authorizing
storage of up to 50,000 acre-feet of San Juan-

feet and no more than 2000 acre-feet,
beginning in 1990 and continuing until 2010.

Chama Project water in Elephant Butte
Reservoir
for
recreational
purposes.
However, this recreation pool was authorized
only for ten years, ending in 1985. In order

In a similar agreement, also signed in 1986,
the Sierra Water Users' Association is
entitled to purchase at lease 600 acre-feet
and no more than 3,000 acre-feet annually,
beginning in 1988 and ending in 2010. The

to extend the recreational use in Elephant
Butte and to prevent extremely low lake

maximum total under these agreements is

Albuquerque to maintain a recreational pool

5,000 acre-feet, considerably less than the
16,000 acre-foot maximum under the earlier

in the reservoir by using up to 6,000 acre-

agreement

levels, the state reached an agreement with

142

with

the

French

Winegrowers

Association.

This amount was reduced still

with

further in 1988 when, at the request of the
Sierra
Water Users' Association, their
agreement was terminated because of lack of

water

provided

by

the

interest-free

repayment provision in Reclamation law. The
1902 act limited land ownership to 160 acres.

The

1982 act broadened the entitlement
considerably:
subsidized water can be
delivered to land owned up to 960 acres, and
a higher "full cost" rate is to be paid for

demand The city expects to enter into a
revised agreement with Sierra. As with its
other
San Juan-Chama Project water
agreements, the city recovers its costs for
acquiring
the
water,
plus
5%
for
administrative costs.

water delivered to land leased above the
ownership entitlement.
The 1982 act also
prohibits non-resident aliens from qualifying
as recipients of water.

The growers take delivery of the city's
water released to Elephant Butte Reservoir

The city of Albuquerque's contract to

by means of two pipelines, one owned by
Zanchi and Son, Ltd and the other by the

store up to 50,000 acre-feet of San Juan
Chama project water in the Elephant Butte

Sierra

The

Reservoir makes the acreage and ownership

distribution systems of the two pipelines are
interconnected The winegrowers paid the
costs of constructing the pipelines, as well as

limitations of Reclamation law applicable to

Water Users' Association.

paying the pumping and maintenance costs.
The Zanchi pipeline was constructed in 1983

any subsequent use of the stored water for
irrigation.
Therefore, the Bureau of
Reclamation asserts that it has both the
authority and the responsibility to regulate

at a cost of $1.4 million. It lifts water about
600 acre-feet from Elephant Butte Reservoir.

the deliveries to the winegrowers-as to the
acreages, the requirement to pay "full cost,"

Operation and maintenance costs, excluding

and

depreciation, are estimated at $105 per acrefoot The Sierra Water Users' Association
pipeline was constructed in 1986 at a cost of

include filing forms certifying the acreage

citizenship

status

(the

requirements

held, etc). The city counters that it is taking
delivery of the water as municipal and

$880,000. Operation and maintenance costs
are estimated at $140 per acre-foot Taking
into account the amortized cost of the
pipelines, the total cost of water to the

Therefore, they contend, the question of
limitations applying to subsidized agricultural

winegrowers, based on placing 1,000 acres
under cultivation, is estimated at more than
$400 per acre-foot Based on experience to

water do not apply. To date, the Bureau of
Reclamation, already under criticism for not
uniformly
applying
acreage
limitation

date, the winegrowers estimate that their total
water deliveries will be less than one acre-

standards (for a history of the acreage
limitation controversy, see Wahl, 1989, pp. 69-

foot per acre in a normal year. Water is
delivered to individual vines by drip irrigation,
with 700 to 1,000 vines planted per acre.

106), has sought to hold the city to the

industrial water, not agricultural water, and is
paying a municipal and industrial rate.

requirements of the Elephant Butte storage
contract and the Reclamation Reform Act.

However, in order to accommodate the
parties involved, the Bureau has suggested to
Albuquerque that the city has other nonBureau water stored in Elephant Butte which

A controversy has arisen between the
Bureau of Reclamation on the one hand and
the City of Albuquerque and the winegrowers
on the other. The Reclamation Act of 1902
and
succeeding
acts
up
through
the

it could substitute under its agreement with

the winegrowers
limitation would

Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, place limits
on the amount of land that can be irrigated
143

and
not

to which acreage
apply.
To date,

If the Bureau of Reclamation cannot

however, the city has pursued its point with
the Bureau as a matter of principle.

work out an acceptable arrangement for
supplying water at current San Juan Chama

municipal

Whatever the technical requirements
oE the law, the Bureau's regulations for
administering them, and the provisions of the
city's storage contract, there does appear to
be a broader question:
should cities be
restricted in transferring water to agricultural
entities if they already pay municipal and
industrial rates?
The principal source of
subsidy accorded to irrigation water users
under Reclamation law is interest-free
repayment Under the "full cost" formula of
the Reclamation Reform Act, interest is
charged on lands over the 960-acre limit from
1982 forward, but no interest is charged for
the years that have elapsed since project
construction.

and

industrial

rates

to

the

winegrowers, it should consider amending its
Elephant
Butte
storage
contract
with
Albuquerque. If necessary the Bureau should
also modify its Reclamation Reform Act
regulations, or go to Congress to clarify
whether it intended the Reclamation Reform
Act provisions to apply in such cases.
Clarifying this matter could prove important

in other water transfer situations.
Tbe potential market for surface water rights
from the Middle Rio Grande Water
Conservancy District
When the groundwater basin around

By contrast, for municipal and

industrial water, interest is amortized from
project construction, including interest during
the years of construction. Therefore, one
would expect that the rates charged by the

Albuquerque

was "declared" (put under
regulation) by the State Engineer in 1956, the
city was granted consumptive use rights from
the Rio Grande River equal to its then

Bureau for municipal and industrial use to
Albuquerque and passed through to the
growers could exceed even the "full cost"
rates under the Reclamation Reform Act
However, the municipal and industrial rate
might be less than the "Cull cost" rate if the

current rate of groundwater pumping, less
50% as an estimate of the return flows to the
river. The result was a right of about 18,000
acre-feet per year.
Pumping above this

amount will eventually require the city to
utilize surface water rights to offset the
effects of pumping on reducing flows in the
Rio Grande. The principal surface rights that
the city will devote to this purpose are its

interest rates applicable to San Juan Chama
Project municipal and industrial water were
significantly lower than the interest rates
applicable under the Reclamation Reform
Act2

contractual rights to 48,200 acre-feet of San
Juan Chama Project water. At the current
rates
of
consumption
and
projected
population growth, the city does not expect to

The purpose of the Reclamation
Reform Act was to limit the distribution of

need any of its San Juan Chama project
water until the mid 1990s and does not
expect to need the total of those supplies

subsidized irrigation water to any one entity.
There would appear to be no similar social
purpose to placing limits on water which is
already sold to municipal suppliers since the

until 2030. Beyond that date, however, the
city plans to utilize other surface water rights
that it acquires during the interim.

interest-free subsidy does not apply to them.
Indeed, there is no legislative history in

During the 1960s and 1970s the city
acquired 797 acre-feet of water rights that
were
incidental
to
land
acquisitions.

Reclamation law placing similar limits on the
distribution of water for municipal and
industrial purposes.

However, in 1982, the city adopted a more
144

general water rights acquisition policy: the
city will purchase water rights at $1000 per
acre-foot when they are offered to the city.
The quantities are measured as consumptive

(serving Paradise Hills and parts of the city of

Albuquerque), Sandia Peak Tram (serving
Sandia
Heights),
and
the
Valley

Improvements
Association
(serving
Rio
Communities and areas between Los Lunas
and Belen). In addition, Belen, Los Lunas,
and Socorro require developers to either
acquire water rights or make payments as a
conditions of annexation and subdivision

use, and the seller must bear the costs of
getting the transfer approved by the state
engineer. Under the program, the city has

acquired some groundwater rights, but most
of its acquisitions have been privately owned
surface water rights from within
the
boundaries of the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District
From 1982 through
1989, the city obtained 1,625 acre-feet, or less
than 200 acre-feet per year on average (see
Table 3).
When the city obtains surface

The city now estimates that its
standing acquisition price of $1000 per acrefoot is toward the lower end of the value of
comparable sales in the area. In fact, since

approval.

rights, it files for the right to convert them to

the price has stayed the same since 1982, it

groundwater rights-adding them to the
pumping capacity it has at its existing wells.
The
city
is
allowed
to
convert
the

has actually declined in real terms (no upward

adjustments were made for inflation). The
city has been outbid on some water rights,

consumptive use portion of the right, taken as

with several other offers ranging up to $1,200

2.1 acre-feet per acre.3 From 1 to 6 tracts
have been acquired each year, with the
average size being about 33 acres, yielding an
average of 70 acre-feet of consumptive use
per acquisition.
To date, the city has
offered a free lease-back of these rights for
10 years and expects to extend these leases
until such time as it needs the water.

per

acre-foot

and

one

up

to

$1,695.

However, the city continues to be made
offers at its $1000-per-acre-foot price, and

feels that it will continue to be successful in
attracting additional sellers. Unlike some of
the
other
purchasers
(new
housing
developments outside the city), the city does

not need to place its water to use in the near
future; leases them back to the sellers at no
cost; and can afford to acquire rights slowly.

Albuquerque has appropriated a total

of $240,000 in funds for water rights
acquisitions since 1982. In addition, the $23
million that the city received from the state
for maintenance of a recreation pool in

It should be emphasized that these
transfers of rights to Albuquerque and its
suburbs are for private water rights and not
the rights of the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District
More explanation is

Elephant Butte Reservoir and up to $250,000
per year from any leases of San Juan Chama
Project water is authorized for water rights

warranted The State Engineer's Office was
created in 1907, and anyone verifying
beneficial use of water before that date is

acquisitions. Since the total amount of San
Juan Chama Project water leased has been
small, the city may plan to devote additional
funds to water rights acquisitions in the

considered to have a valid water right (N.M.
Stat Ann. § 72-1-3). Furthermore, the 1927
enabling
statute
for
irrigation
districts
provided that nothing in the statute was to
affect prior vested rights (N.M. Stat Ann. §

future.
The city has some competitors for the

73-1447(0).

surface rights it acquires.
These include
Albuquerque Utilities
(serving the Rio
Rancho development), New Mexico Utilities

Therefore, no consent of the

Middle Rio Grande District is required for
transfer of rights that date from before 1927.
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Table 3. Surface Water Rights Purchased by Albuquerque

Leased
Year

Purchased

acft
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

1988
1989
Total

94.57
25.81

Number
of Tracts

Back

acft

Average
Size

ac ft

0
0

1

94.57

1

25.81
28.85

173.09
112.75

173.09
100.17

6
2

205.39

194.89

4

57.95
614.42
34133

57.95
614.42
34133

3

1932

4

2

153.61
170.67

162531

1481.85

23

Average

56.38
5135

70.67

Source: City of Albuquerque files.
Notes:
1.

All purchases were at $1000 per acre-foot for
2.1 acre-feet of consumptive use per acre.
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It is estimated that about 30,000 acres of the

1988 (this includes the estimated 30,000 acres
with privately vested rights).4

acres in the district presently irrigated have
such rights.

(3) A single landowner may own a
parcel that contains both pre-1927 private

When an individual seeks to sell
private (pre-1927) rights, the state makes an
evaluation of whether there was beneficial

rights and district rights. If he subdivides and
sells the land for urban use, he may sell his
private rights. But the district has had no

use of water before 1927 and whether there
is adequate evidence that the rights have
been in continuous use since that time. This
is accomplished by utilizing a map of land use

past practice of simultaneously attempting to
sell its rights associated with the land.

in the area dating from 1917, as well as a
1926-27 survey map when the district was

(4) Under New Mexico law, water
applicants can apply for an extension of time

formed.
Subsequent record points are
available from 1936-37 maps, and aerial
photographs from 1947,1955, and 1963. The

to place the water to beneficial use, provided
they show diligence in doing so. In 1963 the
district assigned its permit to the Bureau of
Reclamation, which has subsequently made
applications for extensions of time and the

water use figures commonly assigned to such

rights are 3.0 acre-feet per acre of diversion,
with 2.1 acre-feet per acre of consumptive

extensions have been granted.

use.

(5) The State Engineer at one time
took the position that the district could not
sell or lease any of its water entitlements
until it showed that it could first meet the
needs on all of its lands. Since irrigation on
district lands never developed to the extent
envisioned in its original permit, there was no
defined date by which this need could ever be
demonstrated. More recently, however, the
State Engineer appears to have modified his
position somewhat-the district must show that

When it was formed, the Middle Rio
Grande Irrigation District filed for the right
to store water in El Vado Reservoir and
divert water to irrigate up to 123,000 acres
- the amount thought to represent the
maximum irrigable acreage in the valley (with
an estimated diversion of 3 acre-feet per

acre).
A subsequent permit allowed the
district to change its points of diversions to

consolidate hundreds of prior diversion points.
Several factors complicate evaluation of just

it can meet the needs of its private water
owners, as well as those of the Indian tribes
which it serves, before it can sell or lease

what quantity of water rights the district has.
(1) Rights have never been perfected
under the district's permits. Estimates are

water.

that since 1903, no more than a maximum of
80,000 acres has been irrigated within the
district

In conclusion, it is not known just
what amount of water the district is entitled
to under New Mexico law.
The State
Engineer's Office has indicated that it would
look favorably upon attempts by the district
to assess its current uses and to solidify rights
applied for in its original permit, including by
means of lease or transfer to other parties.
The district can probably do this for water
which has not been utilized for some time.
Particularly relevant in this regard is a 1964

(2) Furthermore, under the doctrine of
prior appropriation, an appropriator is subject
to forfeiting rights if he does not place them
to beneficial use for some period of time.
The irrigated acreage in the district has
generally, with about 54,000 acres irrigated in
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statute (Act of June 1, 1965, N.M. Stat Ann.
§ 72.5.8) under which an appropriates must
be given notice of potential forfeiture of

(which also borders the river). Las Cruces,
could develop an interest in acquiring surface
water from the project
However, the

rights. After that time, the appropriate* has
one year to place the water in use. No such
notice has yet been given to the District.
This suggests that the acreage irrigated by the
district in the 1961-64 period, as well as any
acreage continuously irrigated since that time,
is
relatively
secure
under
state
law.
(According to state estimates, about 49,600
acres were irrigated in 1965 and 57,000 acres
in 1988.)

principal interest in transferring irrigation
water from the Rio Grande Project has been

from the growing urban area around El Paso,
Texas. Two agreements have been executed
in the El Paso area - one in 1962 and
another in 1988.
The potential for water
transfers within this project is complicated by
controversy over interstate transport of

groundwater.
The El Paso controversy over interstate

For several reasons, the city of
Albuquerque is not presently trying to acquire
water rights from the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District The city does not need
to place additional water rights to use until
after 2030, and it is acquiring some private

transfer of water
Reactions to some of the potential
transfers of federally supplied surface water in
this
area will
be colored
by recent

controversies concerning the desire of El
Paso, Texas, to utilize groundwater pumping
from wells located in New Mexico.
(The
material in this subsection is based upon
Shupe and Folk-Williams, 1988, p. 25-26). El
Paso, a city of a half-million people, diverts
about 100,000 acre-feet of water annually
from the Rio Grande River. About half of
this amount is returned to the river after

water rights for this purpose. There is also
considerable uncertainty over what procedures
would apply to the acquisition of district
rights, thereby lowering their value relative to
private rights.

Nonetheless, this discussion

suggests that the district has a valuable asset
in its water; that it should move to evaluate

what its current and historical uses have been
(at least since 1961); and that it should work
with the state to determine what quantity of
rights it can perfect through either continued
irrigation or through leasing or sale.

treatment
Although El Paso gets some
water through transfers from landowners in
the Rio Grande Project (described below), it
relies primarily on groundwater pumping from
the Hueco Bolson aquifer underlying Texas
and New Mexico. The aquifer is estimated to
contain 30 million acre-feet of fresh water, 10

The potential for transfers of water from the
Rio Grande Project in New Mexico and
Texas

million of which underlie Texas. El Paso's
annual withdrawals exceed the aquifer's
annual recharge rate by a factor of 20. The
city estimates that it will deplete the aquifer
in about 50 years, with serious water quality
problems occurring before that time. The

The Rio Grande project supplies water
to irrigation districts in two states, including
the Elephant Butte Irrigation District in New
Mexico and the El Paso County Water
Improvement District No. 1 (refer to Figure
1).

city estimates that as early as 1995, pumping
from the aquifer will be inadequate to meet

The Elephant Butte Irrigation District

peak summer demand.
In light of these
difficulties, the city has initiated a number of
water conservation and aquifer recharge

contains lands to the north, west, and south
of Las Cruces, New Mexico. The El Paso

County Water Improvement District No. 1
lies just south of the city of El Paso, Texas

activities.
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In

addition,

El

Paso

initiated

The 1962 water transfer agreement with

the

appropriation of groundwater below some
lands in New Mexico. In 1980, the city went

El Paso

to court claiming that New Mexico's ban on

The

El

Paso

County

Water

exporting water to other states was illegal. El

Improvement District No. 1 contains some

Paso also filed 326 permit applications for
wells in New Mexico, with a total annual

69,000 acres.

It covers its costs principally

through an assessment of $28 per acre (such

pumping rate of 296,000 acre-feet
In
January 1983, the federal district court ruled
that New Mexico's ban on exports of water
was unconstitutional, being in violation of the
interstate commerce clause.
In February

assessments

comprise

90%

of

district

revenues).
This
assessment
entitles
landowners to up to 3.5 acre-feet of water
per acre, or whatever pro rata amount is

available from the project for a given year.

1983, the New Mexico legislature repealed its

Prior to 1962, the city of El Paso had

export

ban, but enacted a new statute
regulating the appropriation of water for outof-state use. Under this statute, the State

purchased some 2,000 acres in the El Paso
County Water Improvement District No. 1 for

Engineer must find that the diversion "is not

the purpose of dedicating the rights to
municipal and industrial use.
However, in

contrary to the conservation of water within
the state and is not otherwise detrimental to

1962,

the

city

engaged

in

a

major

new

agreement with the district for the acquisition

the public welfare of the citizens of New
Mexico11 (N.M. Stat. Ann., § 72-12B-1). In
1984, the New Mexico legislature also placed
a two-year moratorium on the issuance of
new well permits that could affect the flow of

of water supplies. This agreement is notable
for several of its features. Principal among
these is that it allowed the city to negotiate
with individual landowners, with the district

the Rio Grande River below Elephant Butte

playing

the role of assuring that district
facilities and the interests of other district
landowners were protected.
Unlike the

Reservoir.
In an August 1984 ruling, the
federal district court generally upheld the

New Mexico statute regulating out-of-state
appropriations, but ruled that the moratorium
was illegal. In December 1987, culminating a
series of hearings, the New Mexico state

earlier land purchases, the 1962 agreement

involved the assignment of water deliveries,
without the land changing ownership.
More specifically, the agreement
allowed the city to reach agreements with
landowners to transfer their project water
supplies to the city for a minimum period of
25 years. These transfer agreements were
subject to several restrictions.
They were
limited to 2 acres or less per landowner,
unless approved by the district, and they were

engineer denied El Paso's permits on the
basis that the city had adequate water for the
next 40 years and that New Mexico law did
not allow appropriations for needs beyond 40
years
(N.M.
Stat.
Ann.
§
72-1-9B).
Resolution of these legal issues is still
pending.

irrevocable.
The assignments had to be
recorded with the El Paso County clerk and
were limited to lands lying within both city

Given the delays and controversies
surrounding the appropriation of additional

groundwater, it is not surprising to find that
El Paso has interest in acquiring surface

and district boundaries.
The city was
obligated to pay all assessments, taxes, and
other charges levied by the district on the
lands from which the water was transferred.

water that might be available from the federal

Rio Grande Project

Water deliveries were to be made only during
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entered

the

irrigation season, and the city was
responsible for installing its own diversion
works and measurement devices, subject to

into

except

upon

a

showing that there is no other
practicable source of water

approval of the federal project manager. The
city was free to utilize the delivered water

supply

anywhere within its jurisdiction for municipal
and industrial uses (but not for lease or
resale to agricultural users) and could assign
the rights to the water deliveries with the
permission of the Bureau's contracting officer.

furnished
for
the
uses
aforesaid if the delivery of
such water shall be detrimental
to the water service for such
irrigation project or to the
rights
of
any
prior
appropriators.

that

One
interesting
feature
of the
agreement concerns the protection afforded
to community ditches within the district The
maintenance of these ditches is not the
responsibility of the district However, the
agreement requires the city to participate in
the operation and maintenance of such
ditches, including emergency repairs, on the
basis of the pro rata portion of acreage
assigned to the city. In any cases where the
water deliveries for all lands along the ditch
are transferred to the city, the city is
responsible for re-establishing a ditch at the
end of the lease term.

for

no

the

purpose;

water

shall

(3)

be

Among the recitals to the contract are that it
will be in accordance with the provisions of
the 1920 act and that "the delivery of water
to the City ~ will not be detrimental to the
water service for the project or to the rights
of any prior appropriator."
The 1988 water transfer agreement in
the El Paso area
In November 1988, the El Paso
County Water Improvement District No. 1
entered into a somewhat similar agreement to

respond to the increasing amount of land
being subdivided both inside and outside the
city limits of El Paso. For this purpose a
new authority was created, the El Paso

Under the 1962 agreement, the city
executed agreements to obtain about 20,000

acre-feet of water by assignment
The
Bureau contract establishing the agreement
references, among other acts, the authority of
the Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat 451;
43 U.S.CA. 521). The act provides that

County
Lower
Valley
Water
District
Authority, with the power to sell water
outside of the El Paso city limits, as well as
to El Paso. This water transfer agreement is
signed by the irrigation district and the two
urban suppliers, as well as the Bureau of
Reclamation. Under this agreement, which is
similar in most respects to the agreement
with the City of El Paso, discussed above, the
Authority will seek assignment of rights to
project water from individual landowners.
This agreement is restricted to tracts of 2

the Secretary of the Interior .is hereby authorized to enter
into contract to supply water
from any project irrigation
system for other purposes than
irrigation, upon such conditions
of delivery, use, and payment as
he may deem proper, provided
(1) that the approval of such
contract by the water users'

acres per owner, unless specifically approved

by the district
The initial term of
assignments will be for 75 years and will be
irrevocable
during
that
term.
The
assignments are automatically renewable after

association or associations shall
have been first obtained; (2)
that no such contract shall be
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that time, unless notice is given six months

question of the Bureau's permission came to

prior to expiration. Water may be delivered
by the Authority anywhere within the

the attention of officials in the Department
of the Interior. This resulted in a visit to the

boundaries of El Paso County, Texas. One
interesting feature of this more recent

area by the Assistant Secretary for Water and
Science
and
the
Commissioner
of

agreement is that it virtually prohibits the
Authority from purchasing lands in the
district, limiting purchases or lease of lands to
300 acres.
This contract is held as
subservient to the prior 1962 agreement with
the city of El Paso. The cooperation among
the two urban water purveyors is indicated by

Reclamation. Within 30 days the agreement
with the H Paso County Lower Valley Water
District Authority was approved by the
Bureau.

Potential

the fact that the 1982 agreement allows the
city of El Paso or its Public Service Board to
utilize all of part of the water obtained by

Role of the Bureau of Reclamation
The Bureau of Reclamation did not

the

the

As noted previously, the Elephant

The Authority does not have to pay
the Bureau of Reclamation any higher rate
for the water transferred from the irrigation
district (which would normally be the case
under Reclamation law). The reason is that,
in this case, the irrigation district has already
paid off its entire repayment obligation and
essentially has title to the water (see Wahl,
1989, pp. 173-176).

a facilitator in

invoking

Butte Irrigation District in New Mexico
borders the town of Las Cruces, as well as
being upstream of El Paso, Texas. Clearly, it
is a potential source of water for each of
these cities. One indicator of the district's
interest in potential transfers is its refusal to
sign the 1988 agreement between the El Paso
County Water Improvement District No. 1,
the Bureau of Reclamation, and the El Paso
County
Lower
Valley
Water
District
Authority. This refusal was not based on the
district's opposition to that or similar
transfers. To the contrary, the district was
supportive of the transfer. The source of the
district's opposition to the agreement was the
inclusion of the Bureau of Reclamation as a

the Authority.

initially act as

transfers

Elephant Butte Irrigation District

1988

signatory. A digression is necessary to explain
this point

agreement. It took the irrigation district, El
Paso, and the Authority about 3 months to
reach agreement among themselves on the
transfer.
However, after 16 months of

Both the Elephant Butte District and
the El

discussions with the Bureau, the entities had
still not obtained permission to proceed. The
Bureau raised doubts about the transfer since
the project was authorized as an irrigation
project The plight of those living in outlying
areas needing urban water supplies became
an issue of public concern. The district was
able to deliver irrigation water, but not

Districts

Paso

County

Water Improvement

have completed

their

repayment

obligations for project construction to the
U.S. (The El Paso district also paid off a
separate loan through the Bureau of

Public Service Board was unwilling to take
assignment of water for domestic delivery to

Reclamation's 1987-88 program allowing
prepayment of outstanding loan balances.)
This means that both districts are exempt
from the acreage limitation provisions of
Reclamation law.
Accordingly, farming
operations in these districts are not subject to
a 960-acre limitation on ownership or the

areas outside the city limits.

requirement to pay statutory "full cost" on

potable water to households.

The El Paso

Eventually, the
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water delivered to fanning operations having

more could be done to create incentives for

leased land above this limit
Another
implication of their paid-out status is that the
project water rights for irrigation should
transfer to the district (see Wahl, 1989, pp.
173-176). Particularly because of this latter
point, the Elephant Butte District counselled
the El Paso County district that it was not
necessary to make the Bureau a signatory to
the contract:
that to do so implied the
Bureau still had some contractual or
ownership interest in the water. The Bureau
had also asked the Elephant Butte District, as

more efficient utilization of surface water
supplies within New Mexico. Surface water
rights in the middle Rio Grande area are not
adjudicated.
The Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District evidently generally keeps
its conveyance ditches full so that its fanners
can take delivery at any time, a practice
which results in some unknown amount of
evaporation and seepage losses.
Also,
although there is a system in place for
transfers
of
private
water
rights
to
Albuquerque, there is no similar system in
place for the transfer of district water, in

a participating district in the project, to also
be a signatory. Elephant Butte declined.

spite of the fact that substantial land areas in
the

Its refusal probably indicates that the
district has examined its own posture and
legal standing with respect to water transfers
in some detail In the future, the district
could be approached by either Las Cruces or
by El Paso for assignment of some water
deliveries or water rights.
By its recent
action, the district is probably seeking to
clarify its clear entitlement to water, without
the need for Bureau intervention.

district

near

Albuquerque

have

been

converted to urban or suburban use.

1.
Procedures should be established
regarding voluntary transfers of water from
the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
to growing urban entities.
Establishing

such

a

system

would

require several steps.
a. The State and the District need to

The

Elephant

Butte

District

has

clarify that the district has the opportunity to

demonstrated its desire for greater autonomy
in other ways as welL At various times, the
district has approached the Bureau regarding
taking title to project facilities.5 The Bureau
has resisted these requests, principally on the
rationale of its responsibility for meeting the
international treaty obligations to Mexico.

solidify its surface water rights on converted

Conclusions and recommendations

district threatens to make the problem worse
-more land will shift away from agricultural
use, and the associated water rights will have
been unutilized for a longer period of time.

land through lease or sale to the City of
Albuquerque or other municipal suppliers.
As noted, both the state water code and
current state water rights administrators
appear to provide some flexibility to the
district in this regard. Delaying an attempt to
clarify what opportunities are available to the

As noted at the outset, several
institutional measures have been taken, in
addition to structural ones, to more carefully
and

efficiently

utilize

the

limited

b.

water

The District needs to quantify its

water rights in the Albuquerque area-its
historic uses of irrigation water, its current

supplies
of the Rio
Grande
Valley.
Prominent among the institutional measures
are the Rio Grande Compact and New
Mexico's procedures for regulating the use of
groundwater. However, it appears that much

irrigated usage, and the amount of land no
longer using district surface water.
The
district has made some limited attempts at
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doing so in the recent past, but has not
followed through. As noted in point a, delay
is likely to exacerbate the problem.
The

users should pay for irrigation
facilities.
However, it does not appear
equitable that lands that are leaving the

district may feel that such an undertaking will
be expensive, and its financial resources are

agricultural category should be able to escape

irrigation

the obligations that were incurred on their
behalf.
One remedy would to require
prepayment of their allocation of irrigation
costs, both capital costs and sufficient
operation and maintenance costs to avoid
increasing the burden on the remaining Class
A ratepayers.
This prepayment could be
credited against the Qass B assessments of
the converted land parcel

limited. However, the water resources owned
by the district are potentially salable.

The

proceeds from lease or sale could provide
considerable revenues to the district, thereby

more than covering the costs of hydrologic
investigations.
If the district feels itself

unable to undertake this quantification
process, it should consider entering into a
cooperative agreement with the City of
Albuquerque. The city would be the chief

d.
The district should establish a
requirement, when either private rights or
surface rights are sold, that the sellers prepay
their allocation of capital costs, as well as the
estimated present worth of future operation

benefactor and therefore would be a likely
source of funds for the quantification process,
with the cost to be credited against any
future purchases the city makes of the

district's water.

and maintenance costs. A standard principle
of water transfers is that there should be no

Quantification of the district's water
rights
in
the Albuquerque
area
and
establishing a transfer process would appear
to benefit the state generally, as well as the
district, Albuquerque, and the surrounding
suburban water companies. Urban conversion
of lands in the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District leaves more flows in the
Rio Grande, which goes against the state's
general policy of making the greatest use of
water it is allowed under the Rio Grande
Compact

injury to third parties. However, the fact that
the amount of agricultural deliveries has
decreased in recent years in the Albuquerque

c.

area has meant that a greater financial
burden has fallen on the remaining farmers to
cover both capital and operation and
maintenance costs allocated to Class A lands
(as explained above, Qass A lands pay a fixed
25% of the total district assessments). The
district is caught in something of a dilemma
here, shifting a greater percentage of its
revenues to property assessments would solve
this problem, but would encounter opposition.
One small, but important measure would be

The district should require lands

moving from Class A assessment to Class B

to require that costs be prepaid on lands
selling water rights. Requiring prepayment of
capital costs and shifting all of the O&M
burden to property assessments after the time
of sale would be another potential option,

to prepay their allocation of irrigation costs,
or devise some other method to avoid the
increasingly high assessments on the fewer
remaining irrigation water users in Qass A.
As discussed above, due to urbanization, the
proportion of district lands subject to Class A
assessments (irrigated operations of 5 acres or

but, if the land has little economic value at
that point, this alternative may not be a
secure one.6

more) has been gradually declining. However,
district rules require that Class A landowners
pay a fixed proportion (25%) of the total
assessments. It does appear equitable that

2. The management levels of the Bureau of
Reclamation could do more to clarify water
transfer principles to its office and field staff.
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(a)
Albuquerque currently relies
exclusively on groundwater rights, reserving its
surface rights to meet future compact
requirements for surface flows. Clearly, an

Both the water district and the Bureau
personnel we spoke with in the course of the
study had seen the Department's principles
on water transfers.
However, the Bureau
personnel in Albuquerque had not received a
copy of the bureau's own internal guidance
for implementing the policy.

alternate strategy would be for the city to
treat and use some portion of its surface
supplies,

thereby

groundwater.

3. The management levels of the Bureau of
Reclamation could do more to review and

saving

on

its

use

of

This alternate strategy would

rely more heavily on the renewable surface

supplies, as opposed to groundwater mining,

clarify the purpose of applying certain acreage
limitation guidelines to the transfer of
municipal and industrial water.

supplies

Bureau personnel appear to have
carefully and properly insisted on the
applicability of acreage limitation to the

current urban distribution system is designed
to use wells.
The city should consider
studying the relative cost of this alternate

winegrowers who purchased water from
Albuquerque-it is an explicit requirement of

strategy. An optimal strategy that minimizes
cost may involve using a mix of the two water

the city's Elephant Butte storage contract

sources.

and would delay the need to use surface

Bureau personnel also offered the city some
alternatives for complying with the present
requirements, such as amending the contract
or allowing the city to utilize nonReclamation
project water-alternatives
rejected.

which

the

to

meet

compact

requirements.

However, it would also incur higher treatment
and delivery costs, especially given that the

(b)

The

state

transfers of water past

which

city

lies

does

not

prohibit

the Otowi gauge,

north of Albuquerque,

but

it

requires that any transfer past that point first

quantify the historical consumptive use (of all

parties)

However, there are some broader
policy questions raised, such as whether there
is any particular program purpose in applying
rules intended to regulate subsidized irrigation
water to water that is sold for municipal and
industrial purposes, regardless of to whom the
water is resold. Bureau management could
have, and still can, provide more general
policy guidance on this question - including
considering such options as encouraging the
preparation of an amendatory contract,
clarifying Congressional intent, or seeking
new legislation.

above

the

gauge.

This

is

a

tremendous expense to be imposed on the
first transferring parties.
If there are
expected benefits to such transfers, upstream
water users might want to consider banding

together to

finance such a quantification.

Alternatively, they might elect to be taxed to

allow

the

state

to

undertake

such

a

quantification.
(c) There will undoubtedly be future
pressures for interstate transfers of water
from
the area below Elephant Butte
Reservoir to the El Paso, Texas, area. So
far, New Mexico has resisted such transfers,
at least of groundwater. But there is also the
potential to lease surface supplies, which

There are some other interesting
aspects of water use in the Rio Grande Basin
that merit future consideration and study,

could result in additional income to state

although they are not the direct subject of
this report

residents. If New Mexico considers that, over
the long-term, pressures may mount for
154

interstate leasing, it might consider whether
leasing surface supplies would be less
objectionable than leasing groundwater. The
state might consider undertaking studies of
how such leasing would function.
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ENDNOTES

1.

The case studies in this chapter were completed in the winter of 1989 and the spring of

1990.

2.

The rates mandated by the Reclamation Reform Act might be higher for a given year since
they are current yield rates on long-term government debt Rates applying to repayment of

construction charges for municipal and industrial use are usually established as coupon rates on
all outstanding government bonds as of a given date. Furthermore, such rates would be fixed
by the years of project construction, when interest rates were likely much lower than the rates
applying under the Reclamation Reform Act's "full cost" formula.
3.

This system evidently does not take into account that when the pumped water is used, some
portion, perhaps as much as 50% results in return flows to the river.

4. The decline in Class A acreage (agricultural use on operations of 5 acres or more) in Table
1 also reflects a decline in irrigated acreage. The irrigated acreage figure reported here is

somewhat larger than in Table 1 since some irrigation takes place on Class B lands.
5. Title to project facilities ordinarily remains with the Bureau of Reclamation, even after
project repayment is complete, unless otherwise provided by Congress (for additional discussion,
see Wahl, 1989, pp. 153-54, and 171 and Wahl and Simon, 1988).

6. Note that since Albuquerque has leased back the water associated with all of its acquisitions,
the district would presumably be receiving its Class A revenues on the associated land, at least
until such time as land was actually removed from agricultural use.
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PROVO RIVER PROJECT

PROVO RIVER PROJECT, UTAH
Background

The Provo River Project is located in
north-central Utah.

releases

of

100,000

acre

feet

annually.

Of this amount, 58.3 percent was

subscribed for by municipal users and 41.7

Water is diverted from

percent by irrigation users.
As discussed
below, these percentages have changed.

the Weber River and the North Fork of the

Duchesne River and delivered

averages

through a

canal and tunnel, respectively, to the Provo

The project facilities collect Provo

River.
The water flows down the Provo
River where it is then stored in Deer Creek
Reservoir. From the reservoir, some of the
City and Salt Lake County through aqueducts.
Provo City receives its share of project water

River floodwaters and water from Weber
River
via
the
enlarged
Weber-Provo
Diversion Canal.
Additionally, water from
the upper Duchesne River is diverted through
the Duchesne Tunnel into the upper Provo
River. These waters are stored in the Deer

by releasing its storage water in Deer Creek

Creek Reservoir which is situated along the

Reservoir

Provo River about

water is delivered to Salt Lake City, Orem

into

the

Provo

River

and

by

16 miles northeast of

Provo, Utah.
Water released from the
reservoir is either diverted into the Salt Lake

exchange diverting springs tributary to the
Provo River.
The balance is released
downstream for irrigation and power uses

Aqueduct and Olmsted Flume to supplement

(See Figure PR-1).

Salt Lake City's, Orem City's and Salt Lake
County's water supply. Provo City also uses
project water by exchanging its project water

The need for the project arose during
the drought years of 1930-31.
Lands
previously irrigated by water from Utah Lake

for water from springs in Provo Canyon. The
remaining water is diverted into the Provo
Reservoir Canal at the Murdock Diversion
Dam, about seven miles below Deer Creek

suffered when storage in the lake dropped
from 850,000 acre feet to 20,000 acre feet.
This, combined with a severe water shortage
experienced by Salt Lake City, led to a

Dam. The water delivered through the Provo

concerted effort to obtain an adequate water

acres of land that lie in north Utah County
east of the Jordan river and west of Utah

supply.

Reservoir Canal is used to irrigate the 46,609

The City of Provo and five other

communities in Utah County, and Salt Lake

Lake and the Jordan River.

City joined together with the
interests to sponsor the project1

Powerplant, located near the Dam, has two

irrigation

Deer Creek

generators that each produce 2,700 kilowatts
of power.

The project was authorized under the
provisions of the Act of December 5, 1924*
and approved by the President in 1935. The
Salt Lake Aqueduct was approved in 1938

The project is operated by two user

organizations.
The features of the Deer
Creek Division of the project are operated
and maintained by the Provo River Water

and

the Deer Creek Power Plant was
authorized by the Secretary of the Interior in

Users Association.

The Association was

incorporated under the laws of Utah in 1935.
The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake

1952.

City is responsible for the operation and

The Provo River Project was planned

maintenance of the Aqueduct Division.

from its inception with a major municipal
component The Deer Creek Reservoir has
an active capacity of 149,564 acre feet and
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Project Costs

taken off the top of the total $23.4 million
obligation for user payments prior to I960.4

There are two major project divisions,
Deer Creek and the Salt Lake Aqueduct.
Costs for the Salt Lake Aqueduct totaled

The construction repayment obligation
is
divided
equally
among
Association
shareholders. The only difference between
municipal
and
irrigation
users'
annual
payments has been the rate of repayment of
the excess cost obligation. The excess costs
contract was in the nature of a service

about $12.8 million and are the responsibility
of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City.

The Deer Creek Division was
completed in two phases, with distinct
repayment obligations. The original project
cost for this Division was $11.4 million.

contract

and

the

rate

of

the

irrigator's

repayment obligation was decided annually by
the Secretary, based on ability to pay.

Channel revisions were undertaken beginning
in 1945 to protect private lands and
improvements from flood damage caused by

Consequently, the irrigation users' rate
fluctuated and went as high as $3.25 per
share per year. The municipal users paid a
set rate of $3.25 per share per year pursuant

importations of water to the Provo River.
These additional costs, called the "excess"
obligation, totalled almost $12 million, for a
total project cost of about $23.4 million.

to a supplemental repayment contract.3
Under the original contract obligation, all
users will pay $2.85 per share annually.

Repayment obligation

Power
revenues
will
provide
a
substantial credit against the future repayment

The
Provo
River
Water
Users
Association is the repayment entity for the
costs associated with the Deer Creek
Division. The original contract was entered
in 1936 with five supplemental contracts
dating from 1937 to 1959.
The way the

obligation.

contracts were set up, the Association had to

pay off the excess costs before the original

repayment obligation of $285,000, $191,587
was
credited
from
power
revenues

obligation. The excess costs were paid off in

accumulated from 1984 through December 31,

1990. In 1991, the Association will begin
payments on the $11.4 million original

1989.

The power facility construction

costs were paid off (with no interest) in 1984.

Since
then,
excess
power
revenues
accumulated in an escrow account until the
excess costs contract was paid off.
Association's

January,

1991

Of the

construction

Power revenues that fluctuate from

year to year are expected to reduce future
annual repayment obligations as well.

obligation. There is a 40 year repayment
period on this original obligation beginning
January 15, 1991.

The Metropolitan Water District of
Salt Lake City is the contracting agency for
the Salt Lake Aqueduct Division.
It has

Of the total Deer Creek Division
obligation of $23,406,426, the irrigators are
responsible for $6,213,470. They have paid

been making payments on its $12,869,151
obligation since about 1953 and has paid off
about $9.4 million to date. There is a 40
year contract term, so payout is expected in

$2^46,044 as of October 31,1990. As of this

same date, the M&I users3 paid off their
excess costs obligation of $7,284,357.
In

1993. Assuming a supply of 61,700 acre feet,6
this Division cost added about $208 per acre
foot capital cost to the obligation under the
Deer Creek Division repayment contract.

1991, the M&I users begin payments toward

their share of the principal contract, which is
$8,373,756.
Approximately $2 million was
160

Operation and maintenance costs

Association can store Provo River natural
flow water in Deer Creek Reservoir.

The Association is responsible for
operation and maintenance (O&M) of the
Deer Creek Division. The users are assessed
an O&M fee each year. There is a separate
O&M fee assessed to users benefiting from

The Olmsted Power Plant located
near the mouth of Provo Canyon has nonconsumptive power rights with priorities
ahead of the Deer Creek project water rights.
BOR purchases power from the Western

the Provo River Canal.
Operation and
maintenance costs associated with the Salt
Lake Aqueduct are paid by the Metropolitan

Area Power Administration (WAPA) to
replace the power loss at Olmsted caused by

Water District of Salt Lake City.

the storage of the natural flow winter power
water in Deer Creek Reservoir.
The
exchange increases the annual yield of Deer

Water Rights

Creek Reservoir to a total of 120,000 acre
feet, of which 100,000 is allocated to the
Association and 20,000 to the BOR as
Bonneville Unit water for delivery to the
Central Utah Water Conservancy District
(CUWCD).

The Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
filed on both direct flow and storage rights

for the Duchesne, Weber and Provo Rivers.
Some of the water used for the powerplant is
not consumptive project water (preexisting
water rights), but is used downstream as

nonproject water rights.
About 25 cfs of
Little Deer Creek water was acquired by the

Allocation ofproject water

Association and transferred to the Bureau as
a part of the project water rights.

The Association does not make a
decision on allocation of project water until

Deer Creek Reservoir reaches its fullest or
Description ofproject water rights

highest level in the spring.
If there is
adequate water, each shareholder receives
one acre foot of water. If not, the water
delivered to the Association's shareholders
and to CUWCD is proportionately reduced.

Project water rights include about
290,000 acre feet of Deer Creek Reservoir

storage

water

rights

from

the

Provo,

Duchesne or Weber River basins. There are
some spring and seepage rights included in
this amount The priorities of project water
rights range from prior to 1903 to 1960.
Authorized uses include irrigation, domestic,
power, municipal and industrial uses.
As

a

result

of the

Deer

If not for the Deer Creek-Strawberry
Exchange Agreement, discussed above, there
would likely have been reductions in the
quantity of water delivered to the Association
shareholders during the low water supplies
each year since 1987. A full allocation under
the Exchange requires at least about 123,000
acre feet of storage water in Deer Creek
Reservoir. A reduction in the quantity of

Creek-

Strawberry Exchange Agreement with the
BOR and Central Utah Water Conservancy
District, the Association is able to store Provo

delivered Provo River project water has only
occurred in 1961 (60 percent delivered) and

River natural flow water even in drought

1977 (99 percent delivered).

years. Under its water rights, it can only take
the Provo River water when the water rights
in Utah Lake are being satisfied. The BOR
has agreed to replace Utah Lake water from

the Enlarged Strawberry Reservoir so that the
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Provo River Project Transfers

apparently anticipated that conversions from
agriculture to municipal use would occur over

The Provo River Project began
delivering water in 1941. At its inception,

time:

The uses may from time to

over half of the total project water supply of
about 100,000 acre feet was planned for
delivery to municipal users and many years in
excess of 100,000 acre feet has been delivered

time change from agriculture
to municipal and domestic or
other uses which may require
additional
rediversion
and

annually when extra allotment (spill water)
was delivered. Today irrigation users hold
about 22,300 shares and municipal users hold
about 77,700 shares.

conveying works and increased
capacity of rediversion and
conveying works,7

Since the project was initiated, there
have been some transfers of project water

water right proof, is indicative of the scope

from

certificates.

This language, taken from a project

and flexibility built into the project water
The proofs and ultimately the
certificates were structured so that all project
water could be used for irrigation or all for
municipal and industrial purposes.

irrigation to municipal use.
The
percentage of M&I water has increased from
583 percent to 73.454 percent One transfer
involved the acquisition of Association stock
from
an
irrigation
company
by
the
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake
City.

Additionally,

the

Association's

By-

A new stock certificate was issued by

Laws recognize this same shift in purpose of

the Association in the name of the Metro
District All other transfers from irrigation
to municipal use involved the sale or trading
of stock of irrigation companies that are
shareholders in the Association. These intrairrigation company transfers are not reflected
in the 73.454 percent figure stated above;
they are a part of the 27. 546 percent of
stock classified as irrigation use. However,
once these company stock transfers are
finalized, the rights to an additional
approximately 10,000 acre feet of project
water will be held by municipal users.

use in the section requiring annual crop
reports:

This

provision...supplies

a

method
by
which
the
obligations...may be satisfied

The
stockholders
affected
ought to cooperate.... These
are not the strictly irrigation

subscribers alone, for a large
part of the water supply
intended for ultimate domestic
and
industrial
uses
will
doubtless

be

devoted

to

irrigation for many years to
come.*

Limitations on change of purpose of
use

The BOR's role in transfers from
irrigation to municipal use is limited. The

Project legislation authorized the use
of project water for irrigation, municipal,
industrial and power generation purposes. As

Utah Projects office has limited its review to
a standard like the State Engineer.
They
analyze the proposal for potential harm to

stated above, municipal use has always been
a major component of this project

other water users, and may require mitigation

of this harm.9

In addition, to the large municipal
component at the project's inception, it was
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Interestingly, the original repayment
contract expressly authorizes the Association
to "dispose of its stock to parties desiring to

or metropolitan water districts.

In addition,

there

land-owning

use project water for domestic, municipal and
industrial purposes as permitted by the Act of

(about 3 percent) of the Association's stock.

February

Project water may be considered
appurtenant to the associated irrigated lands
because of liens or mortgages for the benefit
of the Association against all assets of the
irrigation companies. This type of security
was required from all of the irrigation
companies using Provo River Project water.

25,

192O.nw

Every

share

of

share of project water, and the delivery of
such pro rata share of project water is not
deemed detrimental to the water service for
irrigated lands served by the project, even
water

shortages

are

expected

two

private

corporations that own a total of 325 shares

Association stock is entitled to its pro rata

though

are

at

The Association's Articles of Incorporation

times.11 This language taken from the 1920
Act, seems to eliminate the need for a
"detrimental" analysis when water is changed
from irrigation to nonirrigation uses.

state that each shareholder must "give
assurances, liens and/or mortgages...to secure
payment" of the stock and all assessments, as
may be required by the Association's Board
of Directors.12
From the information
provided, however, the Association has not
required liens or mortgages specifically on
project lands. In contrast to the Strawberry
Project, the Bureau did not file liens on
Provo River Project lands.

Limitation on change of place of use
There
have
been
no
apparent
attempts to transfer Provo River project
water for use outside of the originally
contemplated service area.
The project
service area is large, covering almost all of
Salt Lake and Utah counties, and parts of
Wasatch and Summit Counties.
This area
encompasses all major municipal water user
service areas in the project vicinity.

Adjusted repayment and profits

per

Municipal users pay the same price
acre foot of project water as ,the

irrigation users. The only difference in the
repayment structure of M&I and irrigation
users has been the rate of repayment for the

As with the purpose of use, the place

of use for project water rights was broadly
described in the project water rights proofs

excess costs. This was done in accordance
with current Bureau policy that costs should
be repaid at rates approximating the users'
repayment ability.
Since the excess cost

and certificates to include a large use area

covering parts of four counties and several
cities. Therefore, all changes in the place of

contract is now paid off, all users will be
paying the same rate beginning with the 1991

use

contemplated by the transfers to
municipal use occurring to date have required
no approval by the State Engineer.

payment

There has been no regulation of
money received from the leasing or sale of
project water.
Since the 1950s the
Metropolitan District of Salt Lake City has
been leasing project water to the Salt Lake
County Conservancy District and to some
fanners in Utah County and Salt Lake
County. Metro has been receiving revenues

Appurtenancy requirements
Project water is not tied by federal
contract to specific project lands. Unlike the
Strawberry Valley Project, there are no
contracts between the individual water users

and the BOR.
The stockholders of the
Association are primarily irrigation companies
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from these lease arrangements for almost 40
years. The Bureau has never raised the issue
of regulating leases or sales of project water
in this situation nor in any of the transfers
described below.

irrigation companies that were shareholders in
the Association. This occurred as a result of
previously irrigated project lands being
developed into subdivisions and translated to
an additional 2,000 shares in the Association."

Metro District of Salt Lake City transfer

irrigation
company
stock
project and nonproject
water rights. The District is in the process of

The

represented

Between the late 1930s and the early
1940s Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City (the District) subscribed for 46,500
shares of project water in two separate

both

filing change applications with the Utah State
Engineer on the nonproject water.
With

regard to the project water rights, the transfer
to municipal use should, like the ULDC
transfer, require no change in the type of use

blocks. Then, in 1958, the District entered
an
agreement
with
the
Utah
Lake
Distributing Company (ULDC) for an
exchange of water. Under this agreement,

or place of use.

The water will be used in

the project service area for municipal
purposes. Again, the repayment obligation

the District received 15,200 shares of Provo
Water Users Association stock from ULDC

will stay the same.

The stock was endorsed by ULDC and turned

WelbyJacob exchange

in to the Association, which then issued new
certificates to the District In exchange, the
District constructed a pumping plant at the
Jordan Narrows (See Figure PR-1) and
annually delivers over 15,200 acre feet of
Utah Lake water to ULDC shareholders
formerly using the ULDC water. The District
stores the 15,200 acre feet of ULDC water in

In the 1980s, Salt Lake County Water
District (SLC Conservancy
District) purchased shares in two of the four
districts within the Provo Reservoir Water
Users Company, which is a shareholder of the
Association.
The
purchased
stock
represented about 8,400 acre feet of project
Conservancy

Deer Creek Reservoir for use in its service

water. Following the purchase, the stock was
transferred to a newly formed entity, the
Welby-Jacob Irrigation District
The SLC
Conservancy District must deliver 40,000 acre
feet out of Utah Lake to users on the Welby
and Jacob canals.
In exchange, the
Conservancy District is entitled to its share of

area.

This
transfer
required
little
involvement by the BOR. The ULDC filed
change applications with the State Engineer
to change the point of diversion for
nonprpject water rights. Project water was to
be used within the existing service area, and

project water, about 8,400 acre feet, plus
some nonproject water for a total of about
30,000 acre feet of higher quality water. The
Bureau was not involved in the transfer
except to file two change of water right
applications with the State Engineer for
Weber River Project water.

municipal use was already authorized by the
state engineer and the project documents.
The repayment requirements stayed the same.
Orem City acquisitions
In the late 1930s and early 1940s the
Metropolitan District of Orem City (the
District) subscribed for 2,254 shares of

Association stock.
Since this original
subscription the District has acquired stock in
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ENDNOTES

1.

Water and Power Resources Service Project Data Book 1033 (1981) [hereinafter Project

Data Book].
2.

43 Stat. 701.

3. The M&I users are the Metropolitan Water Districts of Salt Lake City (61,700 shares),
Prove City (8,000 shares), Orem (2,254 shares), American Fork, Lehi, and Pleasant GroveLindon (500 shares each).
4. These pre-1960 user payments were made under the original contract prior to the time the
excess costs contract was entered.

5.

See Supplemental Contract Among the United States, The Provo River Water Users'

Association and Metropolitan Water Districts, dated Nov. 16, 1959, at 2.

6. This Metropolitan District of Salt Lake City originally contracted for 46,500 acre feet, then
in 1958, acquired an additional 15,200 acre feet of project water.
7.

Proof of Appropriation for Water Rights Application No. 12230, at 39 (filed 6-25-1936).

8.

By-Laws of the Provo River Water Users Association at 3 (emphasis added).

9. This may be based on the U.S. Department of the Interior 1988 Policy Statement, Principle

3 which reads "DOI will participate in or approve transactions when there are no adverse thirdparty consequences, or when such third-party consequences will be heard and adjudicated in
appropriate State forums, or when such consequences will be mitigated to the satisfaction of the
affected parties."

10.

Repayment Contract dated June 27, 1936 at 10-11.

11.

Id. at 11.

12. Article XTV, Articles of Incorporation of Provo River Water Users Association.
13. The developers were required by Orem City to relinquish their stock in the irrigation
companies as a pre-condition to subdivision approval.
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RAPID VALLEY UNIT AND RAPID VALLEY PROJECT

RAPID VALLEY UNIT AND RAPID VALLEY PROJECT, SOUTH DAKOTA
Introduction

Rapid Creek.

The expense of having to

reroute a major highway and railroad line
caused a change in plans to build Deerfield

The Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
has constructed two projects in the Black
Hills near Rapid City, South Dakota: the
Rapid Valley Project and the Rapid Valley
Unit See Figure RV-1. The Rapid Valley
Project consists of the Deerfield Dam and
Reservoir, about 25 miles west of Rapid City,
located on Castle Creek, a tributary of Rapid
Creek. The Rapid Valley Unit, located 15
miles west of Rapid City on Rapid Creek,
consists of the Pactola Dam and Reservoir.
These facilities are operated jointly to provide
water to Rapid City and for irrigation in the

Dam on Castle Creek instead. This plan was
approved in 1942 and construction began that
same year. Water first became available from
Deerfield Reservoir in 1948.
In 1948, landowners in the Rapid
Valley Water Conservancy District and the
Bureau of Reclamation agreed to resurrect
plans
to construct
Pactola Dam
and
Reservoir. Growing water needs for Rapid
City and for nearby Ellsworth Air Force Base
increased the interest in the construction of
this dam. Moreover, the abandonment of the
railroad that ran through the proposed site
made this option more feasible. This project

Rapid Valley Water Conservancy District
This case study provides general
background
information
concerning
the
project It then considers issues related to
proposals for a change of project water use

was included in a larger plan for development
of the Missouri River basin that had been
generally authorized under terms of the Rood
Control Act of 1944. Construction of Pactola

from irrigation to urban and other uses.

Dam began in 1952 and was completed in
1956.

Project Background

FadMes and water suppfy

Setting

Deerfield Dam is an earthfill structure
that impounds Castle Creek. It has a total
capacity of 15,700 acre-feet and an active
capacity of 15,200 acre feet The average
annual discharge of Castle Creek at Deerfield
Dam is 29300 acre-feet

Rapid Creek, and its primary tributary,

Castle Creek, head in the Black Hills of
South Dakota and flow east through Rapid
City to a junction with the Cheyenne River.
An agricultural economy grew up in Rapid
Valley based on irrigation diversions from
Rapid Creek.
By 1930 the demand for
irrigation water exceeded the available supply

Pactola Dam also is an earthfill
structure. It directly impounds Rapid Creek.
Pactola has a total capacity of 99,000 acrefeet and an active capacity of 55,000 acrefeet The annual discharge of Rapid Creek

in Rapid Creek, limiting the crops that could

be grown to those that were not dependent
on full season irrigation except on those lands
with senior water rights.1
In 1937, the
Bureau
of
investigation

at Pactola averages 29,500 acre-feet

Reclamation
completed
an
of opportunities for water

storage and supply in the area.

The original
authorization in 1939 to build a project
contemplated construction of Pactola Dam on
167
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Figure RV-1. Rapid Valley Project, South Dakota
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Project operation and water uses

In ordinary years Rapid Creek and its
tributaries contain enough water to meet the
existing water needs in Rapid Valley and fill
Deerfield and Pactola Reservoirs. The water
available to the Conservancy District is

Under the Deerfield and Pactola
Reservoir Operating Criteria, dated May
1978, the two reservoirs are operated on a

pooled storage basis.2 The primary existing
commitments of water are to Rapid City and

considered a supplemental supply. Therefore,
users are supposed to have their own primary

to the Rapid Valley Water Conservancy
District. According to the Operating Criteria,
the contracts between the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Conservancy District
and the city provide the following: Rapid
City has a priority commitment of a maximum
of 7,000 acre-feet per year of available stored
water in Deerfield
Reservoir and an

water supply.
Between 1958 and 1988
average annual diversions to the Conservancy
District were 13,710 acre-feet
Of this

additional amount as

on an annual basis to Rapid City. The city's

amount

about 88 percent came from the
native flows in Rapid Creek and the
remaining 12 percent came from storage out

of Pactola.
During this same period the
storage system provided about 3,751 acre-feet

available in Pactola

diversions

from Rapid Creek during this
period averaged 8,490 acre-feet The average
total intake during this period to the Rapid
City water system was about 9,347 acre-feet.
This included an average delivery of 1,362

Reservoir for a total of 14,000 acre-feet in
the two reservoirs. The Conservancy District
is provided with a maximum of 8,000 acrefeet of stored water in Deerfield Reservoir
and can purchase additional stored water

acre-feet to Ellsworth Air Force Base. In
1988 the Rapid Valley Service Company

from Pactola Reservoir under the terms of its
contract with the Bureau.

If there is less

began taking 100 acre-feet of stored water
under its contract for the first time. Since

than 14,000 acre-feet of water available to
Rapid City in storage on May 1, storage
inflows will be credited to the city until a
total of 14,000 acre-feet has been credited to
the city for the year and all remaining water
will be available to the Conservancy District
In addition there is a contract with the Rapid

1986 C&J Sanders has been taking 40 acrefeet per year.3

The Rapid Valley Water Conservancy

District encompasses about 8,900 acres of
irrigable land. At this time about 7,203 acres

Valley Water Service Company that makes

available

600

acre-feet

are in irrigation.

of water out of

Pactola Reservoir as a third priority. And
finally there is a contract with C&J Sanders
for 60 acre-feet from Pactola Reservoir which
has a fourth priority.

of six ditch companies as well as other
irrigators. The Bureau of Reclamation places
the value of the crops grown in this area in
1987 at $808,650.

Both Deerfield and Pactola Reservoirs
There are
picnic grounds, campgrounds, and boating and
fishing access. Rapid Creek sustains a good
trout fishery. Reduced water availability in
recent years has impaired the recreational
are used as recreational facilities.

Rapid City is South Dakota's second
largest city, with a metropolitan population in
1990 of about 81,000 people. The city has
been growing at a modest rate and is
expected to continue to grow into the near
future. The demand for water for Ellsworth

uses of the reservoir and has stressed the

fishery in Rapid Creek.

There has been little

change in irrigated acreage in recent years.
Water users in the District include members

Castle Creek also

Air Force Base is expected to remain fairly

supports a good trout fishery.

constant
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per acre-foot For water beyond 13,600 acre-

Payment status for the project

feet there is an additional charge of $5 per
acre-foot According to Bruce Laymon of the
Bureau of Reclamation in Newell, South
Dakota the city's contract payment obligation

Under the 1943 contract involving
water from DeerGeld Dam, Rapid City was to

repay

$500,000

as

its

share

of

the

is $l,800,000.5

construction costs for this dam. Payments
were to be made in 40 equal installments of

$12,500 each. This obligation was completed
in 1987.

operation and maintenance charges with the
remainder going towards repayment of the
construction cost portion of the obligation.

The Conservancy District was not
obligated with any specified repayment
obligation for the construction costs of
Deerfield. Rather, it was to pay $1 per acrefoot for water delivered to it from the
reservoir. The contract is written in a form

A separate contract signed in 1961
governs the sale of water to the Rapid Valley
Water Conservancy District from Pactola.
Under this contract the District is obligated
to pay a fixed charge of $1,000 per year. In
addition, the District must pay $1.25 for each
acre-foot of water that is delivered to it from
Pactola. Since this is a service contract, it
does not specify a total repayment obligation
for the construction costs of Pactola
attributable to the irrigation use. However,
the Bureau has established a formula by
which the District payments are divided into
27 percent for O&M charges with the
remainder going towards the construction cost
obligation.
Again, according to Bruce
Laymon, the construction cost repayment
obligation for the District for Pactola
Reservoir was $2,139,214. Of this amount
the District has repaid about $29,000.
Deliveries of water to the District over the
past 30 years have averaged about 1,500 acrefeet per year. The payment required for that
water usually has not covered even the

that suggests that the payments by the
District are meant to go towards construction
costs in excess of $500,000.
There is a

provision that states that when the "actual
costs of the joint works in excess of the
Municipality's obligation have been returned
to the United States in full the District's
obligation under this article shall cease."4 In
fact, officially the District does not receive
water from Deerfield so it is not making any
payments to the U.S. for this facility.

Under the 1952 contract for water

supply to Rapid City from Pactola Dam,
Rapid City is required to make payments
based on the city's "basic total annual intake."
The contract assumes an increasing quantity
of water intake through time and uses a

correspondingly
increasing
basic
annual
payment requirement At present the city is

associated O&M costs.6

in the year 31 to 35 of the contract obligation
which assumes a basic total annual intake of
10,700 acre-feet of water and requires a basic
annual payment of $96,000.
A second

Project water entitlement

As mentioned, the parties have agreed
to the operation of Pactola and Deerfield
Reservoirs on a pooled storage basis. The
1943 contract governing Deerfield Reservoir
specifies that Rapid City is to have a

schedule in the contract sets payment for any
water that is used beyond the basic intake.
In

the year 31

to 35

category

the

Of this amount the city has

paid about $930,000. The Bureau uses a
formula to divide up the payments and
attributes 36 percent of the payments to the

next

increment of water goes from 10,700 to
13,600 acre-feet. Any water in this increment

"preferred" use of 7,000 acre-feet of water for

of use must be paid for at the rate of $15.86
169

Under the 1961 contract for water
supply
to
the
Rapid
Valley
Water
Conservancy District from Pactola, water is
available to the District in an undefined

domestic, municipal and industrial purposes
and that the Conservancy District is given a
"junior priority" to 8,000 acre-feet of water

for domestic and irrigation purposes. Under
this contract, water only becomes available to

amount but subject to the senior rights of
Rapid City. The city's rights are specified to
require an estimated storage reservation of

the District if there is sufficient water in
storage to supply the full 7,000 acre-feet

14,000 acre-feet14 This includes the 7,000
acre-feet of water in Deerfield Reservoir.
Under this contract the Conservancy District
explicitly agrees to the operation of Pactola
and Deerfield Reservoirs on a pooled storage

entitlement of Rapid City. The city's water
entitlement extends over a full water year
while the District's entitlement is only for the

irrigation season.
Any portion of the
entitlement not used at the end of the water
year is subject to disposal by the United
States so long as there is "no reasonable
likelihood" that such disposal will result in

basis. Thus, the District may receive water
from Pactola on the basis of availability which
is a function primarily of satisfaction of the
city's requirements. The District pays $1,000
per year and an additional payment of $ 1.25
for each acre-foot of water requested. The

less than full availability of the following
season's water supply.7 This contract is in the
form of a "repayment" agreement

contract is for a 40 year term but specifically

The 1952 contract involving water
supply from Pactola for Rapid City states that

provides for renewal.15

water is to be made available to the city in
the quantities "requested but not in excess of
the City's needs for the then current water
year...."* Section 5 of the contract specifies a
schedule of an agreed "basic total annual
intake" for a series of 5 year blocks. The
basic total annual intake includes "all metered
water from every source taken by the City
into its water system^.."9 The contract further
provides that if Rapid City's need exceeds the
designated basic total annual intake, the
Bureau will "furnish to the City its needed
additional water to the extent that water is
available."10 The contract further provides
that the City will furnish Ellsworth Air Force
Base with up to 1,810 acre-feet of water per

The 1982 contract with the Rapid
Valley Water Service Company contemplates
a supply of up to 600 acre-feet of water per
year from Pactola Reservoir as supplemental

year."

Changes of Project Water Use

supply for the company's domestic and
residential purposes.16 Expected water use is

based on an estimate of the demand for
water during the 10 year life of the contract

(between 1982 and 1992) during which
population is expected to increase in the
service area. The service company agrees to
make an annual payment of $2,600. The first
100 acre-feet of water that is supplied costs
$16 an acre-foot Additional water costs $2
an acre-foot

The contract also recognizes the

continued existence of the city's priority right
to 7,000 acre-feet of storage in Deerfield
Reservoir and recognizes the right of the

For
considerable

United States to pool the stored waters of

several

reasons

interest

in

there

developing

is
new

arrangements for the use of the water
available from the Rapid Valley storage

the two reservoirs.13 This contract is in the
form of a "service" agreement The contract
expires at the end of the 40 year term (in
October 1992), but the city has a right to
renewal.13

system.

A drought in the Black Hills region

has caused water levels in the reservoirs to
decline sharply.

Between September 1987

and September 1989 reservoir storage in
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Pactola dropped from 49,495 acre-feet to

25,547 acre-feet."

of purchasing the water entitlements held by
users
in the conservancy district and
transferring these entitlements to urban use.
Among the issues to be considered are the
nature of the legal entitlement to water in
Bureau facilities held by users within the
conservancy
district,
and
under
what
circumstances if any these entitlements may
be transferred out of the District for urban

In February 1991, levels

dropped to about 24,000 acre-feet A second

factor is the continued growth of population
in Rapid City and a corresponding need to
ensure a water supply for that growth. At
the same time, agricultural activity in the area
downstream of the city has been changing.
In some areas residential development has
been taking the place of irrigated farms.
There has been some shift from full-time
farming to part-time fanning in certain areas.
Perhaps most importantly, the 1952 contract
between the Bureau and Rapid City will
come up for renewal in 1992.

water use.

Nature of the district's entitlement

The Rapid Valley Water Conservancy
District has entitlements to the supply of
water based on two contracts.
The 1943
contract involves the Bureau, Rapid City, and

In 1989 the governor of South Dakota
requested the Bureau of Reclamation to study
ways in which the water supply in the Rapid
Valley could be better managed to meet

present and future demands.

the

District

This

contract

up to 8,000 acre-feet of water from that

In its March

available out of DeerOeld Reservoir. This is
a permanent commitment of water in the
nature of a repayment contract and clearly
not a service contract With the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior, the Conservancy
District may be able to assign some or all of
its interest in this contract to another party
including the city.
The interest is in the
stored water that is available during the
period of time between April 30 and October

1990
report,
"Rapid
Valley
Water
Management Study," the Bureau identified
eleven alternatives that would either conserve
the water supply, augment the water supply
or in some other way improve water
availability.
Of particular interest for this
case study was the reservoir management
alternative.
The report points out that

existing water contracts commit an annual
right of delivery to the four primary
contractors rather than a commitment of
storage space in the projects.

Conservancy

provides the District with a junior priority of

1 beyond the 7,000 acre-feet that is
committed to the city and the 600 acre-feet
that is reserved to the Bureau.

The report

notes the expectation that the annual water
supply from Rapid Creek normally will be
enough to meet most of the area's needs and

The 1961 service contract for the

supply of water from Pactola Reservoir
introduces considerable ambiguity into the

that the storage supply was to serve as a
supplemental supply. The report recommends
renegotiation of the contracts to establish
storage rights for the users.

position

of the District
This contract
provides that Pactola and DeerCeld are to be
operated as pooled reservoirs. The contract
recognizes the entitlement provided under the
1943 contract to up to 8,000 acre-feet of
water stored in Deerfield.
No particular
water supply is specified for the District from
Pactola. The contract provides that on May

Rapid City has expressed its interest
in increasing its share of the water supply
from the storage projects.
It has not
committed to any particular strategy for

1st of each year the United States will notify
the District concerning the amount of water

accomplishing this objective. For purposes of
this case study, we here analyze the possibility
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only an average of 1,493 acre-feet of water

available for consumptive use in both
reservoirs. The notice is to state in which
reservoir the water is stored and to specify
the amount held in each reservoir that is for

from Pactola Reservoir.

Under the 1943 Contract it is clear
that the District holds the right to receive
deliveries of up to 8,000 acre-feet of water
out of storage in Deerfield. No one else has
rights to receive this water. This contract is

the use of Rapid City in that year. Subject
to the city's rights, the District then can
request the supply of water as available from
the system.

of

the

repayment

form,

ordinarily

contemplating a permanent commitment of
water delivery. Since the permanent right to

The 1961 contract requires the
District not to supply water under this
contract "to anyone other than an owner or
operator of irrigated lands within the District,
or for other than domestic, stockwatering, or
agricultural uses."11
This provision also
specifies that if there is water available to the
District "in excess of the amount required for
the irrigation of its lands," the District may
supply water "for minor industrial uses at
points or places where it is not economically
feasible to obtain water from other sources."19
District water supplied for such industrial uses
must be paid for at the rate of $14.61 per
acre-foot

the supply of water is committed to

the

District, the District and its users should be
considered to hold the water right.
The
transferability of this water right then would
turn primarily on South Dakota law, subject

to contract provisions and other federal law.
This analysis is made less certain,
however, by several other factors. First, the
1943 Contract contemplated the possible

In evaluating the transferability of a
appropriative water right it is

construction of another storage project that
was to be for the primary benefit of the
Conservancy District
In fact, this facility
never was built under this contract. Deerfield
Reservoir was expected to cost $500,000." In
return for receiving a priority right to 7,000

customary to consider the extent of the
historical use under the right to determine

acre-feet of water from this reservoir the city
agreed to pay to the U.S. this $500,000 over

normal

the quantity of water that may be
transferable. The 1989 summary of storage
water available in the system shows the
amount of water in the two reservoirs
considered to be available to the District
between 1958 and 1988.30 It also summarizes
the diversions of water by the Conservancy
District from these reservoirs. Over this 30
year period, the average quantity of water
stored in Deerfield available to the District
was 6335 acre-feet and the average quantity
of water available in Pactola was 41,561 acrefeet
However, the actual diversions from
these reservoirs during this time period taken
by the District present a very different
picture. The District has not officially taken
any water from Deerfield since 1960. And,
between 1960 and 1988, the District took

a 40 year period.0 The District was obligated
only to pay $1.00 per acre-foot for water
actually delivered to it from the reservoir.
Apparently, the District is not considered to
receive water from Deerfield under this
arrangement
Since the District members

have never beneficially used water from
Deerfield it does not appear that water rights
associated with Deerfield have ever vested
with the District or its members.
The District's interest in water from
Pactola Reservoir is based on a water service
contract Unlike a repayment contract, this

agreement does not require that the cost of
the storage facilities attributable to the user's
water supply be repaid within 40 years.
Rather, these contracts, authorized under the
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1939 Reclamation Project Act, provide a
commitment from the U.S. to a supply of
water for an indefinite period but under

rights of Rapid City but senior to any
subsequent
water
service
commitments.
Moreover, that right appears to extend to
whatever water is available in Pactola
Reservoir beyond that committed to Rapid
City.
No particular quantity is specified.
This arrangement may be continued under
the upcoming contract renewal if the District
wishes to do so. Under these circumstances
the transferable interest held by the members
of the District appears to be in the contract

contract terms subject to renegotiation at the

end of the original contract term.
The
District has a clear statutory right of renewal
for the water supply but this right applies
only to contracts such as these that are for
irrigation use.23

The nature of the water right held
under such an arrangement is not clear.24 On

rather than in water rights that may have
vested as a matter of state and federal law.

the one hand, it can be argued that the water
rights have vested with the District and the
users, at least to the extent that the water
has been applied to beneficial use. The U.S.
is simply the "carrier" of the water to the
District The carrier arrangement is defined
by the contract The contract also may place

Other issues

In addition to determining the nature
of the water rights held by the District and its
members, there are at least four other factors

that must be considered: possible limitations
affecting a change in the purpose of project
water use; possible limitations affecting a
change in the place of use of project water;
possible changes in the payment for project
water; and environmental protection.

certain limitations or requirements on the use
of the water but the fundamental right to

divert the water derives from the beneficial
use made by the irrigators themselves.
Alternatively, it can be argued that

the irrigators themselves have not made a
permanent commitment to the use of the

Purpose and place of use

water since they elected to take a service
The

contract rather than a repayment contract

Rapid

Valley

projects

are

somewhat unusual Bureau of Reclamation
projects in that the irrigation function has
always been secondary to the municipal water
supply function. The authorizations for both
Deerfield and Pactola specifically include
municipal and industrial use as well as
irrigation.
The contract for Deerfield

Almost certainly this choice was made
because of a determination that the District
could not pay the full cost of its share of the
construction expenses for Pactola within the
required 40 year period. Especially since this
supply represents only supplemental water for

the District which it uses rather erratically,23

provides a first priority to Rapid City's use of
stored water.
Interestingly, the contract
provides a means of making unused municipal
water temporarily available for irrigation but
does not have a provision for shifting unused
irrigation water to municipal use.27

full repayment in the original contact would

have made for some very expensive water.
Vesting of a right based on use is
complicated by the fact that use during the 30
year period from 1960 to 1989 ranged from 0
to 8,638 acre-feet and averaged about 1,500
acre-feet26

Because the projects clearly envisioned
a municipal use by Rapid City, there should
be no direct barriers to changes that would
allow some additional use of project water by

Thus, the District and its users may be

viewed as having a continued right of service
from the water stored in Pactola junior to the
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National Environmental Policy Act We have

Rapid City. The primary consideration would

be whether any type of transfer would "impair
the efficiency of the project for irrigation
purposes."*
Unfortunately, there is no
guidance concerning this standard. Changes

little information about the fishery in Castle
Creek, Rapid Creek, or the reservoirs but
there may be a need to address issues related
to instream flow values in considering the

to other types of water use, such as for
fishery purposes, are less certain because of
the lack of authorization for the use of
project facilities for this purpose.

effects of an increased consumptive use of
project water. Very likely, any arrangement
allowing for increased municipal use of
project water would need to address reservoir
and stream conditions and mitigate any
adverse effects on these values associated

Charges for project water

with the new arrangement
The actual construction costs for
Deerfield and Pactola Dams have not yet
been repaid. Only about half of the actual
costs are considered reimbursable and less
than 20 percent of these costs have recovered
to date. Payments made by the Conservancy

District have not even been enough to cover
the full O&M costs associated with the water
delivered.

Under these circumstances there may
be a basis for the Bureau to establish a
municipal and industrial rate for any
additional water that is delivered from the
project for these purposes. One approach

would be to establish a rate based on a
schedule that would accomplish the desired
repayment of construction costs (and cover
O&M costs) during some specified period of
time. Another would be to price this water
as "Additional Water" under the existing
contract for Pactola. A third possibility would
be to price the water to be competitive with
other water supply options for the city. At
present there is no guidance concerning the
approach the BOR should take.

Environmental considerations
Any arrangement that involves a
change in the existing commitment of water
from the Rapid Valley projects will require
the approval of the Bureau of Reclamation.
Such a federal action raises the need for at
least an environmental assessment under the
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STRAWBERRY VALLEY PROJECT

STRAWBERRY VALLEY PROJECT, UTAH
Background

user,, whereby the users agreed to pay the
U.S. in exchange for project water and

The Strawberry Valley Project (SVP)
irrigated acreage is located in the Spanish
Fork area about 3 miles south to 25 miles
southwest of Provo (See Figure SV-1). The

benefits.

The irrigation distribution portion of
the project was completed in 1915 and the
first water delivered that year. Operation and
maintenance of the storage portion of the
project was initially handled by the United

project area covers about 43,000 irrigable
acres and project features include the
Strawberry Dam and Reservoir, several feeder

for irrigation, with incidental domestic, power

States until 1926 when the Strawberry Water
Users Association took over operations. The
Association, formed in 1922, brought together
many of the individual irrigators and irrigation
districts that had been receiving water from
the project It traded shares of stock in the
Association in exchange for a deed of
conveyance from persons holding rights to
receive project water on the basis of one
share of stock for each acre foot of project
water entitlement.3 The Association entered

and stock watering uses.

a repayment contract with the United States

canals and a four mile long tunnel that
carries the stored water from the Colorado
River basin into the BonneviUe basin. There
are
three
project
power
plants,
one
constructed by the Bureau in 1906 and the
other two by the Strawberry Water Users
Association in 1937 and 1942, the project
operating agency.
The old Strawberry

Reservoir had a capacity of 283,000 acre
feet.1 Project water was authorized primarily

in 1926, and supplemental and amendatory

first

contracts in 1928 and 1940.4 The Association

Bureau of Reclamation projects, authorized in
1905.3 Agricultural use in the area had begun

now has about 1200 stockholders representing
about 95 percent of the rights to receive

almost a half century earlier, with low
summer river flows limiting development of
the irrigable lands. The project was intended
to provide a much needed supplemental water
supply for about 23,000 acres of existing
farmland and 20,000 acres of new farmland,
thus improving the economic conditions of
the
area.
Additionally,
the
initial
hydroelectric generating plant was built to
provide power for construction of the tunnel.
Now all three plants provide power for
project operations, residential and commercial

water from the project

The

Project was one of the

Project Costs
The original project construction costs

totaled

$3,502,479.

Of

this

amount,

$3,352,698 was repaid by the irrigators, with
the balance attributable to contributions by
other entities.

The final irrigation payment

was made in 1974.
The Association has taken out a
rehabilitation and betterment (R&B) loan

uses.

with the Bureau in the amount of $7,372,000.
The loan is being used to replace a diversion

Between 1914 and 1917 the U.S.
entered into three contracts with the cities of

structure on the Spanish Fork River and to

Payson, Springville (through the Springville
Irrigation District) and Spanish Fork for large
blocks of project water.
The U.S. also
entered individual contracts with each water

line a canal and replace some sections with
pipe.
The Association began making
payments on this loan in 1988 and has paid
$171,2:00 to date.
The loan payments
178

!

.e

CQ

Hi

U

1

•r->

O

1-1

OJ

co
u
CO

I
CO
u

60

178A

increase over time with a 22f year payout
term.
The increases correspond to the
satisfaction of other, private loans taken out
by the Association and the Springville and
Mapleton Irrigation Districts.5
Payment

Solicitor, project water rights are "owned" by
the United States, and remain subject to all
terms of the repayment contract except for
the repayment obligation.6
The original
application for Strawberry Reservoir storage

comes from power revenues.

was filed by the Strawberry Valley Water
Users Association in 1906.7 The application
was subsequently assigned to the U.S. and
resulted in a final certificate for 100,000 acre
feet of storage. The U.S. filed additional
applications for 60,000 acre feet of storage in
about 1910, and 9,000 acre feet in the 1930s.
This 9,000 was reduced to 6,779 during the
application process.* The U.S. also holds title
to over 500 cfc of direct flow rights from the
Spanish Fork River.9 There is a very small

The water users currently pay to the

Association $1 per share (acre foot) annually
for construction and for their share of
operation and maintenance costs. They also
pay to their respective canal company an
assessment for delivery to the fanners. In
addition, the Association receives substantial
revenues from the three project hydroelectric
power plants to use for project improvements.
All power facility construction costs have
been repaid by the Association. The plants
have been operated by the Association for
several years.

amount, about 3 percent, of project water
that is owned by individual users. In addition,
the Association holds title to direct flow
rights for stock watering, domestic use and
hydro-electric power generation.

Water Rights
Between about 1908 and 1914, the

Description of water rights

Bureau had each water user sign a water

application that was essentially a contract to
The Association manages both direct
Clow and storage rights. Project water rights

guarantee that the user would pay his share

include over 166,000 acre feet of Strawberry
Reservoir storage rights, and over 500 cfc of

by placing a lien on the property and water.
Once the project was paid out in the 1970s,
the Bureau began issuing each user a
certificate recognizing that they had paid in
full for a specific amount of project water
and releasing the liens."

of the construction repayment obligation and

direct flow rights from Spanish Fork River.

Since the Central

Utah Project

is being

constructed over the area covered by the

original SVP, it has become necessary to
negotiate an operating agreement that will
preserve the original project water supply and

Allocation ofproject water

power rights. These agreements are currently
In

being negotiated between Strawberry Water
Users Association and Central Utah Water
Conservancy District.

Association

March
reviews

of
the

each

year,

projected

the
water

supply and makes a decision as to whether

project users will get 100 percent of their
allocated project water, or something less or

Title to project water rights

more.

Each share of Association stock is

entitled to one acre foot of water annually if
the supply is 100 percent Even 100 percent
may not provide adequate irrigation in some
project areas. Users served by the HighLine

Title to project water rights is in the
name of the United States, even though the
project is now paid out According to the
position taken by the Bureau and the
Regional

Canal, for example, are entitled to only two
179

acre feet per acre if the supply is

percent

Proposed Spanish Fork exchange

100

This amount is only 50 percent of

The City of Spanish Fork, with a
population of about
13,000, originally
purchased 440 shares of Strawberry Valley
project water.
Subsequently, the city has

what the Utah State Engineer considers a full
water supply for that land Following the
Association's
March
assessment
and
determination, each canal company is sent
notice of the decision, along with a list of
water users and the number of shares held by
each user. The canal companies must notify

tried to acquire an additional 1100 shares by
contract or through the annexation of project

lands. Spanish Fork currently is entitled to
about 440 acre feet annually of project water
and has requested approval from the
Association for the use of about 1160 acre

the Association if there is any change to the
user list

feet The city is supplying water to about
750 acres of annexed project lands. On the
440 acre feet, the city pays the irrigation
maintenance rate and $1 per share.
The
water is delivered through ditches, and is used
for lawns, gardens and other irrigation-related

Historically, the Association has been
able to deliver 100 percent of users allocated
project water about two-thirds of the time.

During the drought years of 1934 and 1963,
25,700 acre feet and 40,000 acre feet,

respectively, were released from storage and
delivered to users. Between 1920 and 1982,
an average of 61,000 acre feet of project
water

was

delivered

from

storage

to

uses.

an

A few years ago, the city contacted

average of about 41,000 acres of land.

the Strawberry Water Users Association and
proposed an agreement that would allow the

Strawberry Valley Project Transfers

city to exchange project water for higher
quality spring water and deliver the cleaner

Strawberry
Valley
Project
was
developed at a time when primarily irrigation
and some domestic, power and stockwatering

water through the city's domestic or culinary
pipeline.
This exchange would occur only

uses were contemplated.

city's predominant water use during this
period is for irrigation of lawns and gardens,

during the irrigation season.

Recently, some of

the local municipalities have expressed an
interest in using additional project water. In

the

city

argued

that

the

Because the

project

water

some cases, they want to use the water only

effectively would remain in irrigation use.

for lawn and garden irrigation.
In other
cases, they would like to be able to exchange
or trade the water for higher quality water

Presently,

that can be used for domestic purposes. It is
unclear whether the water can be transferred
to M&I use, how such a transfer should be
effected and how much the municipality
should be charged for the use of the water.

The proposal was submitted by
Spanish Fork City to the Bureau of
Reclamation for approval.
Initially, the
Bureau took the position that the proposal
would cause the delivered water to be

The Association is presently conducting a
study of how transfers might be carried out
and developing a policy to submit to the
Secretary of the Interior for approval.

classified as domestic water.12 As a result, the

all

city domestic water is

run

through a single pipeline.11

proposal would need the approval of the

Secretary of the Interior. Further, the water
would have to be declared "surplus" to project
needs and the new use could not impair the
efficiency of the project for irrigation

purposes.13
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One month later, the Bureau

changed its position, following a meeting

Association rules and policies

between the city and Bureau staff.
The
proposal was referred to as a delivery
contract only, and, the Bureau agreed, would
involve no change in use. Rather, the change
was defined as a change in the method of
delivery to subdivided tracts. In addition to
the lack of change of use, the Bureau relied
on the fact that the original project
repayment obligation had been fully repaid by
the Association.14

The Strawberry Valley Water Users
Association is governed by federal reclamation
laws, contracts, Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws. Under Article VI of the Articles of
Incorporation, water rights are transferable to
another parcel of land only by and with the
consent of the Association. There are no
provisions governing transfers except transfers
to different project lands or to a new owner
of the same project lands.

Spanish Fork City patterned its
proposal after the agreement between the
City of Phoenix and the Salt River Water
Users Association. This agreement gives the

Limitations on change of purpose of
use

City of Phoenix the right to take and deliver
project water within the city limits to Salt
River Project lands to which the water is

Project

legislation

does

recognize

domestic (municipal and industrial) uses of
project water. Therefore, the Bureau could
look to the 1906 Act*, 1920 Act14 or the 1939
Act17 for authority to change the use to
nonirrigation purposes. The 1906 Townsite
Act states that the Secretary of the Interior
shall "provide for water rights in [an] amount
he may deem necessary" for the towns
established under the Act18 No findings of
nonimpairment of other project purposes are
required. In contrast, the 1920 Act requires
a finding that there is no detriment to the
water service for the irrigation project and no
detriment to the rights of prior appropriators.

appurtenant, and the obligation to collect and
pay all assessments and charges on behalf of
the individual land owners.

Following approval by the Association,
and signature by the City of Spanish Fork,
the agreement was submitted to the Bureau's
Utah Projects Office. The Bureau withheld
approval pending an amendment that would
clarify that

the water would be used to
irrigate a specific plot of land with
appurtenant project water rights. Spanish

There must also be a showing that there is
no other practicable source of water supply
for the new purpose and there must be
approval by the repayment entity.19 Similarly,
the 1939 Act requires a finding that the
nonirrigation use will not impair the efficiency
of the project for irrigation purposes.30

Fork drafted a change to address this
concern, and the change is now before the
Association's Board for approval The most
current information received is that the
Association's Board has delayed the decision
and at the present time will not sign the
revised agreement until the adoption of a
policy and approval of the policy by the
Secretary of the Interior.
As mentioned

In various letters to the Association
and municipalities between 1975 and 1990,
the Bureau has taken somewhat different
positions on what is required prior to the
transfer of project water from irrigation to
M&I uses.
In response to general
Association inquiries in the late 1970s, the
Bureau stated that any transfer of project

above, the Association has undertaken a study
of its transfer policy and will likely require
cities to convert the water historically used
for commercial irrigation to municipal use and
require conditions to protect the Association's
contractual agreements.
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Under the repayment contract, the
Association is granted the right to transfer

water to M&I use would have to be preapproved by the Secretary of the Interior.21
A few years later the Bureau reiterated this

project water rights from marginal lands to

view that project water may be transferred to

better lands, or to the project water supply

M&I purposes with the approval of the
Secretary, under the general authority of

for use in the project generally until it is
transferred for use on other project lands.
No such transfer is effective unless the

Section 9(c) of the 1939 Act22 However, the
Secretary may not approve a transfer of M&I
water until there is a finding that the new use
would not impair the efficiency of the project
for irrigation

purposes.

Even with

transfer agreement is pre-approved by the

Secretary of the Interior.2*

In a 1986 letter,

a Bureau official indicated that water in the
project supply may be marketed by the

this

finding, the new uses would be subject to

Association

Secretarial review and approval, and M&I
uses would be subject to terms and conditions

Secretary of the Interior.30

irrigation

for

uses

nonirrigation
with

the

as

well

approval

of

as
the

consistent with the Reclamation Project Act23
In

the

1970s,

some

of

the

municipalities in the project area annexed
project lands and assumed that they thereby
acquired Project water shares. This practice

In the mid 1980s, the Association
entered a temporary agreement to sell water
for public health purposes to the Strawberry
Recreation
Company for
use
at
the
Company's summer cottages at Strawberry
Reservoir until the Central Utah Project took
over the operation in 1984. When asked to
approve the agreement, the Bureau stated

was

terminated

when

the

Bureau

raised

objections, but the cities' still maintain a
separate accounting system for the water tied
to the subdivided project lands. In effect, the

cities have been delivering some water for the
benefit of those holding water entitlements

that a change of use to municipal and
industrial use would require a determination
that the irrigation water supply to agricultural
lands would not be adversely affected.34 This
standard is most likely from the 1939
Reclamation Project Act25 In the same year,
the Bureau stated that if project water were
acquired by a municipality, the cost for the

from the Association, and collecting
assessments for this project, water.31

the

Near the project's inception, the
Bureau filed liens on all project land with the
county recorder. This was done to assure

repayment of the construction obligation.
These liens have just recently been released
as the user certificates, described above, were
issued. However, the power to assess a lien
upon
a
shareholders
interest
in
the
Association is retained by the Association by
virtue of its contractual agreements with each
user.32

right to use such water would be determined
by the Bureau.26
Restrictions on change ofplace of use

Project water is appurtenant to
specific parcels of land according to the
Articles of Incorporation of the Association.27

Shareholders of the Association have a right

Nature of interest held by user

to use a specific quantity of water on their
lands. The water may be transferred to other
lands (to which they become appurtenant)
only with the consent of the Association.
The Association's rules prohibit the use of
project water except on project lands.2*

According to a 1986 letter from the
Bureau, holders of the right to use Strawberry

Valley Project water have the right in
perpetuity for irrigation purposes on a
specific parcel of land.
The users can
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transfer this right to another parcel of land
for irrigation use but cannot transfer this
right to municipalities or other water districts
absent express Secretarial approval.33

contracts, deeds of conveyance and Articles of
Incorporation.
The
Association
has
undertaken a comprehensive study on the
overall water supply and demand in the
project vicinity, with a view towards future
transfers of project water to municipal use.

Adjusted repayments and profits

The Association anticipates requiring a formal
change to domestic use under contracts, state
law and the 1920 Reclamation Act.
The
Bureau has not taken a position on who

To date, there has been no transfer of
project water involving an adjustment of the
payment obligation. The project has been
paid out since 1974.
The R&B loan

should receive any additional revenues
collected from new domestic uses.36

payments are expected to come from power

and investment revenues, and from irrigator
payments.
All irrigators pay an annual

Effect ofReclamation Reform Act

assessment to the Association, one dollar per
share or acre foot, to cover their share of the
R&B loan. This obligation has stayed the
same in all past irrigation to irrigation
transfers, but is subject to change if the

Although the RRA's requirements
may be triggered by future transfers to
municipal
users
that
would
confer
supplemental or additional benefits on the

repayment obligation changes.

Association, the current proposal by Spanish
Fork City was determined by the Bureau not

water if there is a transfer to municipal use.

to require certification under the Act. The
reason given was N[s]ince the City is only
delivering water for the benefit of those

In a 1986 letter to the City of Payson, the
Bureau
stated
generally
that,
under

holding water deeds (project entitlements),
there are no additional benefits provided."37

Reclamation Law, municipal use must be

Therefore, the Bureau
require certification.

The Bureau has indicated that there
may be an increase in the cost of project

repaid with interest while irrigation use must

be repaid without interest. Additionally, at
the time project water is acquired by a

Since the

Both the Bureau and the Association
are in the process of developing policies,
rules, and guidelines to govern future requests
for municipal use of project water. The Utah
Projects office has recently indicated that any

future exchange or transfer proposal by
municipalities for Strawberry Valley Project
water will likely be subject to a higher
Secretarial

approval.33

rate

as

well

However,

to

Association imposes such a requirement, the
cities will likely be prohibited from structuring
the transfer to appear as if there is no
change in use. Any use by the cities, even
for lawn and garden irrigation, will be subject
to the new rate. This type of change, to
allow municipal use, may require an
amendment to the repayment contract in light
of a Solicitor's opinion that the original
contract remains in effect38 There has also

why the interest provision would be relevant.

repayment

need

If the Bureau follows through with

project was paid out in 1974, it is not clear

municipal

no

plans to make all future municipal users pay
a higher rate for the water, or the

municipality, "the cost for the right to use

such water will be determined."34

saw

been correspondence from the Bureau
indicating that a transfer to municipal use

as

would be subject to terms and conditions
imposed by the Secretary of the Interior.39 If
the repayment contract is amended, the

the

Association is approaching the subject with
care to avoid a problem with existing
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Reclamation Reform Act would be applicable.
Additional revenues to the Association would
seem to be a clear additional or supplemental
benefit under the RRA.
Other potential municipal usen

Spanish

Fork

is

not

the only
may be
In 1916,
the City of Payson purchased 1,200 shares of
project water. Later, the city proposed the
additional purchase of 722 shares that it had
acquired when project lands were annexed.
However, the Association and the Bureau
never approved of the city's acquisition of this

municipality in the area that
interested in using project water.

additional 722 shares, and no project water
has been delivered to the city under these
shares. Currently, the city is growing and is
actively looking for an additional domestic
water supply. Payson would be interested in

acquiring project water depending on the
cost Additionally, the nearby cities of Salem,
Springville and Mapleton are growing and will
likely be needing additional domestic water.
For these communities, there are not
many alternatives to trying to transfer project
water. All of the cities have been growing
and their original water supplies are no

longer adequate. Most rely on springs and
wells fed by annual precipitation. There has
been a drought for four years now, and the
springs and wells are producing at about 20
percent of their normal capacity.
The
Association anticipates that the cities' needs
will first be satisfied by transfers of private
agricultural water rights and then by Central
Utah Project M&I and irrigation water, prior
to any transfer of Strawberry Valley Project
water.40
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ENDNOTES

1. The Central Utah Project enlarged the reservoir to over one million acre-feet as a part of
the Bonneville Unit by construction of the Soldier Creek Dam.

2. Authorized by the Secretary of the Interior on Dec. 15, 1905 under the provisions of the
Reclamation Act of 1902.
3. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n v. United Sates, 611 R2d 838, 840 n. 2 (Ct of Claims 1979).
4. See contracts dated Sept 28, 1926, Nov. 20, 1928 and Oct. 9, 1940 between the United
States and Strawberry Water Users Association.

5. The private loans were used to cover replacement of facilities since these costs are not
permitted under federal laws authorizing R&B loans.
6. See Letter to Strawberry Water Users Association from John W. Jensen, Project Manager,
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Sept 14, 1977); Memorandum to Project Manager, Central Utah
Projects Office, Water and Power Resources Service from Roland G. Robinson, Asst. Regional
Solicitor, U.S. Dept of the Interior (May 28, 1980) and Letter to Milton Theobald, Manager,
Strawberry Water Users Association from N.W Plummer, Regional Director, Water and Power
Resources Service (Feb. 13, 1981).

7. This earlier Association disbanded in 1914, and there was no Association representing users
again until 1922 when Strawberry Water Users Association was formed.
8. See Utah State Engineer File Nos. 43-3102 and 43-1259.

9. See Utah State Engineer File Nos. 51-1002, 51-1004 and 51-1016.

10. In their individual contracts with the Bureau, the users agreed to join any future
association that might be formed, and to surrender their project rights to the Association in
exchange for an interest in the Association. However, the users individual repayment obligation
remained intact, and when they paid out this obligation, the Bureau issued each user a "final
water right certificate" stating that the user has paid in full for his water right In these final
certificates, the water right is tied to a specific parcel of land, subject to the annual O & M
charges.

11. The exchange plan would not be implemented if the city converts to a dual delivery system.
The city is currently studying this possibility. If it converts, the lower quality project water
could be delivered for irrigation-only use.

12. The term "domestic use" is defined to include "household, stock, municipal, mining, milling,
industrial and other like purposes," but does not include the generation of electrical power. See
Colorado River Compact of Dec. 21, 1928, at art II (h).
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13. See Letter to John W. Anderson from Clifford I. Barrett, Regional Director, U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation (Apr. 13, 1988).

14. See Letter to John W. Anderson from Clifford I. Barrett, Regional Director, U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation (May 17, 1988).

15. 34 Stat 116, 43 U.S.C § 567.
16.

41 StaL 451, 43 U.S.C. § 521.

J

17. 53 Stat 1187, 43 U.S.C. § 485.

■i-

18. 34 Stat 116, 43 U.S.C § 567. A 1911 Land Decision found that this statute prohibited the
Secretary from entering contracts with individuals whose lands had been subdivided into town
lots; that project water may be supplied only to towns that will handle the distribution to its
inhabitants. See Instructions, 39 L.D. 591 (1911). However, a later Solicitor's Opinion clarified

}
.j

j

that the Secretary has the discretion to contract with towns or directly with water users owning

]

1916, Commission Minutes 147, Docket 658.

?

19. See 43 U.S.C § 52.

'"

20. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c).

\

lots or tracts of land within the towns. Opinion, Chief Counsel, Reclamation Service, Feb. 22,

>

21. See Letter to Strawberry Water Users Association from John W. Jensen, Project Manager,
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Sept 14, 1977).
22.

•

43 U.S.C § 485h(c).
■

23. See Letter to Milton Theobald, Manager, Strawberry Water Users Association, from N.W.

»

\

Plummer, Regional Director, Water and Power Resources Service (Feb. 13, 1981).
24. See Letter to Mr. Milton V. Theobald from P. Kirt Carpenter, Projects Manager, U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (July 21, 1986). It should be noted that the Association has a current
agreement with another developer, Bryant's Fort, for the same purpose. There apparently was
never a change of use request with the Bureau or with the State Engineer.

j
,-..
\

25. See Letter to Rodney W. Watkins, Administrator, Payson City from P. Kirt Carpenter,

Projects Manager, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Sept 2, 1986).

'

26. Id.
27.

See Article VI, Articles of Incorporation, Strawberry Water Users Association.

28.

Id. at Article XV.

■
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29. See Amendatory Contract dated OcL 9, 1940 at Article 24; and Letter to Mr. Milton
Theobald, Manager, Strawberry Water Users Association, from N.W. Plummer, Regional
Director, Water and Power Resources Service (Feb. 13, 1981).

30. And subject to imposed conditions and terms, see Letter to Rodney W. Watkins,
Administrator, Payson City from Lawrence G. Moore for P. Kin Carpenter, Projects Manager,
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Sept. 2, 1986).

31. See Letter to Mr. John W. Anderson, Attorney for Spanish Fork City from W. J. Hirschi,
for Clifford I. Barrett, Regional Director, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (May 17, 1988).
32.

See deeds of conveyance between each user and the Association; most are dated between

1922 and 1926.

33.

See Letter to Rodney W. Watkins, supra at 1. The users right is conditioned on the users
compliance with the terms of the Association's Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, Contract and
Deeds of Conveyances.
34.

See Letter to Rodney W. Watkins, supra.

35. Telephone conversation with Lee McQuivey, Utah Projects Office, Bureau of Reclamation
(Oct 16, 1990).

36. Telephone conversation with LaVar Richmond, Utah Projects Office, Bureau of
Reclamation (Oct 30, 1990). The Bureau has discussed whether the money should go to the
Bureau to recoup lost profits or to pay off the R&B loan, or to the Association.
37.

See Letter to John W. Anderson, supra at 1.

38. Memorandum from Regional Solicitor Reid W. Nelson to Projects Manager, Central Utah
Projects Office (Jan. 15, 1980).

39. See Id., see also Letter to Rodney W. Watkins, supra at 1.

40. The cities of Salem, Provo and Spanish Fork may be acquiring some additional water
supply from rights held by the Utah Municipal Power Agency (UMPA). These are all members
of UMPA. The agency acquired some rights in Spring Creek that it no longer needs and has
offered the water to its members.
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TRINIDAD PROJECT, COLORADO

TRINIDAD PROJECT, COLORADO
Background

Project Costs

The Trinidad Dam and Reservoir
Project is located on the Purgatoire River in
southeastern Colorado, approximately three
miles upstream from the City of Trinidad (see
Figure TR-1). Prompted by a 1955 flood that
extensively damaged the City of Trinidad,

The project's total construction costs

were estimated at $21,980,000.
Of this
amount, $15,544,400 was allocated to flood

control and fish and wildlife purposes and
$6,435,600 was
allocated
to
irrigation
purposes.

Actual construction costs totalled
$44,910,000.
The participating irrigation
water users agreed to reimburse the Bureau
the $6,435,600 originally attributed to the

Congress authorized the project's construction
in 1958.1

irrigation portion. This leaves about $37.5
million in nonreimbursable costs allocated by

The project was originally planned for
flood control only, and was authorized for
construction by the Army Corps of Engineers.

the Corps of Engineers to flood control and
fish and wildlife purposes. To represent local
irrigation users and to establish the repayment
terms,
the
Purgatoire
River
Water
Conservancy District was formed.

Because of the long history of irrigation in
the area and the erratic nature of the
Purgatoire River flow, conservation storage
for irrigation was added to the final plan.
The project plan ultimately included fish and
wildlife and recreation purposes as well.
With a total reservoir storage capacity of
114,500 acre feet, 51,000 was allocated to

The repayment contract provides for
variable annual payments over a 70 year

period that commenced in 1985. As of 1989,
the irrigators had repaid $402,774, leaving a

flood control, 20,000 to irrigation, 4,500 to a
permanent fishery pool, and 39,000 to a joint

balance of $6,042,823 on their repayment
obligation.
Each of the ditch companies,
associations or corporations must pay the
district a share of the annual construction
repayment obligation.
Each user's annual
repayment obligation is fixed by their contract

use pool for both irrigation and sediment
accumulation.

For the project's irrigation features,
the Corps coordinated with the Bureau of
Reclamation.

with the District The contracts set forth a
formula for determining the obligation that
takes into consideration the user's priority,
the total amount of project water delivered
that year, and the amount of water delivered

The Bureau was assigned the

responsibility for negotiating and entering into
a repayment contract with the irrigation
users.2
Operating Principles, intended to
obtain a

to the user that year.

maximum beneficial use of irrigation storage,3
were drafted and became exhibits to the
repayment contract The Governor of Kansas
proposed five conditions to be added to the
principles to protect Kansas water users from
flow depletions.
These conditions were
approved by the Conservancy District

The District is also responsible to the
Corps of Engineers for its share of the
operation, maintenance and replacement
(0,M&R) costs associated with the project
The

water

users

themselves

will

be

responsible for the annual O,M&R charges if
revenues received from the City of Trinidad
and available from the District's annual ad
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to

cover

the

The reservoir capacity has also been
filled by out of priority inflows to the
reservoir
that
were
exchanged
with

Water Rights

transmountain
water.
Some
of this
transmountain water was purchased in 1980

The Trinidad Project is unusual
among federal projects in that the project
water rights are entirely based on preexisting
water rights owned by the ditch companies;

by the City of Trinidad for the permanent
fishery pool, discussed ahead. Since this time,
Purgatoire River flows above Trinidad
Reservoir have periodically been stored out

no new rights were established for the project
itself. The companies assigned regulation and
management of the water rights to the
District but retained title.
The District

of priority under the direction of the Division
Engineer, -and an equivalent quantity of

transmountain water simultaneously delivered
to John Martin Reservoir.7

acquired some storage rights, and the City of
Trinidad acquired some storage and direct
flow rights.

Allocation ofproject water
Direct flow water rights are managed

Description of project water rights

by the District except when the irrigation

capacity of the reservoir is empty.5 When the
reservoir capacity is empty the District
relinquishes its control and the individual

Project water includes both direct flow
and storage rights. The water rights of 11
ditch companies totalling about 650 cfs were

irrigators

assigned to the District for administration.

temporarily

exercise

their

rights

under the priority system.

These rights have been the basis of irrigation
in this area for many years and are tied to
the irrigation of about 19,717 acres of land.
Three ditch companies withheld a portion of

Project water is to be equitably
allocated to each acre of the District's
irrigable area in wet years and dry years with

their water rights from the project, and
instead take their rights as they did before
under the priority system on the river.9 As

two exceptions.9
First, since the Model
Company was providing essential water
storage rights to the project, the company was

part of the project development plan, the

granted the exclusive use of 6,000 acre feet
of storage space within the irrigation capacity
of Trinidad Reservoir, for storing water, as
available.10
Second, under the District's

Model
Land
and
Irrigation
Company
transferred to the District ownership of its
20,000 acre feet Model Reservoir storage
decree which has a rate of flow not to exceed
700 cfs. The District also filed for and was
decreed a 39,300 acre feet conditional storage
right under what is referred to as the "joint

use" or "silt control section" decree.

Contract with the Hoehne Ditch Company
the District must deliver 95 percent of the
irrigation requirements of the Hoehne Ditch

Company's 1,200 irrigable acres.11

The

Pursuant to the guidelines in the
Operating Criteria, the District's rules and
regulations set out the distribution procedures

decree allows for the storage in Trinidad
Reservoir, in addition to the transferred
Model right, any flood flows originating on

for the project water supply. Specifically, the

the Purgatoire River above Trinidad Dam

District distributes water to ten ditch
companies, two water users' associations and
one corporation. Each year, by March 1,
each company notifies the District of the

that would otherwise spill from John Martin

Reservoir.6
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number of irrigable acres that will require
water during the irrigation season. Normally,
the irrigation company will request water for

for the permanent pool.
The nonproject
water rights are Antonio Lopez Ditch rights
acquired by the Corps of Engineers in the

the

1960s in connection with lands condemned
for the bed of the reservoir. These rights

maximum number of irrigable acres,
although individual farmers may decide not to
plant all of their irrigable acres. The District
then allocates water to the companies
according to a formula that factors in the
minimum aggregate water supply expected to
be available. If there is more runoff than
anticipated, additional allotments are made
available.

were first leased to the State of Colorado for
use in the permanent pool and then
subleased to the City as part of the 1978
contract
The change of water right
applications for both the nonproject and
project water rights are pending, and are
discussed below.

Permanent fishery pool

As a short term solution, the city has
worked out a temporary supply plan with the
State Engineer to use 140 acre feet of the

Under
the
project
Operating
Principles, 4,500 acre feet of reservoir
capacity is allocated to fishery and recreation.
The State of Colorado is responsible for
acquiring the water needed for the original
filling of this permanent pool, as well as for
subsequent
fillings
and
replacement of
evaporation and seepage losses.

Antonio Lopez Ditch rights acquired by the
Corps.
This is nonproject water and the
temporary supply plan will likely be agreeable
to the State Engineer on a temporary basis
for the next few years but this will not be

sufficient for the pool after 1991. The 140
acre feet covers about one half of the

However,

evaporation and seepage losses and the city
anticipates needing to implement its long
term plan by 1992.

the water for the fishery pool may not
interfere with the District water supply or
create any additional financial burden to the
District or United States.12

Trinidad Project Transfers

In 1978, the state contracted with the
City of Trinidad to have the City assume

As mentioned above, the Trinidad
Project was planned primarily for flood

responsibilities for the permanent pool. The

control and irrigation purposes. The small
amount (4,500 AF) of water to be stored as
a fishery pool was to come from nonproject
supplies. Future municipal use by the City of
Trinidad or any other entity was generally

City has been working on acquiring the
necessary water supply since this time. As
mentioned
above,
the
City
purchased
transmountain water in 1980, and has been
supplying the pool with out of priority river

recognized by the enabling legislation", but

diversions in exchange for simultaneous
releases of the transmountain water. This

not contemplated by the Operating Principles
or Operating Criteria. Future use by the City
of Trinidad was recognized in the project
Repayment Contract

transmountain supply is nearly depleted. The
City is working on obtaining a more
permanent water supply for the pool, and has
recently implemented a temporary supply

The City of Trinidad is now seeking
to change the use of its project water rights.
Additionally, a group of users are looking at
the sale of project water to the state to
expand the fishery pool in Trinidad Reservoir,

plan.
The city's long term plan is to convert

nonproject water rights, and some project
water rights in the Johns Flood Ditch for use
191

develop wetlands and for fish propagation.

In a 1981 agreement between the City
Trinidad and the Model Company,

Other ditch companies in the project have

of

indicated that they are willing to consider a
sale of their ditch rights that are part of the
project to nonirrigation users.

Trinidad exchanged its shares of Model
Company stock for (1) direct flow water

rights and shares of stock in the Johns Flood
Ditch Company (representing the water for
about 1,000 acres of land); (2) contractual

City of Trinidad change application

rights to project water associated with those
water rights; and (3) a prior right to 500 acre
feet out of Model Company's 1,200 acre feet

The City of Trinidad owns both direct
flow and storage project water rights that it

storage account in Trinidad Reservoir.

The
City's primary purpose in acquiring Model
Company stock in the mid 1960s was to gain
project approval. However, even then the
City also had the intention of acquiring the

acquired from the District and from the
Model Land and Irrigation Company (See

Table TR-1).
From the District, the City
purchased 3,000 acre feet of storage in the
joint use pooL

In order to overcome the

associated water rights for possible future

Model Company's resistance to the Trinidad
project, the City purchased 51 percent of the
Company's stock, thereby acquiring an
interest in both direct flow and storage water

municipal and industrial uses.

rights.

Table TR-1

Interest of City of Trinidad in Project Water Rights
Priority

Number

5.

Priority Date

Amount

Name

3-20-1862

2.0 cts.

Johns Flood

Nature of Interest

Model Company
conveyance of 2.0
cts. of their 5.0
cfls. water rights

9

1-14863

1.28 c.£s.

15

4-10-1864

20

10-7-1865
5-31-1866
10-20-1902

3.42 c£s.
4.95 cXs.
2.25 cts.
100.0 c.f.s.

500 AF

27
145

■ |

I

. i

'1

Old Riley Dunton
Salaz North
Hoehne

conveyed 242 shares

Salaz North EnL

representing 60% of

?

Johns Rood

the stock and project
water of the Johns
Rood Ditch

!

Model Account

500 AF of the first

Model Co.

in Johns Rood Ditch

1,200 AF of water
stored or storable
in the Model Account
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The City of Trinidad has recently filed
an application for a change of its project
water rights. The City seeks to change (1)
the type of use from agriculture to municipal;
(2) the point of diversion; and (3) the place

the Picketwire company has been negotiating
with the Colorado Division of Wildlife
regarding a sale of their water rights to the
Division for use in game preserves and for
fish propagation.
The Division plans to

of use.
At the same time, the city has
proposed amendments to the Operating
Principles and the Operating Criteria to
reflect the change to municipal and industrial
use. Kansas is reviewing the City's proposed
amendments
as provided
in
the
five
conditions of approval of the Operating
Principles.

acquire Picketwire Ditch Company lands and
possibly other nearby lands to be used as
game preserves, and the acquired water would
be used in connection with these preserves
and to expand the permanent fishery pool in
Trinidad Reservoir.

The Bureau sees three requirements
that would be necessary before such a
transfer could be final First, the repayment
contract, which does not provide for this type

In addition to the usual change case
issues relating to quantification and terms and
conditions under which the change will be
administered, this case presents an interesting
additional issue: whether quantification of
project water for the purpose of transfers
should be based on irrigable acres, on
underlying direct flow water rights, or some
combination of the two.
The Operating
Principles require the District to allocate
project water to the ditches within the

of use, would need to be amended to allow
this use. Second, the Operating Principles
and Operating Criteria would have to be
amended to permit the new use. This would
require approval by Kansas, as well as the

Bureau
and
the
District
Finally,
environmental compliance will be required
under NEPA. Because of the need to amend
the repayment contract, and because wetlands

have been created as a result of historical
irrigation practices, compliance will likely
require at least an environmental assessment

District so that each acre of land receives an
equitable share of project supply.14 Under

the Principles, individual water right priorities
become relevant only when the reservoir
capacity is empty and
the water is
administered under the original priorities.13

with possible mitigating conditions attached to

the transfer. The Bureau has not yet decided
whether the repayment terms would change.17

The City of Trinidad, however, points to the
The Conservancy District will not
oppose the change if there is no harm to the
local economy and to the other project water

contracts between the ditch companies and

the District in support of their position that
water rights must also be owned in

The Picketwire Ditch Company is a

users. The District anticipates three potential
problem areas.
The first has to do with
changes in return flow patterns.
The
Picketwire Ditch is the highest ditch on the
north side of the project service area. The
Picketwire Ditch's return flows currently feed
into several down gradient ditches. Also, to

consortium of mutual ditch companies that
collectively own 99.21 cfs of ditch rights that

the extent the transfer dries up the
Picketwire lands, there will be an impact on

are part of the Trinidad Project These water
rights have historically been used for

the water table in the lower lands. Secondly,
the District will need to consider the long
term effect firom increasing the capacity of

proportion to irrigable lands as a prerequisite

to project entitlement16
Picketwire Ditch Company proposed

transfer

irrigation purposes.

Since the fall of 1989,
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the

permanent

fishery

pool

in

accordance with

Trinidad

recommendations

of

the

Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army,
published in House Document 325. These

Reservoir. Such use may impair the District's
ability to fully utilize its rights under the
Model storage decree and the joint use or
sediment control section decree. Finally, as

recommendations included recognition of
other project benefits, such as fish and
wildlife and recreation.22 They also suggest

mentioned above, there may be economic
harm from a change in the tax base because

that the project may provide a water supply

irrigated lands are assessed higher than
nonirrigated lands.
There may also be
increased maintenance charges assessed by
the Corps of Engineers for maintaining a

for possible future domestic and industrial

fuller reservoir.18

water supply storage in the Trinidad
Reservoir project, a small storage reserve
could be made available."24

uses.23
Municipal storage space in the
reservoir was anticipated: " (T]f it is deemed
advisable in the future to provide municipal

The
Picketwire
Ditch
Company
anticipates having to jump through several
procedural hoops before the transfer would
be final. These include obtaining approval of
(1) shareholders in the consolidated ditch
companies; (2) the Bureau of Reclamation;

In a discussion of the recreational and
fish and wildlife aspects of the project, House
Document 325 illustrates that administrators
and Congress were aware of the demand for

nonirrigation uses of project water, but were
also concerned about impairing the already

(3) the District: (4) the Colorado Water
Court; and (5) the State of Kansas. The
latter approval, necessary because the

insufficient irrigation water supply:

Operating Criteria and Operating Principles
must be. amended, is expected to present the

[T]he reliable water supply
available for irrigation in the
project area would satisfy only
84 percent of the estimated

most
difficult
obstacle.
The
other
requirements are seen as cumbersome but not
prohibitive.19

requirements in the project
area.
Since the demand

The State Division of Wildlife expects
to share the financial risk of obtaining all the
necessary approvals. If negotiations proceed

exceeds supply to this extent,
water for any additional [type
of] use could be obtained only
by transfer from some present

as expected, the state will probably front
money to the Picketwire Company to cover
legal and engineering expenses that will be
incurred in connection with gaining the

use.23

federal, state and local approvals. This outlay
would then be deducted from the final
purchase price. The Division sees its role in
obtaining the necessary approvals as primarily
one of financial assistance.

This language would seem to be strong
support for transfers of project water from

irrigation to nonirrigation uses.
Even without a clear Congressional
authorization for municipal use, the 1939
Reclamation Project Act provides authority
for the Bureau to make water available to
municipal use provided certain conditions are
met The Bureau must determine that the

Restrictions on change of purpose of
use

The Trinidad project is authorized for
navigation or flood control20 and irrigation
purposes.21 The project was authorized in

new use will not impair the efficiency of the
project for irrigation.26 The Bureau will likely
194
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require proof that the previously irrigated
lands are dried up, and that there are
conditions attached to the transfer if

power

necessary to prevent harm to the remaining
irrigators.

Principles and Operating Criteria, is likely to
be raised in the pending Colorado water

approval of the proposed changes.30

issue,

whether Kansas
over

changes

has
to

This

absolute veto
the

Operating

court cases.

The repayment contract specifically
acknowledges that the City owns a portion of
project water rights that are intended for
future use, should the City's population
grow.37 However, for any new type of use,
the Operating Principles and Operating
Criteria would need to be amended. This
likely presents a minor obstacle in terms of
Bureau approval but may present a major
transfer barrier if it is determined that Kansas
has a veto power over proposed amendments.
Whether Kansas has such power appears to
be an issue in the pending transfer
negotiations and proceedings,38 and is tied to

Regardless of whether the proposed
new use is municipal or fish propagation,
change of use applications would need to be
filed with the state Water Court Many of
the water rights decrees representing project
water limit the type of use to irrigation.

These decrees would need to be changed,
where necessary, to permit new types of uses.
The City of Trinidad has already initiated the
change process for Johns Flood Ditch water
rights, as discussed above.
While the
Colorado water courts have no authority to

change
the
Operating
Principles
and
Operating Criteria, as a practical matter the

the pending Kansas v. Colorado litigation.

court cannot approve a change decree unless

In December of 1985, Kansas filed a
complaint alleging that Colorado and its water

the decree is compatible with the language of
the Operating Principles and Operating
Criteria.31

users had materially depleted the usable and
available stateline flows of the Arkansas River
in violation of the compact. Deliberations

Any change of use that anticipates use

recently commenced in federal court in
California, and Kansas filed a motion asking
the Special Master to prohibit the Colorado

beyond the irrigation season will also require
a change in the District's rules to permit
carryover storage. Currently, any water that

courts from going forward with cases filed in

has been allotted to a Ditch Company and
remains unused at the end of the irrigation
season reverts to the Project Account for
reallpcation in the next irrigation season.32
This is likely no problem for the City of
Trinidad's use of Johns Flood Ditch water,
because of the 1966 agreement between the
District and the City that grants the City up
to 3,000 acre feet of carryover storage in the
reservoir.33 If the Picketwire transfer requires
carryover storage, the District expects that all
remaining irrigation users will demand a

state water court regarding Trinidad Project
water.
One of these cases is the City of
Trinidad application to change the use of its
project water rights.
The Special Master
refused to order a stay of any Colorado

proceedings indicating that the issues are not
the same as the issues pending in the federal
case.29
The
most
significant
effect
on
transfers of the Kansas v. Colorado litigation
may be Kansas's unwillingness to consider
proposed changes in the Operating Principles

change in operations to give each user a
separate account and allow carryover storage.

and Operating Criteria until the federal case
is final. There has been some suggestion that
Kansas may not unreasonably withhold

Separate

accounts

conservation.

would

Under the

also

encourage

current

system,

many users would rather apply water that may
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receive project water, and at the same time
they do not have typical water rights
ownership interests.

not be beneficially needed than lose it to the
general Project Account at the end of the
irrigation season.

The

Limitations on change ofplace of use
The authorizing legislation does not
describe
the
place
of use,
but
the

accompanying House document describes the
project area:
The

project

Picketwire

Ditch

Company

anticipates two issues related to defining the
user's interest First, what is the farmers or
shareholders' title, or what do they have to
sell. Although they have retained title to the
direct flow water rights, the title is subject to
their agreement with the District Second, if
the former or ditch company no longer has a
use for their allotted share of project water,

area—comprises

about 19,500 acres of presently
irrigated land in the valley of
the Purgatoire River, from the
Trinidad dam site downstream
to the mouth of San Francisco
Creek.
The bulk of the
project land is north and east
of Trinidad on the rolling
plains area.34

does the allotment revert to the general
Project Account for reallocation to other
ditch companies and farmers within the
District?
There is a District rule that
prohibits carryover storage; any part of an
allotment remaining unused at the end of the
irrigation season reverts to the Project
Account for reallocation in the next irrigation

season.37 However, there is another rule that
The

Picketwire

transfers

allows a user to transfer all or part of his
allotment to other irrigable lands within the
District The original allottee remains liable
for his share of the construction cost
payment3*

may,

however, require that the District allow a
special carryover account
The project
Operating Principles seem to limit the

distribution of the irrigation capacity in
Trinidad Reservoir to the "District irrigable
area." The District irrigable area is defined
as "only the 19,717 acres of class 1, 2 and 3
irrigable lands to be served lying within
District boundaries."35
The water rights
managed by the District can be used on any
lands within
the
District for
project
36
purposes"

Adjustment to repayment obligation and

profits
The Bureau believes it would be
difficult
to
increase
the
construction
obligation for municipal use by the City of
Trinidad unless the Repayment Contract was

reopened. The current contract recognizes
future municipal use by the City and says
nothing about increasing the cost
The
contract does provide, however, that the

Nature of interest held by water user
As mentioned above, the Trinidad
Project is unusual among federal reclamation
projects in that all project water rights had
been previously held and used by the users.
The ditch companies have transferred the
management of these rights to the District,
but retained
their ownership
interest

District must pay interest at the rate of 3.225

percent per annum on the portion of the
remaining unpaid balance of the District's
repayment obligation that is attributable to
the City's municipal use of project water.39

Because of this unusual arrangement, the

The Bureau has not been a party to

users do not have merely a contract right to

any of the
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Picketwire

Ditch

Company

-

Division of Wildlife negotiations to date.40
Neither the Bureau nor the Corps of
Engineers has decided whether there will be
a reallocation of costs if the parties agree to

the transfer. Any reallocation may depend on
whether

existing
Bureau
contracts
are
amended or new Bureau contracts entered.

Use by the Division of project water will
likely require
an amendment
to
the
repayment contract to allow this new type of
use, thus opening the possibility of a
reallocation of construction costs. If there
are amendments to the contract or a new
contract is entered the NEPA process may be
triggered, requiring an assessment of the
environmental effects of the agency action.41

the

While the District is concerned that
parties to transfers of project water

adequately
compensate
the
remaining
irrigators for harm caused by a change in the
tax base and any increased maintenance costs,
the District has no plans to make the
transferees pay an increased construction
repayment obligation.

Effect of the Reclamation Reform Act

By special statutory exemption in
1982, the Trinidad Project is no longer
subject to federal reclamation laws related to

land classification or acreage limitations.43
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ENDNOTES

1. Rood Control Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-500, § 203, 72 Stat 297, 309 (amended by the
Act of Oct 27), 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 stat 1073, 1079.
2. See ILR. Doc No. 325, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (hereinafter House Doc. 325).
3.

See Report of the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, in House Doc. 325, at 4.

4. See Rules & Regulation of the Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District (hereinafter
District Rules), at Section 12.

5. Sre U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Review of Operating

Principles, Final Report at 42-43 (1988) (hereinafter 1988 Review of Operating Principles).
The withheld water rights are tied to about 278 acres of land
6.

W. at 5. Storage is limited to the portion of the 39,300 acre feet of reservoir capacity that
is unoccupied by sediment This 39,300 acre feet is projected to fill with sediment over the
project repayment term.

J
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7. As of December of 1990, the City had only 90 acre feet left of the 14,000 acre feet
purchased in 1980. Exchange potential is really rare and requires a great surplus of water

,
i

permanent fishery pool.

,

supply. Therefore, it is not a viable long term solution to providing the water needed for the
8.

"Empty reservoir capacity" is determined by the District according to specific factors set out

*
*

in the Operating Criteria in Part E.

9. See Operating Principles at C.I and Operating Criteria at Part B. In many years, the

I

Trinidad Project has insufficient water to supply the full irrigation requirement of all project
lands. See Baca Ditch Co. v. Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist, Case. No. 86CW25,
Water Div. No. 2, Dist Court of Colo., Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and
Decree (March 15, 1989), at 17 [hereinafter 1989 Decree].

10.

See Operating Criteria, at Part A 2. The water stored in this 6,000 acre feet is referred to

as the Model Account and receives preferential treatment in filling during the irrigation and
nonirrigation seasons. Id. at Part C 2.
11. See Contract Between the Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District and the Hoehne
Ditch Company dated Nov. 26, 1966. This contract has been interpreted to require the District
to insure the delivery of 5,028 acre feet of water to the headgate of the Hoehne Ditch. See
1989 Decree, supra at 21.

12.

Seje Operating Principles at Art V.

13. See House Doc. 325, at 7 and 32
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14.

See Operating Principles at Article IV C.2.

15.

Id. at Article IV, D.3(c).

16. The pertinent language reads: "[water] shall be delivered by the Company only...[t]o those
who, by reason of ownership, lease or otherwise, control the use of as many snares of the
Company's stock, in relation to the number of acres of the Company's irrigable area they may
irrigate, as may be necessary to assure the equitable delivery from the Company's ditch system
of a sufficient amount of water, within crop requirements, for the proper irrigation of their
land;" e.g.. Contract Between the Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District and the Model
Land and Irrigation Company, dated May 28, 1966, at 6-7.

17. Telephone conversation with Don Quakenbush, Contract and Repayment Specialist,
Eastern Colorado Projects Office, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Oct. 24 and 31, 1990).
18. Telephone conversation with M.E. (Sandy) MacDougall, Attorney for Purgatoire River
Water Conservancy District (Nov. 7, 1990).
19. Telephone conversation with William Mattoon, Attorney for the Picketwire Ditch Company
(Oct 31, 1990).
20.

Pub. L No. 85-500, 72 Stat. 297.

21.

Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073, 1079.

22.

See House Doc. 325, at 34.

23.

House Doc. 325, at 7.

24.

House Doc. 325, at 32.

25.

House Doc. 325, at 31.

26.

43 U.S.C. § 485 h(c).

27. See Contract between the United States and the Purgatoire River Water Conservancy
District, dated Feb. 10, 1967, at 17 (hereinafter Repayment Contract). This contract was

amended Aug. 1, 1986 (hereinafter Amended Repayment Contract).

28. Telephone conversations with David Harrison, Attorney for the City of Trinidad, William
Mattoon, Attorney for the Picketwire Ditch Company and Grady McNeil, Colorado Division of
Wildlife (Oct-Nov., 1990).
29. Telephone conversation with M.E. (Sandy) MacDougall, Attorney for the Purgatoire River
Water Conservancy District (Sept. 24, 1990).

30.

Specifically, the Bureau has stated that "Kansas is obligated to approve any proposed
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amendment that will not cause 'material depletion' in the context of the Arkansas River

Compact"

Se£ 1988 Review of Operating Principles, at 25.

31.

Meeting with David Harrison, Attorney for City of Trinidad (June 21, 1990).

32.

See District Rules, at Section 7.

33. See Agreement between the City of Trinidad and Purgatoire River Water Conservancy
District dated April 20, 1966, at Exhibit A, § 15(a).
34.

House Doc 325, at 19-20.

35.

See Operating Principles at Article II (10).

36. This is implied from the court's decision in Purgatoire v. Kuiper, 197 Colo. 200, 593 P.2d
333 (1979).
37.

District Rules, at Section 7.

38.

Id., at Section 9.

39.

Repayment Contract, at § 14.

40. The Picketwire Ditch Company did contact the Bureau before negotiations began and
asked generally whether it would be legal for the Company to sell their water rights. The
Bureau advised the Company that the approval process would likely be complex, but that there
was no prohibition on such a sale. Telephone conversation with Tom Gibbens, Chief; Water
and land Operations Division, Eastern Colorado Projects Office, Bureau of Reclamation (Jan. 9,
1991).

41. Telephone conversation with Don Quakenbush, Contract and Repayment Specialist,
Eastern Colorado Projects Office, Bureau of Reclamation (Oct 24, 1990).
41 See 96 Stat 1269, 43 U.S.C § 3901L
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